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Abstract 
The thesis argues that  responsive governance can be achieved  through institutions that 
increase civic influence upon policy agendas. Participatory-deliberative processes (PDPs) are 
understood to offer mechanisms for democratic responsiveness. However, the ways in the 
outcomes of (PDPs) can be linked to policy making has received little attention, especially at 
higher governance tiers. The thesis analyses a PDP set up to influence central government 
policy agendas in the UK; the Sustainable Communities Act (SCA) (2007).The SCA was 
selected for its analytically relevant features. It differs from other PDPs for a combination of 
three reasons: (a) it was specifically designed to allow citizens to identify policy problems, 
develop policy proposals and influence agendas; (b) it operated across governance levels, 
connecting local participation to national policy development; and (c) it institutionalised a 
link to the policy process. The thesis aims to evaluate the processes through which 
proposals were developed and integrated within policy development, with a view to 
assessing impacts upon ambitions for more responsive governance.  
 
The analysis finds achievements such as the importance of reflexive agenda setting 
processes that allow participants to explore and (re)define problems, as well as the 
realisation of a form of responsiveness characterised by a deliberative, rather than a causal, 
relation between input and output. However, modest achievements are marred by 
important problems. First, proposal development processes were prone to ‘capture’ by the 
political priorities of local authorities and interest group representatives. In this respect, the 
analysis concludes that the SCA often resembled a ‘lobbying tool’ for local elites. Second, 
when it came to integrating proposals within policy development, SCA proposals were 
subsumed by the policy development, electoral and legislative cycles of representative 
institutions. Such constraints are real, but not absolute, and can be mitigated through 
institutional design. The thesis ends by making recommendations to this end. 
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1. The Sustainable Communities Act: A Novel 
Democratic Innovation 
 
 
Democratic governance does not consist just in the 
powers of citizen election or majority decision, but in the 
continuous flow of information between governors and 
the governed.  
Paul Hirst (1994: 20). 
 
In his seminal work Democracy and its Critics, Dahl (1989: 337-338) expressed the important 
concern that the ‘growing gap that separates the policy elites from the demos’ may lead to 
‘grafting of the symbols of democracy to the de facto guardianship of the policy elites’. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century this preoccupation incited a ‘revival of interest in 
the study of democracy’ (Shapiro 2003: 2). Spearheaded by scholars seeking to find new 
ways in which civic participation in political life could be increased and improved (Pateman 
1970; Habermas 1984; Barber 2003), these developments have not been limited to 
academic debate but have also been reflected in democratic practice. Over recent decades 
there has been widespread experimentation with new political institutions aiming to 
develop a more democratic and co-operative division of labour between the demos and 
political elites (Smith 2005; Fischer 2009). Thus, ‘democratic innovations’ (Smith 2009), 
‘collaborative governance’ (Ansell and Gash 2007) and ‘participatory-deliberative processes’ 
(Hoppe 2010) have proliferated throughout the world (Fung and Warren 2011) seeking to 
increase the influence of citizens and other non-state actors over the development of policy 
or the management of public resources in a variety of policy areas. 
 
Advocates of these institutions argue that they offer great potential to both ‘deepen’ 
democracy and improve policy making (Fung and Wright 2003; Fung 2006). However, our 
knowledge of these, especially when compared to those traditional institutions which have 
formed the ‘bread and butter’ of democratic theory and political science for most of the 20th 
century (see e.g. Norris 2008), is relatively shallow (Fung and Warren 2011). One approach 
has sought to evaluate these processes and establish the different contributions to 
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democratic governance which they can make (Fung 2003; 2006; Smith 2009; Sirianni 2009). 
A second, perhaps less developed, approach has sought to establish the conditions 
necessary for effective implementation and explain outcomes through comparative analysis 
(Acharya, Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2006; Ryan and Smith 2012). Although these are by 
no means mutually exclusive, this thesis follows the first of these approaches. Arguably, 
more work has been done in this area, but it is still ripe for analysis because different kinds 
of processes are being experimented with that function in different ways and contribute 
differently to governance (Smith 2005; Fung and Warren 2011). Thus, the ways in which 
participatory and deliberative innovations can contribute to the democratic governance has 
by no means been fully mapped out. 
 
Prior to beginning this research, I worked for an advocacy organisation (‘Local Works’ – see 
http://www.localworks.org) which campaigns for democratic decentralisation and 
participatory governance in the UK. It was through my experience there that that I became 
acquainted with the case under study in this thesis – the Sustainable Communities Act 
(2007, henceforth SCA). The SCA is an interesting PDP to consider because its institutional 
design1 differs from the existing population of PDP’s in analytically relevant ways. As will be 
explained over the following pages, it is a rare example of an innovation which (a) is 
specifically designed to allow citizens to define problems and influence agendas that (b) that 
spans a wide breadth of institutional scales by (c) institutionalising a link between local 
participation and central government policy making. As such, an in-depth study of its 
implementation has much to reveal regarding the contributions that PDPs can make to 
democratic governance. 
 
The rest of this chapter begins by explaining the development and design of the SCA. It then 
goes onto explaining in greater detail why its design differs from the very many other 
democratic innovations that have been surveyed by scholars in this field (Fung 2003; Smith 
2005; 2009) and how it has the potential to improve democratic governance in the UK. The 
                                                     
1
 Skelcher and Torfing (2010: 72) provide an apt definition of institutional design as ‘the development and 
embedding of rules and norms that enable and constrain actors’ agency, whether this is a result of purposive 
action or evolving of patterns of behaviour’. Thus, as Cornwall and Coelho (2007: 8), in refernce to  scholars 
such as Fung (2003), explain ‘institutionalists have argued that the key to enhancing participation is to be 
found in better institutional designs: in rules and decision-making processes that encourage actors to 
participate’. 
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chapter then ends by providing an outline of the thesis and a summary of the findings and 
argument developed throughout. 
1.1 The Origins of the SCA: ‘Ghost Town Britain’ 
 
The SCA originated as a recommendation in a research report by the New Economics 
Foundation to tackle problems of local community decline in the UK (Simms et al 2002; 
Oram, Conisbee and Simms 2003). The ‘Ghost Town Britain’ reports charted the decline in 
important amenities and local services such as independently owned pubs, local bank 
branches, post office branches and a variety of different kinds of independent retailers. Far 
from being an inevitable consequence of economic globalisation, NEF put this down to 
favourable policy treatment of business interests by central government, including 
permissiveness regarding market domination by large supermarkets, the prioritisation of 
car-based travel infrastructure and favourable planning controls on large commercial 
developments. The reports argued that the vitality and diversity of local economies was 
under serious threat by these developments. They identified a host of pernicious social, 
environmental and economic consequences, such as increased CO2 emissions, increases in 
poor nutrition and ill health, the loss of financial literacy as people lose touch with trade on 
a daily basis within the community, the rise in overpriced and low quality consumer goods, 
the loss of routes back to employment for the local unemployed and the impoverishment of 
local cultural and retail environments (Simms et al 2002; Oram, Conisbee and Simms 2003).2 
1.1.1 The Purpose of the SCA 
NEF argued that successive governments had limited themselves to implementing fairly 
marginal initiatives which did not resolve the fundamental cause of these phenomena: 
preferential policy treatment of big business interests. Thus, NEF proposed some changes in 
government policy, pointing to a series of measures which would serve to counteract these 
trends, aiming to advance local social and environmental sustainability whilst also 
                                                     
2
 Moreover, in a later report NEF documented a related development occurring on local high streets which 
remained economically active. These local economies had become increasingly dominated by identikit chain 
stores, replacing local enterprises and leading to the emergence of what NEF called ‘clone town Britain’ 
(Simms, Kjell and Potts, 2005). Thus, economic activity on those high streets which had survived the processes 
outlined previously is itself increasingly dominated by similar big businesses. The most recent survey results 
(Cox et al 2010) found that despite widespread publicity of NEF’s research and increased government 
attention to the loss of local diversity and identity, the trend towards ‘ghost’ and ‘clone towns’ continues 
unabated. 
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protecting local economies and the vitality of local communities. In its first ‘Ghost Town’ 
report, NEF (Simms et al 2002) called for policy initiatives such as stronger competition 
legislation, tax incentives for local businesses stocking local produce, increased rate relief 
for small businesses and even experimentation with local or regional currencies to support 
local production and consumption. However, compounding these calls for government 
legislation, the reports argued that changes in central government policy were not 
sufficient. NEF were keen to promote the idea that sustainable solutions to these problems 
require greater participation in decision making by local communities. Thus, one of the 
major proposals from the NEF reports was a call for the ‘Local Communities Sustainability 
Bill’; a mechanism which would devolve significant power to councils over local economic 
development policy (Simms et al 2002: 56) and which constituted the first version of what 
would become the Sustainable Communities Act in 2007. The Bill sought to avoid creating a 
further layer of bureaucracy. Instead of prescribing centrally imposed policies, the Bill 
sought to allow councils to implement locally tailored solutions and looked to secure 
financial support from central government to enable them to do this. Councils would be 
expected to draw up their own targets according to locally defined indicators, such as 
‘amount of waste recycled, local jobs promoted or quantity of goods bought locally’ (Simms 
et al 2002: 50).  
 
Despite this important role for local councils, the proposed process also worked according 
to a bottom-up participatory philosophy. It sought to ‘actively encourage’ councils to engage 
their communities in coming up with proposals to advance local sustainability. As will be 
discussed in subsequent sections, the resulting Sustainable Communities Act (2007) would 
place a requirement on councils to implement participatory processes which demonstrated 
attempts to ‘try to reach agreement’ with the communities they serve. Moreover, NEF 
proposed that the bill should place a duty on the secretary of state to ‘look closely at the 
proposals’ developed by councils in collaboration with communities and ‘report back on 
how they can create the right circumstances for the plans to be implemented’. This is a 
crucial part of the Bill, which ended up being drafted in the final legislation (SCA 2007) as a 
duty for central government to ‘try to reach an agreement’ with councils on which proposals 
to implement.  
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1.1.2 Local Works: Campaigning to Implement the SCA 
Following the publication of the first ‘Ghost Town’ report in 2002, the idea of a Local 
Communities Sustainability Bill was adopted by campaigners who felt that the government’s 
democratic decentralisation agenda lacked ambition. They saw in NEF’s idea recognition 
that the centres of power in the British political system were too distant from local 
communities, preventing a full appreciation of the negative impacts community decline. 
Writing a local newspaper, the Rye and Battle Observer, Ron Bailey (Local Works Campaigns 
Director), provided an apt description of Local Work’s interpretation of the processes’ 
purpose: 
 
The decline of local communities - Ghost Town Britain - is going on 
everywhere. Often local citizens feel powerless to protect their communities 
due to forces that seem so distant. People have to watch vital local services 
and facilities like Post Offices and bank branches disappear whilst having no 
power to stop it. The Sustainable Communities Bill will change that by giving 
communities real power over policies affecting their own areas. What’s 
needed is a bottom-up approach - with local communities having more say in 
what happens at a local level - not a Whitehall top-down approach (quoted in 
Gay, Ares and Whittaker, 2007: 7). 
 
The Bill was essentially intended to put a process in place which could increase the influence 
of local communities over policy development and increase the flow of information 
between local and national tiers of government. As a respondent from Local Works put it: 
 
The philosophy behind the act is that local people are the experts on local 
problems and the solutions to them, so they should be driving the actions 
that government takes …If you accept this, you need to have a process in 
place whereby the ideas and suggestions that local people have … go forward 
to central government and drive those actions. And that is precisely what the 
Act is, it is that process put into Law (Interview 42, Local Works Campaigner 
A) 
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Campaigners were motivated by combating what they saw as a sense of ‘powerlessness’ 
amongst local communities, arising from the perceived inevitability of community decline. 
Campaign rhetoric framed the Bill as a response to widespread disaffection with 
consultative forms of participation, portrayed as essentially tokenistic hoop-jumping 
processes, and described in promotional material as being ‘synonymous with sham’. The 
idea was promoted as setting up a process ‘with teeth’ which went ‘beyond consultation’, 
giving communities a real opportunity to ‘fight back’ against community decline. Moreover, 
campaign rhetoric presented the ‘core philosophy’ of the Bill as the idea that ‘local citizens 
are the experts on their own problems and the solutions to them’. The proposed legislation 
thus aimed to provide a process through which local expertise could be channelled into the 
political decision making process. Civic participation could serve to improve the quality of 
decision making by making government more responsive to the needs of local 
communities.3 
 
NEF and Local Works made a clear connection between the issue of reversing community 
decline and the broader purpose of developing ‘sustainable communities’. They understood 
the first step in this process to be the reversal of the decline in local economies, services and 
communities highlighted in the Ghost Town reports. But their concerns also spanned to 
broader issues of environmental sustainability, social and economic inclusion and political 
participation. In this sense NEF (Simms, Kjell and Potts 2005: 32) described the aims of the 
process in broader terms as giving ‘local authorities, communities and citizens a powerful 
voice in planning their future to guarantee dynamic and environmentally sustainable local 
economies’. In the final wording of the Act, this broader focus was linked to the power to 
promote local ‘well-being’ in the Local Government Act (2000).4  
 
The campaign initiated in 2001 and focused on developing grassroots support for the 
process by co-ordinating mail based lobbying campaigns to pressurise central government 
actors to support the Bill and finding advocates within parliament to advance the legislation. 
It was firstly adopted as a private members’ bill by then Liberal Democrat MPs Sue Doughty 
                                                     
3
 All references taken from Local Works campaign promotional material 2007-2009. 
4
 As stated in the legislation, SCA policy proposals should aim to ‘encourage the economic, social or 
environmental well-being of the authorities area’. The legislation added ‘participation in civic and political 
activity’ to the definition of ‘social well-being’ in previous legislation (SCA 2007). 
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in 2002, and Julia Goldsworthy in 2005, but failed to make it through the legislative process, 
due to lack of support from the then Labour government. Due to the adoption of a more 
favourable attitude towards democratic decentralisation by the Labour government from 
2006 onwards (interview 21, DCLG Minister)5 the Bill was proposed as a private member’s 
bill by Conservative MP Nick Hurd in 2007, and passed with support from the three main 
parliamentary parties. 
1.1.3 The Design of the SCA 
The SCA set up a process whereby local authorities were provided with an opportunity to 
influence government agendas on the condition that they (a) ‘try to reach agreement’ on 
which ‘policy proposals’ to develop with (b) ‘a panel of local representatives’ that (c) 
featured ‘representatives from under-represented groups’ (see appendix item 3 for a more 
detailed outline of regulations). As the original bill proceeded through the legislative 
process, government officials expressed concern that the government might be flooded 
with inappropriate, or technically unviable, proposals. They thus argued for some kind of 
filtering process before the ‘try to reach an agreement’ process initiated at national level. 
Since they felt it would decrease the perceived legitimacy of the process if the government 
itself carried out this ‘filtering’ function, the government argued for the establishment of an 
independent body to asses and filter policy proposals. This resulted in the creation of a 
‘selector panel’, which was to be resourced by DCLG, constituted by councillors from the 
three main parties plus an independent councillor and supported by policy officers working 
for the Local Government Association.6 The ‘selector panel’ would firstly ensure that 
proposals met the requirements of the Act, possibly develop its own additional criteria, and 
then submit valid proposals to government. Finally, the relevant secretary of state and the 
selector panel would ‘try to reach an agreement’ on which proposals to implement. Figure 
four provides an illustration of this ‘double devolution’ process. 
 
 
                                                     
5
 One minister I interviewed who was involved in the design of the SCA process suggested that David 
Milliband’s (then minister of state for communities and local government) articulation of ‘double devolution’ 
policy, as well as John Prescott’s (then first secretary of state) focus on more devolved regional governance at 
the time had facilitated the adoption of a more sympathetic attitude by the government towards the 
Sustainable Communities Bill. 
6
 The LGA is a voluntary organisation widely recognised to represent local government in England and Wales 
(see www. lga.gov.uk) 
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Diagram 1: The SCA Double Devolution Process 
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As is clear from the diagram above, the SCA is essentially composed of different institutional 
layers seeking to abstract from the results of local participation and connect policy 
proposals to representative institutions at higher tiers of government. The analysis chapters 
of this thesis essentially trace the implementation of the process from the bottom up. There 
revolve around three key themes, which are to be outlined in detail in chapter two. First, 
the constitution of the local panels is analysed in chapter five, assessing their inclusiveness 
and evaluating the strength of the claims they could make to represent ‘local people’. 
Second, in chapter six different kinds of communication and forms of collaboration between 
participants and public officials are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in enabling 
participants and public officials to co-produce policy proposals. Finally, chapter seven 
presents an analysis of the implementation of the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’. It was 
through the operationalisation of the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ that an institutional 
link was made to policy development, effectively ‘integrating’ policy proposals within the 
policy development process of central government. 7 
1.2 The SCA’s Originality 
 
As should be clear from the process description above, the SCA aimed to enable the 
exploration of local problems and to integrate outcomes, in the form of policy proposals, 
within national policy development. This section consults the institutional design literature 
to demonstrate that the SCA is important and innovative case of participatory governance 
to consider for at least three reasons: (a) it is a relatively rare example of a PDP specifically 
designed to allow citizens to define problems and influence agendas that (b) spans a wide 
breadth of institutional scales by (c) institutionalising a link between local participation and 
central government policy making. Each of these aspects is considered in turn. 
1.2.1 A Participatory-Deliberative Agenda-Setting Process 
Hoppe (2010: 24-25) argues that the traditional ‘problem solving’ understanding of policy 
science presupposes a more or less established consensus on desirable ends and can thus 
focus on establishing the necessary means through the effective deployment of 
instrumental knowledge and expertise. Problems are understood as relatively well defined 
inputs or stimuli, existing independently of the policy process, to which policy makers 
                                                     
7
 For a more detailed account of the SCA’s requiremenets see appendix item 3. 
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respond in rational ways. However, as Bohman (1996: 117) explains, ‘power can be 
expressed in the way in which problems are defined and thus ‘framed’, often in such a way 
that the participatory success of powerful groups is ensured’. Their social significance, their 
meaning, causes, potential consequences, and the means deemed necessary to solve them 
are in no small part a result of the worldviews and framings underpinning their definition 
(Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 6-14).  
 
The development of PDPs has broadly followed a ‘problem-solving’ perspective, essentially 
limiting its role to the tip of a much larger iceberg (Hoppe 2010: 25). For example, in a 
review of institutional designs, Fung (2006: 67) conceptualises PDPs as a policy making 
instrument to be used in problematic areas where the traditionally ‘authorised set of 
decision makers … are somehow deficient’. In yet another widely cited article, Fung (2003: 
343) argues that the ‘choice of subject’ is a decision to be made by process designers. Thus, 
in PDPs participants usually develop preferences and/or make social choices on pre-
specified policy issues (see also Smith 2005). As a result, the potential for PDPs to allow 
citizens to explore, identify and articulate policy problems has remained under-explored 
(Parkinson 2006; Elstub 2010).  
 
This is an important gap for two reasons. First, control over scope and problem definition 
can be used by commissioning bodies in order to control, or restrain, the outcomes of PDPs 
(Burgess and Chilvers 2006; Parkinson 2006; Tucker 2008). Second, problem definition and 
agenda setting is a crucial part of political systems (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Cobb and 
Ross 1997; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 2011). Placing and maintaining a 
particular understanding of a political problem on the political agenda is a highly politicised 
and resource intensive process (Cobb and Elder 1972; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Cobb and 
Ross 1997). This is especially so at higher governance tiers where, greater entry costs 
decrease opportunities for the laity to influence the direction of politics. As a result, the 
policy process can be quite unresponsive to non-elite understandings, with clearly 
undemocratic implications (Barber 2003: 181, Parkinson 2006: 170-71). For this reason, 
public policy scholars have long posited that one way to evaluate the health of a political 
system is according to the responsiveness of the ‘formal agenda’ of public authorities to the 
issue and problem definitions that constitute the more diffuse ‘public agenda’ (Cobb and 
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Elder 1971; Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976)  In a similar vein, articulating a ‘problem finding’ 
perspective for policy science, Hoppe (2010: 24-25) argues that a key goal for contemporary 
democracies is to ‘develop more reflexive institutions and practices …  [that] … maintain 
sufficient congruence between problems perceived, experienced and framed by ordinary 
citizens and the ways these problems are reconstructed by proximate policy makers’. 
 
The SCA can be understood as an attempt to institutionalise one such process – it aimed to 
connect local problem definitions to national policy agendas. As such it is an important case 
to take into account when considering the potential for PDPs to close the gap between 
policy elites and the demos that Dahl saw as such a fundamental threat to democracy. 
1.2.2 A Multi-level PDP 
 
PDPs are mostly implemented at local, or regional, level (Smith 2009). This is especially so in 
the case of ‘collaborative governance’ (Ansell and Gash 2007) processes that establish a 
more ‘continuous and symbiotic relationship between the state and the public sphere’ 
(Fung 2003: 341) than one-off experiments, that are often consultative in nature (Goodin 
and Dryzek 2006). Local level processes do not suffer as acutely from problems of scale 
associated with direct citizen participation (Dahl 1989). Moreover, the kinds of citizen ‘local 
knowledge’ that PDPs are often valued for incorporating into policy development often 
relates to lived experience accrued in local contexts (Yanow 2003; Sirianni 2009) and thus it 
makes sense that PDPs are often designed to contribute to the solution of local problems. 
 
However, deliberative theorists have begun to question the local-level limitation of 
deliberative processes. For example, criticising the UK New Labour government’s 
democratic renewal agenda for ignoring national institutions and only focusing on 
democratisation at local level,  Smith (2009a: 261) has argued that government proposals 
were ‘a recipe for further disillusionment as significant political decisions are kept at arm’s 
length’. In a similar vein, Parkinson (2006: 177) argues that ‘to be more fully legitimate, 
deliberative democracy needs to be much bigger than local consultations on local issues. It 
needs to be integrated into central government as well’. Innovation at higher governance 
tiers of has been lacking; almost as if participation should know its local place (Wainwright 
2003). This local limitation obviously entails a big problem for the scope of participatory 
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democracy and the extent to which it can deliver upon ambitions for political renewal, 
better policy making and deepened democracy.  
 
For this reason, Parkinson (2006: 168-175) ends his important contribution to system-wide 
level theory of deliberative democracy with a sketch of institutional arrangements that 
could make policy development processes at superordinate tiers of government more 
responsive to citizen deliberation and participation. This is an important endeavour. A 
degree of centralisation in political systems is clearly necessary to enable resource 
maximisation, strategic action, knowledge transfer and equal standards (Fung and Wright 
2003) but centralised systems can be information poor and unresponsive to local 
circumstance (Scott 1998). It is in no small part for this reason that Hirst (1994: 20) argues 
that democracy is not characterised solely by ‘the powers of citizen election or majority 
decision, but in the continuous flow of information between governors and the governed’.  
 
The SCA sought to increase responsiveness by connecting local knowledge to the central 
policy process. This is the kind of information that centralised systems lack (Scott 1998). But 
centralisation need not necessarily imply ‘distance’. By connecting local problem definitions 
to national policy processes, the SCA aimed to make central policy development more 
responsive to local communities. Indeed, it was expected that the SCA would be related to 
and add in important ways to the structures of partnership and participatory governance 
which had been evolving during the New Labour era. As John Hemming then Liberal 
Democrat MP for Yardley, put it: 
 
community action plans, local area agreements and local strategic 
partnerships would all be more effective if they were plugged into a national 
action plan that was itself created through a bottom-up process … if they 
were clearly led by democratically elected local authorities with greater 
power to decide and freedom to innovate; and if they were constructed with 
the full engagement of the communities which they are there to help.8 
 
                                                     
8
 House of Commons Debate, Sustainable Communities Bill, 2
nd
 Reading, 19
th
 January 2007, column 1048. 
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An important aspect of the SCA can be understood as a process seeking to ‘join-up’ the 
complex ecology of collaborative governance which had been evolving at the local level with 
higher tiers of government.9 This is a potentially very valuable contribution. Democratic 
theorists have called for increased attention to processes with such ‘multi-level’ (Gaventa 
2004: 28; Stoker 2006: 174; Skelcher and Torfing 2010; Elstub 2013) and agenda setting 
(Parkinson 2006: 170; 2009; Elstub 2010) characteristics. It is thus important to understand 
how the SCA ‘linked’ governance levels, focusing on the processes used to develop 
proposals and to integrate these within policy agendas at national level, with a view to 
assess the contribution made to responsive governance and to draw out lessons for 
institutional design. 
1.2.3 A Statutorily Defined Link to Binding Decision  
 
PDPs tend to be consultative endeavours (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Pieczka and Escobar 
2012). As noted above, this is especially so regarding processes that relate to decision at 
higher governance tiers, since the problems of scale associated with direct citizen 
participation (Dahl 1989) make the definition of clearer links between the ‘mini-publics’ 
often convened in PDP’s and binding decision a problematic endeavour (Fung 2003; 
Parkinson 2003). Critics can legitimately ask ‘why should a sub-set of citizens enjoy 
privileged access to political agendas’? Even if we accept the argument that the process of 
deliberation which a subset of citizens are engaged in legitimates policy influence, the critic 
might further ask ‘on what basis can we hold this subset of citizens to account?’ (Parkinson 
2006: 5-8).  
 
It is perhaps for this reason that one of the main purposes of PDPs is to increase the input 
legitimacy of policy development. An important concern with such consultative processes is, 
as Hoppe (2011: 180) puts it, that they might ‘lend additional legitimacy to policies already 
considered, proposed and (almost) decided upon by the elites’ or, more pejoratively, that 
they ‘channel away urgent political issues from genuine debate in agonistic political settings 
                                                     
9
 Downes and Martin (2006: 485) refer to New Labour’s local government modernisation agenda as bearing 
‘many of the hallmarks of a classic evolutionary strategy which has been fine-tuned and adapted over time as 
circumstances have changed and the weaknesses of some of the initial proposals have become evident’. In this 
context the SCA can be historically situated as a contributor to a further round of reforms which deepened and 
expanded New Labour’s approach to participation in governance. 
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of political mobilisation and agenda building’ (see also Lee and Romano 2013). Nevertheless, 
in a few cases institutional designs have been developed that more clearly define the role 
which PDPs play in the policy process. The example of the British Columbian Citizen 
Assembly demonstrates that it is possible to design deliberative institutions that are 
empowered to make decisions at higher levels of decision. For example, Smith (2011) values 
the British Columbian Citizen Assembly process for its method of ‘large scale public 
ratification’. In this case, the results of participation in a mini-public informed electoral 
reform options featuring on a referendum which was empowered, conditional upon 
reaching a certain threshold, to make a binding decision applicable to the Canadian region. 
This is indicative of the potential to improve institutional designs through the combination, 
or serialisation, of different processes (Smith 2009: 188-192; 2012).  
 
The BCCA design adheres to the logic that the referendum instrument offers an optimal 
process for making binding decisions (e.g. Saward 2001; 2003; Parkinson 2009). Indeed, the 
most widely institutionalised agenda setting process the citizen initiated referendum, or 
‘citizen initiative’ (Setala and Schiller 2012), has been found to have positive impacts upon 
political efficacy (Bowler and Donovan 2002), state responsiveness (Setala and Schiller 
2012a: 258; Setala 2013) and well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2000). Deliberative theorists have 
also identified important roles for direct democratic processes in deliberative systems (e.g. 
Saward 2001; 2003; Parkinson 2009). However, initiatives and referenda have been 
criticised for failing to inspire high levels of deliberation among participants (Chambers 
2001) and, importantly, in the case of citizen-initiated referenda (Parkinson 2009), it is 
widely observed that initiation tends to be dominated by well-resourced or organised 
groups (Smith 2009: 116–117). ‘Problem definition’ therefore remains the prerogative of 
elites. For these reasons, the extent to which initiatives can democratise agenda setting is 
doubtful (Parkinson 2009). 
 
Identifying problems with established forms of agenda setting, Parkinson (2006: 170) has 
argued that ‘there needs to be some way in which the ‘official’ public agenda … can be 
established that is not simply the result of a small groups’ more or less arbitrary exercise of 
power’. He proposes a series of interesting arrangements that could increase the 
responsiveness of public authorities to problem definitions and policy options emerging 
24 
 
 
 
from PDPs or civil society. However, his discussion is limited to a few pages in a 180 page 
text. The thesis essentially seeks to build upon the Parkinson’s ‘sketch’ of the institutional 
architecture of a more legitimate deliberative system (ibid: 171) by focusing on what 
contributions PDPs can make to democratising public policy agenda setting. 
 
One of the most original features of the SCA, as noted above, was the statutory requirement 
the government ‘try to reach agreement’ with proposal developers on which proposals to 
implement (SCA 2007: 2). Advocates of the process in the Local Works campaign based 
much of their promotion of the process on this aspect of the legislation. Although it was not 
intended to provide full ‘popular control’ (Smith 2009: 12) over binding decision, it was 
intended to ensure a greater degree of responsiveness on the part of public authorities than 
that usually associated with purely consultative exercises. It will be interesting to consider 
what the operationalisation of the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ can show us about 
finding new ways to connect the outcomes of PDPs to the policy process. 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
 
(i) Literature Review: Research Questions and Analytical Framework (Ch. 2) 
Chapter two explores the participatory governance and institutional design literature to 
articulate key research questions and outline an analytical framework used to evaluate the 
SCA. The review results in the identification of three key areas of design: these can be 
summarised as: ‘who participates?’, ‘how is participation organised?’ and ‘how do the 
results of participation relate to policy development?’ Further design features, and 
evaluative criteria, can surely be considered (e.g. Sirianni 2009; Smith 2009). However, I 
have opted for a simple approach because these are the basic components of any 
participatory democratic process (e.g. Fung 2006; Fishkin 2012: 72) and they tie in neatly 
with themes underpinning the research questions. Each of the three main analysis chapters 
is structured around one of these themes. The themes are then bought together in the 
concluding chapter. 
 
(ii) Research Design and Methods (Ch. 3) 
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Chapter three explains the rationale informing the research design and selection of methods 
used to answer the research questions. It explains why a single case study research design 
was chosen, and also discusses the approach to sampling, data collection and analysis. The 
problem-oriented, realist and pragmatic nature of this research is explained and some of the 
difficulties faced when executing the research design, as well as the decisions made 
throughout, are explained and justified. 
 
(iii) The Implementation of the SCA: An Overview (Ch. 4) 
Analysis chapters are organised around the design features outlined in the analytical 
framework. This thematic structure aids analytical clarity but can reduce narrative flow. For 
this reason, chapter four provides a ‘birds-eye view’ the implementation of the SCA The 
implementation of the ‘first round’ of the SCA process is traced, beginning with an overview 
of local public participation processes implemented in 2009 and ending with the integration 
of proposals within policy agendas. In regards to the latter, chapter four presents the results 
of a content analysis of an official document in which the government responded to SCA 
proposals. The descriptive statistics produced begin to provide a picture of the SCA’s impact 
upon policy agendas and its role in policy development. This chapter is mainly descriptive 
and primarily intended to provide a point of reference for later analysis chapters. However, 
some analysis is involved leading to insights which will be further explored and developed. 
 
(iv) Analysis Chapters: Who? How? To What Effect? (Ch. 5, 6 and 7) 
Chapters five, six and seven do most of the analytical work. Each is based around a specific 
part of the analytical framework. Chapter five seeks to determine to what extent public 
participation processes implemented by the SCA avoided elite control. To this end, different 
approaches to participant selection as well as the different forms of representation 
underpinning selection choices are described and evaluated. Chapter six considers how 
public participation processes were organised, looking at the forms of communication, 
collaboration and division of labour between the different actors involved. The structure 
and rules underpinning discursive interactions have important consequences for discursive 
equality, and thus the chapter also evaluates different forms of collaboration on these 
terms. Finally, chapter seven considers how the results of participation were linked to the 
26 
 
 
 
policy process. To this end it draws upon a potential trade-off explained in the analytical 
framework (chapter 2) between ‘reflexivity’ and ‘responsiveness’ in policy making. It 
explores to what extent the processes through which SCA policy proposals were integrated 
within policy development managed to negotiate a line between ‘reflexivity’ in policy 
making and the ‘responsiveness’ of public authorities to the results of participation. 
 
(v) Conclusion and Recommendations (Ch. 8) 
Chapter eight brings the analysis together to answer the research questions. In short, the 
story told by the analysis is one of modest achievements overshadowed by important 
limitations. At local level these mainly relate to the instrumentalisation of the process by 
local elites, and at national level to conflict with the policy development processes of 
representative democracy. I conclude that some of the SCA’s problems are intrinsic to the 
attempt to democratise agenda setting through PDPs. These provide obstacles which are 
challenging to overcome, but are not absolute. Other problems are specific to the SCA. They 
often exacerbated ‘intrinsic’ problems and can be ameliorated through institutional design. 
Finally, areas for improvement, recommendations for reform and implications regarding the 
potential for PDPs to democratise public policy agenda setting processes are explained.  
 
1.5 Summary of Findings and Argument 
 
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. First, it seeks to explore what an in-depth analysis of the 
implementation of the SCA contributes to our understanding about the potential for PDPs to 
democratise the policy process. The main focus of the analysis will be upon the ‘first-round’ 
of the SCA, occurring from October 2008, when the government issued an invitation for 
councils to engage local citizens and develop policy proposals, to December 2010, when 
government published a response to proposals and gave a rationale for its decisions (see 
DCLG 2010). However, the SCA was not a one-off process, but sought to establish itself as a 
permanent feature of the relationship between UK state institutions at local and national 
levels. Thus, the second aim of the thesis is to develop recommendations which might serve 
as a basis upon which to reform, and improve, the SCA process. The criteria used to evaluate 
its performance are fully explained in chapter two. For now, suffice it to say that there are 
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three main areas underpinning the evaluation of the SCA process, which are covered below. 
This summary is not intended to provide an account of all main findings - it is impossible to 
do this without having presented the narrative through which they are to be understood. 
Rather, it provides a ‘taster’ of the conclusions developed as well as their relation to the 
wider literature. 
 
(i) Inclusion and the Problem of Elite Control 
PDPs are often understood as processes which can contribute to increasing the 
inclusiveness of political systems by engaging those parts of the population which do not 
tend to participate in traditional forms of political activity (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; John 
2009). Similarly, the SCA was designed to engage locally ‘under-represented groups’ in the 
formation of policy proposals (SCA 2007). However, the analysis finds that the processes 
through which proposals were developed in the SCA process mostly engaged local elites. 
Although some more inclusive approaches to implementation were evident throughout the 
cases considered, the analysis concludes that an important problem with the design of the 
process was a permissive regulatory framework, which essentially left it up to local councils 
to determine if requirements to include ‘under-represented groups’ had been met. Often, 
exclusive approaches reflected a preoccupation with committing resources to an untested 
process, resulting in a tendency to draw upon existing institutional structures to constitute 
local citizens panels (where proposals were developed). As such, the majority of cases 
considered mainly engaged actors involved in council-linked partnership governance 
networks such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs).10 
 
This places a question mark over to what extent the SCA could be considered a 
‘participatory’ or ‘democratic’ process because opportunities for the development of 
proposals was often (although not always) limited to very politically active individuals from 
public, private and voluntary sector organisations. Contextualising the development of PDPs 
within the changes in governance over the past few decades Papadopoulos (2012: 135) 
suggests that PDPs are overshadowed by more strongly institutionalised ‘elitist-deliberative’ 
                                                     
10
 Local Strategic Partnerships are council-led bodies promoted by the previous New Labour administration in 
the UK in order to encourage collaborative working between local public, voluntary and private sector 
organisations in local problem solving, service delivery and community engagement. 
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governance processes such as exclusive policy networks, technocratic regulatory agencies 
and increasingly influential judicial institutions. The analysis suggests that, in practice, the 
SCA often fell into the ‘elitist-deliberative’ category. Public officials and representatives from 
organisations featuring on local collaborative governance networks often saw in the SCA an 
opportunity to advance proposals reflecting issues which had arisen in previous local 
consultations, that cohered with devolutionary proposals lobbied for by local authorities or that 
advanced campaigns promoted by local and national interest groups. This lends support to 
previous findings that ‘participatory spaces’ (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) are prone to ‘capture’ 
by the priorities and motivations of the (often local) public institutions that implement them 
as well as the interests of the group representatives which often participate in them, with 
clearly negative implications for inclusiveness. The analysis proposes that more clearly defined 
rules and regulations need to be established and enforced if the SCA is to be institutionalised as 
an agenda setting PDP and not a lobbying tool for local elites. 
 
(ii) Deliberation and Collaboration in Proposal Development 
 
Deliberative processes have been valued for their ability to integrate the understandings 
and perspectives of a diversity of participants into a process of knowledge production 
(Webler 1995; Sirianni 2009). One of most important aspects of the SCA was the 
opportunities it offered for discursive participation intended to allow citizens to identify and 
define local problems and develop policy proposals. The requirement that panel participants 
and local councils ‘try to reach an agreement’ on which proposals to make suggests that the 
role of civic participation in the process is not to develop recommendations which are then 
considered by public officials (as is the case in consultative PDPs) but to collaborate in the 
production of policy proposals. Thus, the research looks at the processes through which 
problems were identified and developed into policy proposals, evaluating to what extent 
they enabled the knowledge of different actors to be effectively integrated into the process 
of producing proposals. The analysis suggests that in most cases where proposals were 
effectively co-produced it was by virtue of limiting participation to highly active members of 
the local population - those featuring on partnership governance structures. These could 
draw on substantial expertise and consult organisational networks to inform the 
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development of proposals at minimal resource expenditure. In these cases, public officials 
and panel participants tended to collaborate closely in the development of proposals 
through processes which constituted a genuine attempt at reaching agreement. However, 
the problem here is that this form of collaboration was achieved through low levels of 
‘dialogic pluralism’ (Escobar 2011). ‘Local’ or ‘lay’ knowledge (Yanow 2003) was to a great 
degree absent from the process. As above, it was collaboration between local elites that 
underpinned the development of proposals, excluding significant parts of the population. 
 
A few cases did engage more widely, but the problem with most of these approaches was 
that panel participants were not involved in the development of proposals. Rather, panels 
developed preferences regarding proposals which had been raised through petitioning 
processes and developed, or ‘fleshed out’, by council officers. As such, public officials had a 
high degree of framing influence over panel deliberations, something which has been often 
found to be problematic by scholars of ‘mini-publics’ (e.g. Parkinson 2006; Tucker 2008). 
Moreover, attempts to reach agreement between local authorities and local panels were 
not evident. Instead, panels made recommendations which were either ‘cherry-picked’ or 
‘rubber stamped’ by decision makers. Thus, panel deliberations certainly did not influence 
the development of proposals and it is also not clear to what extent panels influenced the 
selection of proposals.  
 
It is noteworthy, however, that a small minority of local authorities did constitute relatively 
diverse panels and made more concerted attempts to reach agreement with these. In this 
group of cases local panels were engaged in more long term processes and developed 
proposals in closer collaboration with public officials and policy experts, with local 
authorities committing more resources to the provision of participant support structures. 
Importantly, unlike the more consultative processes considered above, panels allowed 
participants to redefine problems and proposals through deliberation. They thus went some 
way towards implementing ‘reflexive’ agenda setting processes recommended by scholars 
of institutional design (Lang 2008: 86). Although the analysis highlights some important 
problems arising from the effects of power asymmetries between citizens, public officials 
and policy experts, the thesis concludes broadly in favour of these approaches and argues 
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that they enabled a more original and comprehensive exploration of local problems to take 
place.  
 
Papadopoulos (2012: 146) suggests that the prevalence of ‘deliberative-elitist’ processes is a 
sign that ‘deliberation cannot be reconciled with equal participation’. This analysis does not 
provide grounds upon which to dismiss this possibility, but the experience in councils such 
as Sheffield and Cambridge leaves the question open. 
 
(iii) Integration of Outcomes within Policy Development 
The role of PDPs in policy development is often far from clear, and suspicions abound that 
they are little more than ‘symbolic’ (Papadopoulos 2012), ‘tokenistic’ (Arnstein 1969) or 
‘therapeutic’ (Chandler 2001), etc. If public authorities do not incorporate outcomes 
meaningfully, then it is not clear just how PDPs contribute to responsive governance, an aim 
which often underpins their institutionalisation (Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Hoppe 2010; 
Chambers 2012). Indeed, PDPs exist alongside a complex and evolving ecology of 
governance (Papadopulos 2012), meaning that policy makers must consider these alongside 
other inputs (Fung 2006). It is perhaps for this reason that PDPs are often consultative, 
intended to increase the in-put legitimacy of representative institutions without 
compromising the ability for ‘reflexivity’ in policy development. However, consultative 
status does little to disprove suspicions that PDPs provide little more than ‘window dressing’ 
for real decision making processes (Lee and Romano 2013). 
 
Arguably, a way to mitigate these concerns is by developing ways in which PDPs can 
‘institutionalise and legitimise popular control’ over binding decisions (Smith 2011; see also 
Font and Smith 2013). As will be explained in chapters two and three, the 
institutionalisation of ‘links’ between outcomes of PDPs is an under-explored area of design 
– especially at higher governance tiers.  Indeed, one of the most interesting features of the 
SCA is that it institutionalised a link to the policy process. The legislation placed a duty upon 
the Secretary of State to ‘try to reach an agreement’ with proposal initiators on which 
proposals to implement (see appendix item 3).  This is essentially an attempt to reconcile 
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maneuvrability for the government with a clearer role in policy development than 
consultation.  
 
The story of the SCA in this respect is one of modest achievements marred by substantial 
limitations and constraints. The analysis suggests that the integration process did manage to 
ensure a greater degree of responsiveness than that usually associated with consultative 
processes. Responsiveness was mainly evident in the engagement with the problems 
underpinning proposals, rather than a commitment to implement outcomes. In this respect, 
the analysis coheres with a view of responsiveness that does not necessarily involve a causal 
relation between inputs and outputs, but a deliberative relation between them (Chambers 
2012). Responsive governance is not achieved to the extent that outcomes ‘mirror’ 
proposals, but to the extent that proposals communicated problems to, and informed 
deliberation by, policy makers. 
 
However, such achievements were relatively modest when compared to the main finding 
from the analysis of integration - that coherence with extant agendas was the main factor in 
shaping outcomes. The SCA integration process became hostage to the policy development 
cycles of representative institutions as well as bureaucratic and opaque communication 
processes between different government departments, many of which responded 
unenthusiastically to policy proposals. Due to a combination of these factors, the SCA was 
essentially subsumed within the policy processes it intended to influence, mirroring 
concerns often found in empirical analyses of participatory governance (e.g. Burgess and 
Chilvers 2006).  
 
The analysis suggests that one important limitation of the SCA process that might explain 
this rather negative account was the low level of ‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 
2003a) underpinning the SCA process. Advocates of the SCA in the Local Works campaign 
went to great lengths to generate and sustain civic interest which could scrutinise 
government, but their efforts were constrained by factors relating to the nature of the SCA 
process as well as Local Works itself. Essentially, the opaque nature of the integration 
process made it harder for Local Works to identify important points at which to mobilise 
supporters. Perhaps more importantly, Local Works is a highly centralised professional 
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advocacy organisation with ‘protest business’ organisational characteristics (Jordan and 
Maloney 1997; Scokpol 2003). It is highly effective at mobilising supporters for participation 
one-off activities and pressurising government for the adoption of specific policies (such as 
the SCA itself), but its support networks are relatively thin and non-committal when 
compared to those that have been deemed fundamental in the ‘claiming’ of state power 
through PDPs (Fung and Wright 2003). For these reasons, the analysis points to the 
importance of ensuring scrutiny and accountability through external mobilisations, and 
identifies a need for more research on the role of ‘referee institutions’ (Parkinson 2012: 
157) as well as actors such as ‘deliberative activists’ (Fung 2005; Kadlec and Friedman 2007). 
1.5.1 Implications and Recommendations 
So, what does this tell us about the prospect of democratising public policy agenda setting 
processes through PDPs? Papadopoulos (2012) argues that the development of PDPs should 
be understood within the context of a broader trend towards technocratic and elitist forms 
of governance in contemporary democracy. Reflecting on the weakness of their 
institutionalisation when compared to these, he argues that ‘pessimism of the mind 
demands that we ask ourselves whether participatory forms of deliberative policy-making 
appear to be more than quantite negligeable … yet optimism of the will should induce us to 
reflect also on strategies to make participatory forms of deliberation matter more’ (Ibid: 
147, emphasis original). The analysis of the SCA in this thesis does much to feed ‘pessimism 
of the mind’. Many of the problems faced by the SCA arise from difficulties that are intrinsic 
to the attempt to democratise the policy process through PDPs. The analysis points to a 
series of limitations which essentially arise from difficulties surrounding the accommodation 
of participatory democracy within representative institutions. In a nutshell, institutional 
conflicts were manifest in the influence which local public authorities and partnership 
governance structures had over the SCA as well as the shaping of integration dynamics by 
the electoral, policy development, and legislative cycles of representative institutions. 
 
Although ‘intrinsic’ limitations of scale and institutional conflict are real and considerable, 
they are not absolute. They are, to a degree, contingent on design and context. The 
conclusion of the thesis therefore focuses upon those case-specific areas where the design 
of the SCA and the context of its implementation exacerbated intrinsic problems, and 
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suggests reforms which might improve the process. Regarding reforms to design, changes to 
the rules and statutory regulations underpinning the process are proposed, with a view to 
increasing the inclusiveness of local panels and the influence of these upon the 
development of policy proposals. Regulatory reforms cannot be expected to eliminate 
possibilities for elite capture of proposal development. However, the definition of minimum 
standards and their stricter enforcement might go some way towards this end by 
communicating clearer expectations regarding the processes through which proposals 
should be developed if they are to be taken through the process.  
 
Second, many of the problems which the SCA faced were a result of its institutional design – 
i.e. relying on local public authorities to sponsor proposals and upon government to make 
binding decisions. The development of proposals through processes focused on the locality 
and resourced by local authorities exacerbated problems of scale, because nationally 
relevant proposals were developed in response to local contexts, as well as institutional 
conflict, because the political priorities of local authorities often influenced the SCA. In 
terms of the integration of proposals within the policy process, the contingency of outcomes 
upon coherence with extant agendas and the subsuming of the SCA within established 
policy processes might be put down to the fact that proposals were integrated within 
central government bureaucracy. Thus, the conclusion discusses different options for setting 
up a decision sequence which raises ideas and develops proposals in larger scale processes, 
that can mitigate the problem of scale by developing a more synoptic view of local 
problems, and that does not end within central government institutions, but functions 
parallel to these. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight that in institutional design there is a big gap between the 
intentions of designers and outcomes (Goodin 1996). In the case of the SCA, this gap is 
evident in the instrumentalisation of the process by local councils and the subsuming of 
policy proposals within established processes. The analysis suggests that one of the main 
problems at both local and national level was that the SCA failed to generate sufficient 
motivation for public authorities to follow through on the intentions of design. Most 
importantly in this regard, the thesis concludes that the Local Works campaign lacked the 
capacity to generate a base of more continuous civic support and interest in the SCA than 
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that associated with the lobbying activity which led to the original legislation. The resulting 
lack of ‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 2003a) goes some way towards explaining 
the relative ease with which public authorities were able to shape the SCA according to their 
interests and expectations regarding the process - as supposed to those arising from the 
meaning and purpose which advocates originally ascribed to the SCA. As well as changes in 
regulations and design, the analysis concludes that the development of a more effective 
‘countervailing power’ will be crucial if the SCA is to develop into an institution which makes 
a more substantial contribution to democratising the policy process. 
 
 
  
35 
 
 
 
2. A Deliberative Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter draws on a combination of deliberative democratic theory and institutional 
design literature to articulate an analytical framework that will be used to evaluate the SCA 
in subsequent chapters. Section 2.1 develops an account of the main tenets of the theory, 
and describes it development from establishing normative-theoretical foundations to 
focussing on more practical questions of institutional design. Section 2.2 then consults the 
literature relating to the design of participatory-deliberative institutions and processes. It 
identifies three key areas of design to consider and develops a series research questions and 
hypotheses relating to each of these that will underpin empirical analysis in later chapters. 
 
2.1 Deliberative Democratic Theory: A Brief Introduction 
 
PDPs owe much of their philosophical underpinnings to deliberative democratic theory in 
the latter 20th century. As Bohman (1998: 401) explains ‘deliberative democracy, broadly 
defined, is any one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation of free 
and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-government’. 
Theorists differ on many key points of deliberative theory, but the thread that unifies 
deliberative democrats is the importance they attribute to the discursive legitimation of 
policy making. Thus, Chambers (2003: 316) explains that “a deliberative approach focuses 
on qualitative aspects of the conversation that precedes decisions rather than on a 
mathematical decision rule”. This is not to say that deliberative democrats necessarily 
discard the decision rules such as voting, rather that regarding legitimacy a greater 
emphasis is placed upon the weighing arguments than that associated with aggregative 
conceptions of democracy concerned with counting votes. 
 
A key tenet of deliberative theory is the ‘moralising effect’ of public discussion. As Barber 
(2003: 181) put it, the process of public reason giving makes opinions and preferences ‘earn 
legitimacy by forcing them to run the gauntlet of public deliberation and public judgment’. 
Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that that deliberation allows citizens to develop, 
articulate and justify preferences according to their understanding of the ‘public good’ 
(Goodin 1986; Miller 1992; Cohen 2007). This is understood to have both intrinsic and 
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instrumental value. Intrinsically, Kadlec and Friedman (2007: 16-20) consider the intrinsic 
value of participation and deliberation to lie in their capacity to foster ‘social intelligence’, 
which protects and expands ‘our capacity for free and communicative inquiry’  as well as 
‘our capacity to perceive and evaluate the shared consequences of our choices, habits, 
policies and practices’. Thus, deliberation is assumed to increase efficacy and capacity for 
independent judgment and agency. 11  
 
Instrumentally, an inclusive ‘dialogue’ process can improve the epistemic basis of decision 
making by bringing in a greater plurality of perspectives (Escobar 2011). Webler and Tuler 
(2000) argue that well run deliberative processes enable the ‘best possible understandings 
and agreements’ to be reached (see also Skelcher and Torfing 2010: 77; Kadlec and 
Friedman 2007: 16-20). Knowledge and expertise is not understood to be an attribute of 
individuals, that is readily available to ‘mine’ or ‘tap’, but as something that is ‘co-produced’ 
through dialogic processes (e.g. Webler 1995, Sirianni 2009).    
 
Section 2.2 shall elaborate these arguments and in the process develop a deliberative 
analytical framework that will organise empirical chapters. Before doing so, however, it is 
important to locate the analysis within recent developments in deliberative democratic 
theory. 
 
2.1.1 The Development of Deliberative Democratic Theory 
Elstub (2010) describes the development of deliberative theory in terms of three 
‘generations’, the first focusing on normative foundations (e.g. Habermas 1984); the second 
on reconciling these with social and political complexity (e.g. Bohman 1996; Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996); and the third focusing on the institutionalisation of deliberative 
democracy (Baber and Bartlett 2005; O’Flynn 2006; Parkinson 2006). Although we have 
                                                     
11
 For the pedagogical benefits and positive psycho-social effects of participation see Pateman (1970); 
Bachrach and Botwinick (1992); Sen (1999). For a critical appraisal of these theories see Warren (1992; 1993). 
For recent empirical research affirming the ‘emancipatory’ potential of deliberative participation see Niemeyer 
(2011) and describing the mechanisms which deliver this see Knops (2006). But, for a sobering account of the 
difficulties involved in testing these claims empirically see Pedersen (1982). 
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learnt that in practice PDPs can fall considerably short of enacting ideals of the democratic 
ideals which often inspire them (e.g. Barnes et al 2007; Pearce 2010; Davies 2011; Hoppe 
2011), their widespread institutionalisation (e.g. Smith 2005; Hajendijk and Irwin 2006; 
Ansell and Gash 2007) has had the salutary effect of deepening our understanding of what 
participatory and deliberative democracy looks like when attempts are made to establish it 
in current conditions. 
 
This is important in addressing a pressing critique made of early forms of deliberative and 
participatory democratic theories (e.g. Habermas 1984; Barber 2003); that they focused on 
normative foundations and the description, or ‘armchair design’, of institutions embodying 
such principles, at the cost of praxis (for different versions of this criticism see Bachrach and 
Botwinick 1992; Blaug 1996). Analyses of institutionalisation provide a way of addressing 
this concern because they bridge the divide between political theory and empirical political 
science (Fung 2007; Thompson 2008). This provides deliberative democratic theory with 
what Bohman (1996: 13) calls the ‘descriptive component’ without which norms are in 
danger of becoming ‘abstract and empty ideas, rather than reconstructions of the rationality 
of actual practices’. As Dryzek (1996: 9) put it, ‘when democratic theory meets the real 
world, it should emerge strengthened, as well as chastened’ (see also Forester 1999: 9-10; 
Kadlec and Friedman 2007: 2-3; Skelcher and Torfing 2010: 72). By analysing the 
institutionalisation of the SCA, understood as an agenda setting PDP, this thesis contributes 
to the ‘third generation’ literature.12  
 
The next section articulates the approach that will be taken to evaluating the SCA process. 
To this end, it reviews the growing body of ‘third generation’ literature concerned with 
evaluating institutional designs and analysing institutionalisation. 
                                                     
12
 It should be noted, however, that deliberative theorists are rightly wary of the normative-empirical 
relationship. Dryzek (2008) argues that the institutionalisation of deliberative processes has been too closely 
accommodated with existing structures, leading him to differentiate between his more critical approach, 
which underlines the need to expand the discursive nature of democracy (Dryzek 1990; 2000), and ‘Rawlsian’ 
forms that link deliberative democracy more closely to the institutions of liberal representative democracy 
(e.g. Bessette 1994). As Elstub (2010: 306) explains, there is a balance to be struck here: ‘democratic theory 
must remain at a critical distance from reality, if it is to provide suggestions for “externally justifiable” 
institutional reform, yet this distance must not be excessive or these suggestions will fail to provide practical 
guidance’.  
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2.2 Evaluating PDPs: ‘Who?’, ‘How?’ and ‘To What Effect?’ 
 
It would not be an overstatement to say that, absent some exceptions (Bessette 1994), in its 
inception the major focus of academic debate regarding deliberative democracy was 
discursive participation in the ‘public sphere’ (e.g. Habermas 1984; Fraser 1992). However, 
as the literature began to engage with questions surrounding institutional design and policy 
making a complementary focus emerged around the design of forums (which in this thesis 
have been labelled PDPs) that bring sub-sets of the population to engage in organised 
participation and deliberation, usually on specific issues. Fung (2003: 339) articulates the 
logic informing this move beyond the public sphere as the main focus for deliberative 
democratisation well: ‘given the fragmentation of cultural and political life, effective large-
scale public sphere reforms may consist largely in the proliferation of better mini publics 
rather than improving the one big public’. Moreover, the more widespread 
institutionalisation of links between policy agendas and the outcomes of PDPs might 
pluralise and improve the ‘sluices’ (Habermas 1996: 356) which open policy agendas to 
influence from public sphere opinion formation. As such, they might play an important 
‘intermediate’ role (Parkinson 2006: 168), providing channels of communication between 
the formal and informal political spheres (Hendriks 2006; Chambers 2012: 53-55). 
 
The focus on deliberative forums turns academic attention to the design of processes and 
institutions (e.g. Smith 2009). Useful typologies and evaluative frameworks have been 
developed that emphasize the context-dependent nature of process design and are 
intended to inform public administrators facing different situations and looking to achieve 
different goals through designing participatory processes (Fung 2003; 2006). This section 
shall draw upon this literature to derive an analytical framework that can be used to 
evaluate the SCA.  
 
The development of an evaluative framework which can be universally applied across PDPs 
is a research agenda in itself (Rowe and Frewer 2004; Rowe et al 2005; Burgess and Chilvers 
2006; Smith 2009; Wright 2012; Geissel and Newton 2012). Many process evaluations are 
deductive in nature, usually relying on theoretical frameworks derived from participatory 
and deliberative forms of democratic theory (Webler and Tuler 2000; Fung 2003; 2006; 
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Smith 2009; Sirianni 2009; Geissel 2012). Some, however, are more practice-oriented and 
inductive (e.g. Forester 1999; Davies and Burgess 2004; Mansbridge et al 2006). This thesis 
has followed the first of these because a more deductive approach enables the thesis to 
stand on the shoulders of the literature and more precisely define the areas where an 
analysis of the SCA can contribute to the gaps in knowledge. 
 
Three key areas of design have been identified from the literature. The following 
subsections shall explain these and articulate research questions that will underpin the 
analysis of the SCA.  The first two areas of design build upon two criteria outlined by Webler 
(1995). ‘Fairness’ refers to the extent of opportunity provided for interested or affected 
parties to participate in the decision-making process. ‘Competence’ refers to the ability of 
the process to reach the best decision possible given what is reasonably knowable under 
given conditions (see also Webler and Tuler 2000).  ‘Fairness’ relates to the question of ‘who 
participates?’, and ‘competence’ turns our minds to the question of ‘how does participation 
take place?’  
 
It is important to note that these are separated for analytical reasons, but in reality they are 
deeply interrelated: ‘who’ and ‘how’ influence each other. In ideal form deliberative forums 
would maximise ‘dialogic pluralism’ (Escobar 2012a) which can improve the epistemic 
quality of decisions by increasing the inclusion of different perspectives (Williams 2000). 
Thus, levels of inclusion (‘fairness’) have important impacts upon the ‘competence’ of 
knowledge production. Furthermore the fairness of deliberative interactions can be 
undermined if more confident or capable individuals dominate discussions – it is important 
to attend to both equality of presence and voice when considering ‘who’ participates. 
However, ‘how’ the process is run can mitigate this issue by developing rules and processes, 
such as the use of facilitation, that increase the ‘fairness’ of dialogue. 
 
Finally, an under-developed aspect of the deliberative democracy and the institutional 
design literature concerns the relationship between process outcomes and policy making 
(Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Font and Smith 2013). The framework thus complements the 
deliberative democracy literature with literature on policy making and governance to 
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develop a distinction between ‘reflexivity’ and ‘responsiveness’ that will be used to evaluate 
the institutionalisation of links between SCA process outcomes and binding decision. 
 
2.3 Who? 
PDPs are often designed to redress the long-standing (see Verba and Nie 1972) problem 
socio-economic participation bias (John 2009).  However, their ability to do so is limited or 
one fundamental reason: a defining feature of PDPs is the provision of opportunities for 
discursive interaction between participants and due to the practicalities of real-time 
interactions they are constituted by groups of citizens or stakeholders that are relatively 
small vis-à-vis the population they are drawn from.13 The problem of participation bias can 
be addressed through a range of participant selection techniques that constitute ‘publics’ 
that make different kinds of ‘claims’ (Saward 2006) to be representative of the broader 
population (Fung 2006). The main forms are to be outlined and critically evaluated in this 
section. 
 
A second consideration to take into account is that underpinning participant selection 
choices are often different assumptions regarding the forms of representation that will be 
activated (Saward 2006; 2008). This is an especially important aspect of processes that offer 
opportunities for the participation of relatively small groups of citizens, because it is through 
the representation of different interests and understandings that ‘inclusion’ can be 
maximised in processes that cannot offer opportunities for the direct participation of all 
(Marochi 2009). The use of stratified random selection, for example, is usually underpinned 
by a concern with ensuring that participants ‘mirror’ the make-up of the population they are 
selected from (Saward 2008: 13). Thus, participant selection methods provide a ‘menu’ of 
design choices that are underpinned by different assumptions regarding appropriate forms 
of representation (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007) This research will consider which is 
most appropriate for PDPs intended to define problems and influence policy agendas. 
 
As noted in chapter one, the SCA placed a duty on councils to engage ‘under-represented 
groups’, but the legislation and guidance was relatively non-prescriptive as to what 
                                                     
13
 The use of  ICT can mitigate this problem, but even when this is deployed participation remains limited to a 
sub-set of the population (see e.g.Bingham, O’Leary and Nabatchi 2006) 
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approach should be taken (SCA 2007; DCLG 2008). It is important therefore to consider how 
local councils that implemented the SCA approached participant selection, and to what 
extent such opportunities were provided, and what kinds of representative claims where 
being made in making selection choices. Thus, analysis chapters will seek to answer the 
following questions: 
 
 (RQ 1a) Did the constitution of SCA panels overcome problems of participation bias?  
  (RQ 1b) On what grounds where different participant selection choices made? 
There are a wide variety of potential forms that might be expected to arise in the SCA. 
Regarding the constituencies to be represented, three main forms can be identified in the 
literature (see section 2.4.1). Regarding participant selection methods, four main forms can 
be identified (see section 2.4.2). The potential significance for these in the context of the 
SCA is considered in section 2.4.3. 
2.3.1 Objects of Representation 
 
(i) Boundaries of Political Authority 
PDPs are often bound up with territoriality-defined constituencies. There are three 
problems with this model of representation. First, affected interests are not equally 
represented within spatial areas, meaning as a result they can be significantly disadvantaged 
by this approach (Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2010). This problem becomes more acute at 
lower governance levels (e.g. Smith and Wales 2000: 57; Lowndes and Sullivan 2004; 
Parkinson 2006). The SCA process, where proposals for changes in national policy are 
developed locally (see section 5.2) might be expected to suffer from this limitation because 
it may produce policy proposals which are responsive to particular local contexts, but which 
could impinge negatively upon other areas if implemented nationally. A second concern is 
that notions of ‘local’ or ‘community’ representation may stress shared values and identities 
over difference, and lead to the empowerment of local elites. The danger of forming 
inward-looking ‘little platoons’ (Barker 2011) is especially acute in the make-up of sub-local 
governance structures. As shall be explained in section 6.3.3 many local councils drew on 
such bodies to develop policy proposals. Finally, Parkinson (2006: 73) has argued that an 
important problem with an emphasis on the locality is that it restricts the agenda of 
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democratic deliberation to ‘issues which are decidable at the local level’. The danger is that 
if participants feel important issues are kept off the agenda participatory governance may in 
fact deepen alienation (Smith 2009a). 
 
(ii) ‘Ordinary’ People 
One of the critiques most often made of participation is that it is often dominated by a 
citizens with similar demographic traits; highly educated, relatively wealthy, and politically 
active, perhaps activist, citizens (John 2009) – the ubiquitous ‘usual suspects’. Designers of 
PDPs often seek to exclude the ‘usual suspects’ for legitimate reasons. PDPs are often 
specifically aimed at opening new channels of communication between the state and 
excluded groups and it is often deemed important to avoid activists which may have 
strategic motives for participation in order to protect process integrity (Kadlec and Friedman 
2007: 7-10).  However, as Parkinson (2006: 69-70) explains, this focus on avoiding ‘usual 
suspects’ is often underpinned by a problematic preoccupation with representing ‘ordinary 
individuals’. The problem is that representatives of ‘ordinariness’ are impossible to find 
because the idea is based on a statistical impossibility: ‘one can have statistically 
representative samples … not statistically representative individuals’. Thus, if representing 
the population in this sense is important, Parkinson (2006) argues that it makes more sense 
for designers of PDPs to attempt to recruit statistically representative samples (see section 
3.2.2) rather than attempting to find representatives of the ‘common person’. Finally, 
deliberative theory is based on the notion that the process of reason giving underpinning 
public deliberation eliminates preferences based on individual interests as well as dubious 
moral and epistemic grounds (Goodin 1986; Miller 1992). Thus, rather than trying to 
represent the perspectives of ordinary individuals, whose assumed lack of knowledge or 
interests apparently makes them more amenable to deliberation, a more appropriate way 
to avoid partisan attachments might be to design a process in such a way to promote 
deliberative ‘citizenship’ (Smith and Wales 2000).  
 
(iii) Affected Interests 
One of the most popular approaches to ‘constituting the demos’ (Goodin 2007) is the 
inclusion of all affected interests. However, the inclusion of all affected interests in 
deliberative institutions is difficult to achieve. First, many deliberative innovations operate 
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within territorially defined constituencies and are thus often prevented from including 
interests which cut across these. Second, affected interests might be too diverse to be 
represented in a deliberative process which has limitations imposed upon it by the 
requirements of interaction in real time. Finally, the principle of ‘all affected interests’ 
presumes a set agenda around which affected interests are to be defined (Goodin 2007). 
This is problematic if abilities to participate the definition of the agenda of the process are 
limited.  Thus, as Goodin (2007: 55) notes, if the ‘all affected interests’ principle is to be fully 
realised, ‘all interests possibly affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible 
agenda’ should be included. This problem is hidden from view by the fact that most PDPs 
are set up to solve predefined problems in specific areas, but, even in this narrower context, 
the determination of ‘who is affected’ is often unclear, or left as an ‘open question’ 
(Parkinson 2006: 68). In PDPs, control over the framing of the problem to be addressed and 
the constitution of the public are two of the main ways elites can control these process 
(Parkinson 2006; Tucker 2008) and defining legitimate membership based on affected 
interests does little to address these problems. 
 
2.3.2 Participant Selection Methods 
 
Different forms of participant selection can be understood as different ways of approaching 
the representation of the constituencies outlined above. When process managers make 
participant selection choices they are effectively making claims on behalf of participants. 
Moreover, the substance of deliberative process is, to an important degree, dependent 
upon the constitution of the public involved (Bohman 1996; Davies and Burgess 2004) and 
the need for process features such as facilitation or education and capacity building 
processes can be expected to depend to a great extent on choices made in this respect. This 
section reviews some of the approaches, outlines some of their advantages and 
disadvantages and discusses how we might expect these to operate in the context of 
agenda setting innovations. 
 
(i) Stratified-Random (and Quota-Based) Selection 
One of the most popular approaches to constituting publics for PDPs in through the random 
selection of participants drawn from representative samples of the population constructed 
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through attitudinal or interest-based variables. This approach is defended on the grounds 
that it maximises the chances for affected interests to be included, which improves the 
epistemic basis of deliberation by ensuring the presence of different understandings of 
social and political phenomena (Williams 2000; Fishkin 2012). Moreover, random selection 
minimises the chances of engaging actors who wish to participate for self-interested or 
strategic reasons. This is an important aspect of building the kinds of civic ‘trust’ in PDPs 
which it has been argued is necessary if it is to be more broadly institutionalised and 
empowered to make decisions (Cutler and Johnson 2008; McKenzie and Warren 2012). It is 
also noteworthy that stratified-random selection fits a problem definition context because 
participants are selected based on their demographic or attitudinal characteristics, not in 
terms of their relationship to a pre-determined issue.   
 
However, three main problems are often associated with this approach. First, stratification 
might leave certain groups out of the sample. In this respect, process managers have 
important decisions to make regarding the ‘categories’ to be represented (O’Neill 2007). 
Second, the logic underpinning selection on demographic traits is that interests are in some 
way shaped by different socio-economic, ethnic or cultural positions. However, it is by no 
means assured that participants identified as belonging to particular groups will, merely by 
their presence, substantively represent relevant interests. This problem might be 
exacerbated by the process of deliberation. If deliberation is constitutive of preferences and 
identity, post-deliberation participants might not be descriptively representative of the 
population they were selected to represent (Smith and Wales 2000; Parkinson 2006). Third, 
the samples required to ensure statistical representativeness are too high for deliberation 
to occur between all participants. Thus, statistical representation is often substituted with 
the weaker notion of representing a ‘cross section’ of the relevant population. Although this 
enables real time discussions, it is likely to exclude important views. A second approach, 
taken by the deliberative poll, for example, is to break the sample into smaller groups for 
deliberations, perhaps bringing it together in plenary sessions at key points of the process. 
Thus, participants do not deliberate together and thus ‘it is impossible that all the relevant 
differences between people will be present, and so unlikely that participants will confront 
anything other than the most dramatic, dominant cleavages’ (Parkinson 2006: 78). 
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(ii) Civil Society Groups 
Civic organisations are heavily involved in PDPs (Hendriks 2002; 2006a) and make claims to 
represent diverse constituencies (Cabannes 2004: 28; Parkinson 2006; Houtzager and Gurza 
Lavalle 2010). However, the relationship between deliberative democracy and group 
representation has been characterised as an ‘uneasy alliance’ (Williams 2000). Research 
suggests that ‘activists’ are unlikely to engage in ‘cross-cutting’ discussions characterised by 
political difference (Mutz 2006) and that the partisan attachments hamper deliberation 
(Hendriks, Dryzek and Humold 2007; Muirhead 2010; Gaynor 2011). On the other hand, 
group representatives often articulate counter-hegemonic ideas which otherwise might not 
be considered and provide a pragmatic way to identify and engage representatives from 
socially disadvantaged groups (Bohman 1996; Mansbridge et al 2012: 7). Even if these do 
not come from similar backgrounds, as Parkinson (2006) finds often to be the case, they can 
often draw upon their understanding of the problems faced by disadvantaged 
constituencies (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007; Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2010). 
Their engagement can therefore improve deliberation by increasing inclusion. Moreover, 
partisanship does not necessarily hamper deliberation. Indeed, deliberation would be 
impossible if this was so, since no individual, however politically active or apathetic, is 
‘unsullied by knowledge or interests’ (Parkinson 2006: 82). Thus, partisanship per se is not a 
problem, but becomes an issue to the extent that it limits an individual’s disposition to 
engage deliberative exchanges. In this respect, Kleinman, Delborne and Anderson (2011, 
quoted in Moore 2012: 151) conclude that ‘a well-facilitated process in which participants 
have prior perspectives (although not clear instrumental interests) on the issues at stake 
might still produce a fair and reasonable outcome’. 1  Although dogmatism and strategising 
is still an important problem (Gaynor 2011), the participation of group representatives 
makes sense especially if we subscribe to an understanding of deliberation which does not 
necessarily seek consensus, but more broadly to develop mutual understanding between 
culturally distinct ‘sub-publics’ which can provide a basis for on-going co-operation in the 
public sphere (Bohman 1996: 100, 145-47, see also Kadlec and Friedman 2007: 13-15) 
 
(iii) Targeted Recruitment 
Sponsoring organisations often directly solicit the participation of individuals or 
representatives of groups. There are two approaches to such ‘targeted recruitment’. In the 
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‘active’ approach, the participation of individuals from specific groups is sought through 
advertising campaigns, the provision of financial incentives and/or outreach initiatives. A 
‘passive’ approach builds incentives for certain groups to participate into the process itself, 
for example, by limiting the agenda to an issue which is especially concerning to a certain 
social group. As Fung (2006: 72) explains, this can make participation in the process more 
appealing to certain parts of the population. It has been found to be an especially 
productive way of ensuring participation by marginalised social groups. By focusing on 
problems that are much more urgent to the poor, such as sanitation, housing and basic 
infrastructure the problem of participation bias is mitigated. In Participatory Budgeting in 
Porto Alegre, a combination of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ targeted recruitment has been found to 
be surprisingly successful in incentivising the participation of marginalised parts of the 
community  (Smith 2009: 43).  
 
Although these approaches are to be valued on this basis, there are some drawbacks. 
Outreach initiatives especially can be resource intensive and their success depends heavily 
on the disposition and performance of professionals trained in public engagement or 
community organising. Moreover, analyses of participatory budgeting have found that this 
approach can attract the more active members of the target community, especially those 
already involved in local associations (Santos 1998: 486; Souza 2001: 168), and is not so 
effective at incentivising the participation of the ‘very poorest’ (Smith 2009: 44). Finally, 
both these forms of selection are questionable in an agenda setting context, because they 
depend, to a degree, upon a prior problem definition. 
 
(iv) Lay or Professional Stakeholders 
The engagement of stakeholders is an especially popular approach to engaging affected 
interests in collaborative governance processes (Ansell and Gash 2007). As Fung (2006: 67-
8) explains, stakeholders can be citizens who have a specific interest in an issue and 
volunteer to participate in these processes, or professionals from public, private and 
voluntary organisations who have a stake in the issue, or claim to represent those who do. 
These forms of participant selection have the advantage of engaging citizens and 
professionals who usually have a high level of expertise and thus can readily contribute to 
the process as well as engage with public officials on an equal footing. However, this is 
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clearly a more elitist form of participatory governance. It might, in Fung’s (2006: 73) terms, 
be expected to enhance the ‘effectiveness’ of governance at the cost of enhancing 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘justice’. Much of the point of participatory governance is to enable lay 
understandings to influence policy development and this might be missed by engaging 
professional stakeholders solely. Finally, the stakeholder concept, by definition, assumes a 
pre-set agenda.  
2.3.3 Representation, Participant Selection and Legitimacy in ‘Systemic’ Perspective 
It should be clear from the outline of different forms of representation and participant 
selection that each has important advantages and drawbacks. None provides a basis for 
‘perfect legitimacy’. For this reason, Parkinson (2006: 98) concludes that ‘legitimacy 
depends on a variety of representatives, activating a variety of constituencies, coming 
together at a decision making moment’. Thus, the forms of representation at play in 
participatory governance should not be evaluated in isolation, or as potential replacements 
for electoral representation, but in terms of their relationship with the institutional 
framework that embeds them (see also O’Neill 2007). In this more ‘systemic’ perspective 
(Thompson 2008; Mansbridge et al 2012) participatory governance can be seen as a thread 
which is woven into a broader governance system. Dryzek’s (2010: 15) differentiation 
between ‘categorical tests’ and ‘systemic tests’ is useful here. ‘Categorical tests’ focus on a 
specific phenomenon in isolation, ‘systemic tests’ focus on the contribution of phenomena 
to the ‘construction of an effective deliberative system’. As Dryzek (2010: 85) explains, 
‘appreciation of the systemic aspect implies that categorical tests will sometimes give 
misleading answers, so if the two tests point in different directions, systemic tests should 
take priority’. Rather than judging representation and participant selection in isolated 
instances and according to an ideal standard, the evaluation of representation and 
participant selection in this thesis shall be underpinned by this more global, or ‘systemic’, 
understanding. 
 
2.4 How 
 
At the heart of deliberative democratic theory is an understanding of knowledge, not only 
as being a quality of individuals, but also as something that is produced through dialogic 
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processes (Webler 1995; Sirianni 2009; Escobar 2011). Deliberative knowledge production is 
conceptualised in different ways in the deliberative democracy literature. For example, 
Habermas (1996) calls for the development of ‘considered opinion’ in the public sphere, 
Smith’s (2009) interest is in the development of ‘considered judgment’, and Sirianni (2009: 
49) evaluates collaborative processes according to their ability to ‘co-produce expertise’, a 
concept he borrows from Landy (1993). The key concern underpinning these concepts is the 
development of processes which can effectively integrate the different experiences and 
perspectives of participants into a process of knowledge production. In this vein, Webler 
and Tuler (2000) argue that one of the key aims of PDPs is to construct: 
 
the best possible understandings and agreements given what is reasonably 
knowable to the participants at the time the discourse takes place. It is 
conceptualised as two basic necessities: access to information and its 
interpretations and use of the best available procedures for knowledge 
selection 
 
Because they lead to the inclusion of different perspectives and actors, the different forms 
of representation and participant selection discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 have an 
important impact upon the dynamics of knowledge production. This section turns to a 
different aspect which influences this process; the rules and procedures governing 
interactions between participants. This is an important design area to consider. As Barnes, 
Newman and Sullivan (2003: 393) explain ‘developing the capacity to take part is an 
objective of many initiatives that seek to enable members of the public to participate in 
policy making but the form and content of the process affect both the skills that may be 
necessary and the opportunity to develop them’. Thus, deliberative designs should seek to 
create conditions that enable participants to develop their epistemic capabilities as well as 
personal, interpersonal and political skills. This has both intrinsic value in so far as it 
develops the capacity of participants for independent agency and instrumental value in so 
far as it enables, in Webler and Tuler’s terms, the ‘best possible understandings and 
agreements’ to be reached (see also Skelcher and Torfing 2010: 77; Kadlec and Friedman 
2007: 16-20) . Thus, advocates of collaborative and participatory governance (e.g. Fischer 
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2009; Sirianni 2009) highlight its potential to combine and integrate ‘lay’, or ‘local’, and 
‘expert’ forms of knowledge in policy making and thus lead to better decisions. 
 
The design of processes governing interactions between participants are a key area to 
consider in this respect, and this thesis seeks to investigate what the SCA can tell us about 
how institutional design can encourage the development of ‘considered judgement’ (Smith 
2009) or ‘co-production of expertise’ (Sirianni 2009), especially in respect to defining policy 
problems through public deliberation. To this end, this thesis seeks to answer the following 
sub-question: 
 
 (RQ 2a) Through what processes were proposals developed in the SCA?  
 (RQ 2b) What forms of interaction were present between participating actors and 
which was most effective in co-producing expertise? 
The following subsections explore what the institutional design literature has to say on this 
matter, with a view to setting the context in which the analysis of the SCA will be carried 
out. Firstly, different forms of collaboration are identified and explained providing a 
typology of ideal types that will be used to describe collaboration in the SCA. Secondly the 
importance of taking the effects of power asymmetries between participating actors into 
account is highlighted and the potential for facilitation to mitigate their effects is 
considered. 
 
2.4.1 Forms of Collaboration 
This sub-section describes three different approaches to the design of participant 
interactions in PDPs. Following a description of each approach, an illustration is given of 
how each operates in three cases; the British Columbian Citizen Assembly (Warren and 
Pearse 2008), UK local authority-led community planning processes (Geddes 2006) and a 
‘deliberative mapping’ process held in the UK (Burgess et al 2007). Before beginning it is 
important to note that, although each form is theoretically distinct, these are ideal types 
and are combined in different ways in the practice of participatory governance. Thus, 
institutional design choices do not revolve around the adoption of one or another of these 
models. Instead, different designs implement different combinations of these forms of 
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interaction. Chapter seven will draw upon these distinctions as a basis upon which to 
describe, compare and evaluate the forms of collaboration in the SCA. 
 
(i) Serialised  
In ‘serialised’ forms of collaboration there is a clear separation and division of labour 
between processes used through different stages of the engagement process (T). Actors 
involved at separate stages have minimal face to face contact and interact through a series 
of ‘serialised’ events which link the different stages of the process. The Citizen Initiative held 
in British Columbia (Warren and Pearse 2008) is a good example of an institutional design 
with clearly ‘serialised’ features. Diagram 2 provides a simplified illustration of the division 
of labour which the BCCA implemented. 
 
Diagram 2 Diagram 2 Serialised Process Illustration: the BCCA. 
The process was set up by public authorities and empowered to make a decision on 
electoral reform (T1). A descriptively representative mini-public was set up to deliberate 
upon different electoral models (T2). Deliberation occurred in a series of meetings over an 
extended time period. Before developing recommendations, civic participants received an 
education on the issue, receiving reading material in between sessions and calling upon 
support structures to clarify any issues which arose. The recommendations developed by 
participants deliberating in the mini-public were put to the electorate in a referendum (T3) 
(Warren and Pearse 2008).  
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‘Serialised’ designs have three main advantages. First, they offer possibilities to 
institutionalise combinations of processes and thus develop ‘institutional 
complementarities’ (Smith 2009: 188-192). For this reason the linking of a mini-public to an 
empowered referendum has been touted as welcome design feature of the BCCA (Smith 
2009; 2009a; 2011). The mini-public counteracts the low levels of deliberation associated 
with referenda, which itself mitigates the problems of low inclusiveness in PDPs. 
Serialisation of these processes leads to a more legitimate decision (Saward 2001; Saward 
2003). Second, the separation of powers which these divisions create might limit the 
potential for manipulation of the process because it multiplies the number of points which it 
would be necessary to influence. Third, serialisation is an effective way of linking processes 
across governance scales and thus can contribute to overcoming the problems of scale 
associated with participatory forms of democracy.1  
 
On the negative side setting up a process like the BCCA is resource intensive and time 
consuming. Moreover, when ‘serialisation’ occurs over a substantial period, as in the BCCA, 
the clear separation between the processes operating across different stages reduces the 
potential for reflexivity in agenda setting and decision making, something which analysts of 
PDPs have often called for (Lang 2008). Thus, it is not an appropriate model for the 
governance of policy areas which are subject to change in the short term and require 
flexibility. Serialisation can also mean that some of the value added by the different 
processes is lost. Thus, in the BCCA, the considered judgments developed in the mini-public 
only had the effect of informing options in a referendum. It could be argued that a better 
decision, on an epistemic level, would have been taken by the mini-public, where 
participants had the opportunity to develop preferences in deliberative fashion.1  
 
(ii) Iterative 
‘Iterative’ forms of collaboration are characterised by repeated interactions of two or more 
actors involved in a process through some mediating actor. This occurs principally in long 
term processes, with the mediating actor or group acting as a bridge between participants, 
the sponsoring authority and other related actors. In his description of the activities of 
Public Engagement Practitioners (PEPs) engaged in community planning processes in 
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Scotland, Escobar (2011a; 2012) explains the key ‘nodal work’ they carry out, giving shape to 
public engagement by linking the different actors and organisations involved together (see 
also Forester 1999: 3). In this sense an important part of participatory governance occurs 
‘backstage’ (Escobar 2011a; 2012), in the interactions which PEPs have between process 
participants and actors from broader institutions embedding these. Diagram 3 below 
illustrates the iterative form of collaboration in the case of UK local community planning 
consultations.1 
 
Diagram 3: Iterative Process Illustration: UK Community Planning. 
Councils have taken different approaches to consultations on community planning (T1), with 
some engaging mainly key partner networks involved in Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) 
and others involving the general public to a greater extent. In the latter approach, 
involvement usually takes more traditional forms such as public meetings, neighbourhood 
forums, talks with community organisations and surveys but also includes more innovative 
approaches such as different kinds of deliberative panels or focus groups are evident (Birch 
2002; Davidson and Elstub 2013). PEPs have an important role in rationalising the results of 
public engagement and relaying the results to actors in public institutions and governance 
networks. In the process they shape proposals for a local policy agenda (T1/T2). The LSP 
then responds to this by drawing up a community strategy (T2) outlining the key local policy 
objectives for the medium – long term (usually 5-15 years) which is to be approved by the 
council (T3). The council and the LSP then co-ordinate local organisations for the 
implementation of the strategy, and PEP’s are also often involved coordinating actors to 
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facilitate implementation (for evaluations of LSP’s and community planning processes see 
Sullivan and Howard 2005; Geddes, 2006; Lowndes and Sullivan 2007).  
 
Iterative collaboration is a more reflexive approach to participatory governance. The 
‘bridging’ and ‘translation’ role of PEPs seems crucial in this respect, connecting PDPs to 
agendas emerging elsewhere and visa – versa. This can enable participants in PDPs to 
engage with concerns as they emerge. It is also an approach that might be more suited to 
problem definition, since it provides greater opportunity for the agenda to be challenged 
and modified at different stages.  For example, through mediating actors, participants might 
formally commission research into emerging issues, or, more informally, draw upon the 
collective expertise of the involved organisations in between meetings. Thus, iterative 
collaboration is an important part of developing reflexive agenda setting processes that 
allow participants to develop greater ownership and exert a greater degree of control over 
the process (Lang 2008). One problem with this approach is that it seems that the quality of 
such approaches depends very heavily on the ‘translation’ (Escobar 2011a) role of those 
actors bridging the different parts of the process (see also Bartels 2012). 
 
(iii) Convergent 
Convergent collaboration is perhaps that form of interaction which intuitively comes to 
mind when we read the words ‘public deliberation’ or ‘collaboration’. Participating actors 
interact in real time and in the same space. There are lower levels of division of labour 
between the different actors involved, who collaborate closely on the task at hand. This 
form of collaboration is widely seen in ‘empowered’ (Fung and Wright 2003) or ‘co-
governance’ (Talpin 2012) PDPs such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and, 
especially, ‘analytic-deliberative’ processes (Burgess et al 2007; Fischer 2009) usually held 
on complex policy issues where citizens and policy experts collaborate closely or even 
deliberate together.14 Diagram 4 provides a simplified illustration of this form of 
                                                     
14
 ‘Analytic-deliberative’ processes aim ‘to reconcile technocratic and citizen-centric approaches’ (Burgess et al 
2007: 300), making them an especially popular approach in technical policy areas. It is argued that this 
approach has the potential to engender forms of reasoning amongst civic and policy actors which can develop 
new ways of understanding intractable policy problems and help develop more sustainable solutions to these 
(Fischer 1993; 2009; Fung 2003a; Sirianni 2009; Hoppe 2010). 
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collaboration and labour division between participating actors based on the case of a 
consultative ‘deliberative mapping process’ held on organ transplantation policy in the UK 
(see Burgess et al 2007).  
 
Diagram 4: Convergent Process Illustration: Deliberative Mapping 
In the case of the deliberative mapping process illustrated above, a citizen panel was formed 
to engage in a series of meetings to deliberate upon policy options which had been 
developed by specialists associated with the sponsoring organisation (T1). Initially, meetings 
had an educative purpose - citizens would consult informational material and raise relevant 
issues with process managers and with each other in discussions (T1 / T2). By the final 
session citizen’s preferences were collated in a report drafted by process managers (T2) and 
given to specialists in organ transplantation to consider. A workshop was then held where 
specialists responded to the citizen recommendations in the report, followed by a ‘question 
and answer’ session and a series of informal deliberations between specialists and citizens 
(T2 / T3). Finally, citizens were bought together for a final panel meeting where they 
reconsidered their initial preferences in light of the workshop and made final 
recommendations (T3). 
 
Reflecting upon similar issues to those identified by Lang (2008) regarding the difficulty of 
implementing reflexive agenda setting processes, Burgess et al (2007: 306) explain that it 
was essentially due to resource constraints that revisions to problem definitions and 
framings did not occur throughout the process. However, ideally these would have been 
enabled, and thus an ‘agenda revision’ heuristic is included in the diagram (T 2). As 
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participants become educated on the issue, develop their preferences and interact with 
specialists, they might make important contributions to the processes’ agenda, or challenge 
initial framings and problem definitions. This enables a more holistic consideration of the 
problem. The main problem with these approaches, however, is that asymmetries in 
epistemic authority between actors makes them especially open to subtle forms of 
domination and control (Davies and Burgess 2004; Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007). As 
shall be discussed in the next section, the adoption of mitigating strategies such as 
facilitation is often seen an important process feature for this reason (Levine, Fung and 
Gastil 2005: 275). 
 
As noted above, these forms of collaboration are ideal types and some combination of these 
is often, if not always, found concomitantly in PDPs. Indeed, this is evident in the three cases 
provided as illustrations. For example, the BCCA has been depicted as a ‘serialised’ process. 
However, both ‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ forms of interaction were present the in the 
mini-public that bought citizens together for a relatively long period to deliberate on 
electoral reform models and develop referendum options. Thus, design choices do not 
revolve around the adoption of one or another of these models. Instead, different designs 
implement different combinations of these forms. Collaborative form is a crucial design 
feature, since it begins to define the roles which different actors are expected to take and 
provides a structure for interactions between actors. It therefore has a substantial influence 
upon the dynamics of participation. Chapter eight shall contrast, compare and evaluate the 
different approaches taken by councils implementing the SCA on this basis, with a view to 
judging which form is best suited to a problem definition context. 
2.4.2 Communicative Inequalities and the Role of Facilitation  
One of the most common criticisms of deliberative democracy is that economic, social and 
cultural forms of inequality prevent the realisation of the deliberative democratic ideal 
(Sanders 1997; Young 2001). As Fung (2005: 406) explains, ‘even with mutual respect and 
goodwill, the effect of such inequalities may be that certain groups or points of view are 
underrepresented, some perspectives are silenced, or particular styles of communication 
are favoured’. My interest in studying the SCA arose from its potential to democratise 
agenda setting by providing opportunities for citizens to identify, define problems and 
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develop policy proposals. However, this potential is substantially undermined if subtle forms 
of control and domination are at play in local panels because the conditions of equality 
necessary for democratic deliberation are compromised. These concerns place substantial 
doubt on the notion that participatory governance can be a force for democratisation. Thus, 
it is important to consider whether and how democratic and mutually enabling relations can 
be fostered between participating actors, ensuring that the outputs of the process are 
genuinely ‘co-produced’ (Sirianni 2009: 49) and not the result of gerrymandering by elites.  
 
This might be ensured by limiting participation to highly active, confident and expert 
sections of the population, or those sharing certain social traits. Habermas’ exemplar of the 
pre-modernist European public sphere constituted by bourgeois social gatherings suggests 
that we might expect improved deliberation on this basis. In Fung’s (2006: 73) terms, such 
exclusion might deliver high levels of ‘effectiveness’. For this reason, collaborative 
governance processes engage citizens as stakeholders with desirable knowledge in certain 
policy areas. However, this approach is clearly less suited to generating ‘justice’ or 
‘legitimacy’ (Ibid). Moreover, research suggests people in diverse groups tend to discuss 
issues more deeply and learn more from each other (Mutz and Martin 2001; Mutz 2002) 
and it is widely argued that diversity increases the epistemological quality of deliberation 
(Bohman 1996; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000; Young 2001). It is thus important to 
consider ways in which ‘equality of voice’ (Smith 2009) can be ensured in deliberative 
events characterised by high levels of pluralism (Bohman 1996; Ganuza and Frances 2012), 
this section shall review the potential role which facilitation can play in this respect. 
 
Facilitation is often understood as a way in which the encounters between different actors 
can be organised in order to improve the quality of deliberation and, more specifically, to 
mitigate power asymmetries (e.g. Fung 2003; 2005; Levine, Fung and Gastil 2005; Kadlec 
and Friedman 2007). However, although there is an appreciation of different forms of 
facilitation (e.g. Coleman and Goetz 2001; Ryfe 2006), little empirical work has sought to 
address how they impact upon the dynamics of deliberation in PDPs (Smith 2009; Moore 
2012). Dillard (2013: 15) argues that the deliberative democracy literature has mistakenly 
presented ‘facilitators to be part of a group possessing the same skills, training, and moderating 
pedagogy’. Drawing upon content analysis of transcribed deliberations, Dillard concludes 
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that ‘facilitators are indeed integral to the deliberative process’ (2013: 14). She describes 
three ‘types’ of facilitation which differ according to the extent discursive tools and 
moderation strategies used to guide group discussions and lead to conclusions. ‘Passive 
facilitators’ deployed few of these techniques, focusing mainly on regulating speech time 
and turn-taking. ‘Involved’ facilitators deployed a greater variety of discursive strategies, 
such as playing devil’s advocate, directly soliciting participant opinions, clarifying responses 
where they were deemed unclear and summarising the results of discussions at key stages 
of deliberation. In between these poles, ‘moderate facilitators’ used a ‘power sharing 
approach’, actively provoking discussions on different issues, but were open to letting the 
group pose their own questions and responses without much subsequent direction. 
 
Dillard’s study does not directly tackle the issue of power asymmetries, although the greater 
participation of ‘involved’ types in regulating participant speech acts suggests that they are 
best suited to mitigating power asymmetries. Moreover, there is further reason from other 
studies to hypothesize that involved forms of facilitation can enhance ‘equality of voice’ 
(Smith 2012: 99, see also Fung 2003a: 135-7; Kadlec and Friedman 2007: 12-13). This is one 
of the main reasons why facilitation is being increasingly recognised as an important aspect 
of PDPs (Smith 2009: 168-9, 197-8). Thus, Levine, Fung and Gastil (2005: 275) argue that 
whilst ‘there is a danger that deliberation will be overtly influenced by skilled organisers’, 
the ‘great danger is having no competent organisation at all’. This seems to be the present 
state of consensus in the literature: facilitation is important but it is not so clear what form 
facilitation should take. In considering which form of facilitation was most suited to 
deliberative problem definition in the SCA context this thesis hopes to make a modest 
contribution to this strand of the literature. 
 
2.5 To What Effect? 
 
Local Works campaigners defined the principle underpinning the SCA as the idea that ‘local 
people are the experts on the problems facing their area and the solutions to them’. In this 
respect, an important aspect of the SCA is its attempt to provide a channel through which 
‘local expertise’ could be connected to the development of policy agendas. This much can 
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be said of most PDPs, however, the SCA is an especially pertinent case to consider in this 
respect because it institutionalised a link to the policy processes (in the form of the duty to 
‘try to reach agreement’) of central government.15 PDPs are not mostly authorised to make 
binding decisions, and those with delegated authority, or some form of power sharing with 
representative institutions, function at local level (e.g. see Fung and Wright 2003). When 
outputs relate to higher governance tiers PDPs tend to be consultative in nature. The duty 
to try to reach agreement was intended to ensure a greater degree of influence than that 
associated with traditional consultation, and it is important to investigate whether its 
operationalisation can teach us anything about the institutionalisation of links between PDP 
outputs and binding decision: 
 
 (RQ 3a) How was the duty to try to reach agreement operationalised?  
 (RQ 3b) What contributions did the SCA make to policy making? 
 
In answering these questions the thesis shall describe and evaluate the links made by the 
SCA to policy development. In order to aid in the latter task, this final section of the chapter 
develops a framework based on a trade-off between reflexivity and responsiveness in policy 
making. It argues that although these features stand at odds with each other in important 
respects, the ability of PDPs to maximise both is an indicator of quality. Finally, drawing 
upon literature on PDPs and the citizen initiative, different arrangements for relating 
outcomes of participation to the policy process, that mitigate this trade-off in different 
ways, are outlined. Drawing upon this literature, ways in which reflexivity and 
responsiveness have been reconciled through institutional design and some of the main 
constraints faced in this respect are illustrated. 
2.5.1 Reflexivity and Responsiveness in Policy Making 
                                                     
15
 This reflects developments in policy analysis literature focusing on the importance of local, or lay, knowledge 
in decision making (Lindblom and Cohen 1979; Sirianni 2009; Fischer 2009). Hierarchical divisions between ‘lay’ 
and ‘expert’ forms of knowledge in policy development process have been convincingly challenged (Scott 
1998; Fischer 2009). Experts are no more knowledgeable than lay citizens outside their formal area of 
expertise, and lay citizens can be expert in different epistemic contexts. Indeed, people confront the results of 
faulty policies, poorly designed or enforced regulations, and a variety of other social and political problems, on 
a day to day basis. Hence, as Yanow (2003: 236) explains ‘the very mundane, but still expert, understanding of 
and practical reasoning about local conditions derives from lived experience’. Thus, Sirianni (2009) 
understands local knowledge to be an important resource to be fostered for the production of public goods.  
 
59 
 
 
 
 
Concepts of reflexive and responsive policy making have received much attention in 
contemporary political science. ‘Reflexive governance’ (see Voss and Kemp 2005; Hendriks 
and Grim 2007) is a concept related to a perceived move from centralised, hierarchical 
institutions  towards a more fluid and dynamic organisation of public power, based on the 
diffusion governance functions throughout networks (see Davies 2011: 9-30). The 
proliferation of bodies bought into policy processes require that state institutions develop 
‘reflexive’ mechanisms for communication and co-ordination, a process which has been 
called ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop 2003; Somerville 2005). The need for reflexivity arises in 
response to the indeterminacy and increased complexity entailed by the recognition of 
‘second order’ problems, or those that arise from negative consequences of past actions 
(Voss and Kemp 2005). This means that the policy process itself must become adaptable, 
changing in response to new demands and problem definitions (Hendriks and Grin 2007).  
PDPs are valued for their potential to increase the adaptability of representative institutions 
by incorporating a greater plurality of actors and knowledge (Sorensen 2006; Hoppe 2010). 
However, reflexivity, in so far as it relates to the relationship between PDPs and the policy 
process, implies that PDPs exist alongside other processes in a complex and dynamic 
ecology of governance (Papadopulos 2012). Thus, ‘full citizen control’ of policy through PDPs 
is not always possible, nor desirable, rather, forms of participation, and their role in policy 
development, ‘are, and should be, legion’ (Fung 2006: 67).  
 
The concept of responsiveness is foundational to representative democracy:  elections 
deliver responsiveness by providing equal opportunities for translating popular preferences 
to public policies (Dahl 1971: 1). Thus, the literature on democratic responsiveness has 
traditionally focused on correlating civic preferences on political issues with policy choices 
(Page 1994). One of the main reasons why PDPs and direct-democratic processes such as 
the citizen initiative are valued is because they provide opportunities for citizens to develop 
preferences and influence policy on this basis thus providing an alternative way, other than 
traditional methods such as public polling or elections, to achieve responsive governance 
(Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Hoppe 2010; Setala and Schiller 2012).  
However, critics argue that, rather than desire to achieve responsive policy making or 
‘deepen’ democracy, opportunism and strategic incentives often underpin the promotion of 
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PDPs by certain actors, in both political and economic spheres (Lee and Romano 2013). As 
well as tackling the problems identified in above regarding control and manipulation arising 
from power asymmetries between actors involved in the process, ensuring policy 
responsiveness is an important way in which selective incorporation of outcomes might be 
avoided, and thus concerns of tokenism and placation mitigated. 
2.5.2 ‘Transmission’, ‘Integration’ and ‘Mixed’ Forms 
The requirements of reflexivity and responsiveness clearly pull in different directions: it is 
simply not possible to fully reconcile an acceptance of indeterminacy with commitments to 
‘empower’ PDPs by translating outcomes directly to binding decision. The first involves 
openness to new problems and alternatives, whereas the latter involves ‘closure’ by 
deciding on a specific form of action (Voss and Kemp 2005: 20-22). However, PDPs 
institutionalise links between outcomes of participation and policy development in different 
ways, and with different implications for this trade-off. This section briefly outlines how this 
trade-off plays out in three different institutional forms (‘transmission’, ‘integration’ and 
‘mixed’) and in the process highlights key areas to consider when analysing the SCA process. 
 
(i)  Transmission 
‘Transmission’ is a clearly defined link between outcome and binding decision. In PDPs 
transmission often entails the delegation of authority in specific policy areas, usually at the 
local level. This includes those arrangements that are in place when PDPs are considered to 
be ‘empowered’ (Fung and Wright 2003). However, the problem of scale affecting PDPs 
(Parkinson 2006: 5-8) complicates transmission beyond local levels. It is perhaps for this 
reason that, where links to decision are clearly defined to higher tiers of government, 
transmission occurs through institutionalising representation at higher levels (e.g. 
Somerville 2005: 134) or, in some cases, through the use of other processes such as 
referenda. The former has been employed in PDPs such as the Participatory Budget in Porto 
Alegre (PBPA – e.g. Santos 1998), which shall be discussed further below, and the later in 
the British Columbian Citizen Assembly (BCCA), where the results of public deliberation in a 
‘mini-public’ defined the electoral reform options on a referendum (Warren and Pearse 
2008). Similarly, in direct-democratic institutions such as the ‘full scale’ initiative (Setala and 
Schiller 2012) an empowered referendum takes place once a proposal reaches quorum 
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requirements. To use the terms developed to describe different forms of collaboration and 
division of labour above, the initiative and BCCA processes work in ‘serialised’ fashion. Once 
quorum requirements are met, or decision reached following deliberation, a referendum is 
triggered. 
 
The referendum instrument is to be valued on the grounds that it offers universal 
opportunities for participation whilst connecting the results of participation to the policy 
process in a transparent fashion. Because it creates a process which functions separately to 
representative institutions, this form of transmission potentially limits constraints often 
found in PDPs such as the cherry picking of recommendations by public authorities (Hoppe 
2011), lack of continuity due to electoral changes (Cooper and Smith 2012: 28) or the 
subsuming of processes within established bureaucratic structures (Burgess and Chilvers 
2006). As a result, an important degree of responsiveness to the results of participation is 
ensured. Indeed, scholars of institutional design focusing on the potential to combine, or 
serialise, different kinds of PDPs (see Smith 2009: 188-192) often envisage a decision 
sequence where PDPs set options for binding decision via referendum (Saward 2001; 2003; 
Parkinson 2006: 170-171). 
 
However, referenda fare poorly in terms of reflexivity. They simplify policy issues to a few 
(often binary) choices and their binding and finite nature leaves ‘little or no room for 
negotiation, compromise and accommodation’ (Smith 2009: 130). Thus, this form of 
transmission is arguably ill-suited to the governance of complex policy areas, especially if 
they are subject to short term changes. The fact that policy options were developed and 
prioritised through deliberative processes in the BCCA mitigates this concern. However, as 
noted above, the ‘serialisation’ of the process might mean that some of the value added by 
deliberation in the mini-public is lost. The outcomes of the mini-public only had the effect of 
informing options in a referendum. Although evidence suggests that some participants in 
the referendum took recommendations developed by the mini-public as a heuristic at the 
ballot box (Cutler et al 2008), one could argue that, at least on an epistemic level, a better 
decision would have been taken by the mini-public. 
(ii) Integration 
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Integration is a softer and less clearly defined link to binding decision, which sets no 
conditions guaranteeing policy action. Such ‘weak’ linkages increase prospects for reflexive 
governance but do so at a potential cost of responsiveness. Indeed, one of the main reasons 
why the Spanish ‘agenda initiative’ (Setala and Schiller 2012a: 8-9) is rarely successful in 
influencing national policy is because of ‘political rejection by the parliamentary majority’ 
(Cuesta-Lopes 2012: 209). In practice it is thus a rather ineffective agenda setting tool. 
Another example is that of electronic petitioning in the UK. This process is also weakly 
institutionalised and has had little influence on policy. However, it has proven to be rather 
popular perhaps because the formation of a petition requires relatively little resource or 
effort and can thus serve as a relatively accessible platform for the promotion of political 
issues and campaigns by individuals and groups (Wright 2012).  
 
Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain impact in cases of integration because policy outcomes, 
even when they are similar to process inputs, might be explained by unseen factors. These 
might include, from a path dependency perspective, contingency upon consequences of 
previous decisions, or, constraints placed upon the range of viable policy choices by the 
interests of socio-economic elites (Dryzek 1996: 25-26; 2000: 94; Baccaro and Papadakis 
2008). For these reasons, Papadopoulos and Warin (2007a: 596) suggest that PDPs ‘seem 
more like management and communication techniques … than effective instruments of 
democratisation of the decision-making process’, deepening concerns that tokenism might 
exacerbate civic disaffection with politics (Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 2001a; Hay and 
Stoker 2009; Somerville 2011). 
 
This does not mean that consultative processes are necessarily tokenistic. One way of 
mitigating the problem of low visibility is by ensuring the publication of a rationale for 
decisions. This can limit disaffection with such processes by providing participants with 
information and feedback regarding the role of their participation in the policy process, 
even if responses are negative (Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 2001a: 452-453, 2006: 289). 
It can also increase responsiveness because it makes decision a matter of public record, 
meaning that government rationales can be more effectively contested by civil society 
actors. Moreover, notwithstanding equifinality, Goodin and Dryzek (2006) have traced out a 
variety of indirect paths through which consultative PDPs have influenced policy 
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development. As noted in section 2.4, the results of consultative citizen juries have, for 
example, influenced policy agendas through attracting media attention and creating a 
constituency of citizens which develop an interest in the subject. Thus, the mobilisation of 
civil actors external to the process, such as civic groups or the media, might operate to 
ensure responsiveness through indirect means. For this reason, Parkinson (2012: 157-8) 
argues that institutions such as the media, judiciary and civic associations can play a 
‘referee’ role in deliberative systems. Indeed, scholars have identified a similar role for 
‘deliberative activism’, understood as advocacy activity that may use non-deliberative 
means to promote the uptake and impact of PDPs (Fung 2005; Kadlec and Friedman 2007). 
 
(iii)  Mixed Forms 
Transmission and integration are opposite poles on a continuum. Between these there are 
many potential arrangements. As noted in section 2.3, commentators on the Swiss citizen 
initiative value the model for its mixed characteristics (Smith 2009: 120; Setala and Schiller 
2012a). In Setala and Schiller's (2012) terms, it is a combination of ‘full scale’ and ‘agenda’ 
initiatives: representative institutions have an opportunity to consider propositions and 
develop counter-proposals before referendum. PDPs have institutionalised power-sharing 
between citizens and public authorities in different ways. For example, the PBPA combines 
participatory democracy at lower levels with representation and technocratic imperatives at 
higher levels (Smith 2009: 36-39).1 There are two aspects to consider regarding reflexivity 
and responsiveness. First, although PBPA spending plans must be ratified by representative 
institutions, the acceptance of budgets, according to Santos (1998: 502), has become a 
‘formality’ because ‘the large participation of citizens mobilised by PBPA compels the 
legislature to approve always the budget presented’. Indeed, one of the most striking 
features of PBPA is the mass mobilisation that it achieves (Smith 2009: 37). The 
‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 2003) generated works to scrutinise public 
authorities, ensuring the responsiveness of policy making at higher tiers to participatory 
inputs (Baccaro and Papadakis 2008: 51-52). The advocacy activity of organised groups and 
civic mobilisation emerges again as an important factor in ensuring responsiveness, 
something which the PBPA experience suggests can be facilitated by institutional design 
(Smith 2009: 43-44). 
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Second, participants in neighbourhood-based assemblies and delegate representatives in 
higher tiers of the process consult public officials in assessing the technical viability of 
proposed plans. This allows for an important degree of reflexivity, as proposals might need 
changing due to factors which citizens may have been missed. Furthermore, collaboration 
between ‘ordinary’ citizens and public officials pluralises the understandings that are 
incorporated into the process and thus stands to improve the epistemic basis of policy 
(Sirianni 2009: 49). However, commentators are concerned that the reliance of civic 
participants upon advice and information from public officials allows the latter to control 
the process, something which is especially prominent in higher tiers where delegates are 
bought into closer contact with bureaucratic expertise (Abers 1998). Thus, as the PB process 
abstracts from the results of initial participation, and begins to connect these with decision 
at higher levels elite actors have more power to shape integration processes. According to 
Smith (2009: 54-55), these problems limit some of the clear gains achieved by the PBPA 
process. 
2.5.3 Relating Outcomes to Policy Development in the SCA: Key Themes 
As will be explained fully in section 5.2, the SCA institutionalised a form of integration. 
However, it is important to underline that it was not entirely consultative. The legislation 
placed a duty on the government to ‘try to reach agreement’ on which proposals to 
implement with a panel of local councillors acting as representatives of process participants. 
This was an attempt to mitigate the dilution of responsiveness which integration can entail, 
and lies at the crux of the SCA process. Although it stops short of transmission, it can be 
seen as a form of power-sharing. The design of the SCA is explained more fully in chapter 
five. For now, it is important to highlight some key themes to consider when analysing 
integration in the SCA process.  
 
First, the issue of power asymmetries between state and non-state actors and the possible 
influence of hidden influences upon binding decision highlights the notion that PDPs do not 
necessarily ‘empower’ participants, but generate ‘new fields of power’ within which state 
and non-state actors operate (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007: 54). In so far as it relates 
to the relationship between PDPs and policy making, this issue is especially relevant in 
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processes that institutionalise power-sharing because a defining feature of these is non-
state actors have a role in making binding decision, rather than developing policy 
recommendations. Second, although the literature points to important ways in which 
prospects for original policy influence through PDPs are constrained by existing structures, 
the development of ‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 2003), and ‘referees’ 
(Parkinson 2012: 157-8)  such as the media, judicial institutions or ‘deliberative activists’ 
(Fung 2005; Kadlec and Friedman 2007), is important in ensuring responsiveness through 
indirect means.  
 
The above discussion suggests that PDPs exist in a complex, and often uneasy, relationship 
with existing power structures (Gaventa 2006). Although the claiming of state power by civil 
society actors is often seen as an important feature of the institutionalisation of PDPs 
(Baiocchi 2003; Cornwall and Coelho 2007), it is equally true that contact with state 
institutions can blunt their critical features and constrain their impact (Dryzek 1996; Cooke 
and Kothari 2001; Blaug 2002). Power works both ways. It can foreclose opportunities for 
change, but its exercise can also enable change (Elstub 2013: 18-19). 
 
Thus, in sum, it will be important when considering reflexivity and responsiveness in the 
SCA, to look closely at the nature of the processes through which outcomes of participation 
are linked to policy development: including the influence of existing structures upon the 
integration of outcomes, the interactions between actors directly involved in integration 
and the role of ‘referees’ that are external to the process. 
2.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the three main aspects of institutional design to 
take into account when evaluating the SCA process. The resulting analytical framework can 
be summarised as relating to three aspects of design: ‘who participates?’, ‘how participation 
takes place’ and ‘to what effect?’ Within each theme I have identified two research 
questions. To sum up: 
 
1. Who? 
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o (RQ 1a) Did the constitution of SCA panels overcome problems of 
participation bias?  
o  (RQ 1b) On what grounds where different participant selection choices 
made? 
 
2. How? 
o (RQ 2a) Through what processes were proposals developed in the SCA?  
o (RQ 2b) What forms of interaction were present between participating actors 
and which was most effective in co-producing expertise? 
 
3. To what effect? 
o (RQ 3a) How was the duty to try to reach agreement operationalised?  
o (RQ 3b) What contributions did the SCA make to policy making? 
 
Regarding the first, different forms of participant selection and representation which one 
might expect to find at play in the SCA have been considered. Each has its distinct 
advantages and disadvantages and it is important to evaluate these in the broader context 
of the role which they play in a decision making process as a whole. Regarding the ‘how’ 
question, this chapter has argued that collaboration is a crucial aspect of design, since it 
begins to define the roles which different actors are expected to take. It is important not 
only to take into account how citizens communicate when participating, but also how labour 
is divided between actors involved in the process. Three forms of collaboration and division 
of labour were outlined, which should not be understood as mutually exclusive, and some of 
the advantages and drawbacks associated with each were outlined. These shall be used in 
chapter eight  as a basis upon which to describe collaboration forms at play in SCA public 
participation processes, and evaluate which offer the best approach to enable participants 
to develop considered judgment when defining problems and considering alternative 
solutions. However, forms of collaboration also have important consequences upon the 
kinds of power relationships between actors involved in participation exercises. In this 
sense, it is also important to take into account ‘inclusion’ when evaluating forms of 
collaboration. Thus, section 2.5.2 considered the role of ‘facilitation’ in mitigating power 
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asymmetries, positing the hypothesis that more ‘involved’ approaches (Dillard 2013) are 
necessary.  
 
In the issue of linking results to decision, a conceptual distinction has been outlined 
between transmission, a clearly defined link which maximises responsiveness at the 
potential cost of reflexivity, and integration, a fussier link which ensures reflexivity at the 
potential cost of responsiveness. The institutional form at play in the SCA is integration, and 
thus the process might be expected to perform poorly in terms of responsiveness. Crucial in 
this respect is the duty placed upon government to ‘try to reach agreement’ with initiators 
on which proposal to implement: did this lead to greater responsiveness than in 
consultation? If so, how so? Chapter six describes how the process was operationalised, 
setting the context for a more detailed consideration of this question in chapter nine. 
Finally, it is important to take into account sources and forms of institutional resistance 
which the SCA might come up against when integrating the results of participation in policy 
development and have identified the importance of taking into account the role of 
‘referees’ (e.g. civil society actors, media, the courts) (Parkinson 2012: 156) in mitigating 
these. 
 
Before presenting the analysis, the thesis moves onto describing and justifying the 
methodology used to investigate these issues. 
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3. Research Design and Methods 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach of the thesis. It presents a problem-
oriented approach to research design, data collection and analysis, designed to answer the 
research questions set out in chapter two. The research is composed of two basic elements. 
The first of these is an analytical framework drawn primarily from normative and empirical 
deliberative and participatory democracy and governance literature, which has been 
presented in the previous chapter. The second element, outlined here, is a two-tiered case 
study of the Sustainable Communities Act (2007), focussing on the local and national levels 
of the process separately.  
 
For the sake of clarity, this chapter presents the development of the research in ‘linear’ 
fashion (design, data collection, analysis). However, it is important to note that there is an 
important sense in which qualitative research does not conform to this structure (Seale 
1999; Yanow 2003: 242). Instead, it can be broadly depicted as a spiral, progressing and 
backtracking in systematic iteration between different phases. Research designs should be 
informed with unpredictability in mind, allowing research to develop in conversation 
between ideas, theories and data. Rather than a linear process, qualitative research is 
perhaps best characterised as emergent (Lewis 2003: 47). Although this does not mean that 
I did not have a well formulated idea once data collection had begun, it was open to being 
pushed in new and different directions. Some of these proved productive than others, until, 
not that long before submission, the thesis began to crystalise around a set of empirical 
categories and themes, derived in conversation between the relevant literature and my own 
empirical work, and a narrative structure which best presented results. 
 
With this caveat in mind, this chapter describes the different ‘stages’ of this research and 
explains the methodological choices made as the research progressed. The chapter begins in 
section 3.1 by explaining the reasons informing the choice investigate deliberative agenda 
setting through qualitative study of a single case, and why the SCA was selected as the case 
to analyse.  Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively explain the approach taken to sampling and 
data collection; finally, section 3.4 discusses the approach to data analysis. 
3.1 Why a Case Study Approach? 
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3.1.1 Generalisation and Depth of Understanding 
As defined by Gerring (2007: 22) a ‘case study’ is an ‘intensive study of a single case (or 
‘unit’) where the purpose of that study is –at least in part- to shed some light upon a larger 
class of cases’. Thus, one of the central purposes of case study research is to apply results to 
the development of knowledge on a broader set of cases of which the case in question is 
said to be representative, or illustrative. However, for obvious reasons, case studies do not 
fare well in terms of the statistical generalisation prised by quantitative research. It is mainly 
for this reason that ‘case-oriented’ research is often seen as the poorer counterpart of the 
‘variable-oriented’ tradition (Della Porta 2008). Thus, a general line of advice given by 
scholars who favour quantitative research is to increase the number of cases under 
consideration in order to raise confidence in the generalisations drawn (King, Keohane and 
Verba 1994). Nevertheless, although it may indeed be usefully applied in certain contexts, 
this advice is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature and value of qualitative 
research, limiting the potential for a productive engagement between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to social science (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Brady, Collier and 
Seawight 2010; Mahoney 2010).  
 
In qualitative studies, findings are perhaps not best understood as ‘generalisations’, but as 
insights aiming to deepen understanding (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In order to develop ‘deepened 
understanding’ it is important for the researcher to ‘fully explore the content or ‘map’ of a 
range of views, experiences, outcomes or other phenomena under study, and the factors 
and circumstances that shape and influence them, that can be inferred to the research 
population’ (Ritchie and Lewis 2003a: 269).  Thus, much of the focus of qualitative research, 
especially in the initial stages of data collection and analysis, is placed upon fully 
constructing the cases and defining the concepts to be used in the investigation, a process 
which has been called ‘casing’ (Ragin 2004; see also Della Porta 2008: 208-209). This is 
something which can be overlooked by large-n designs. For this reason, Munck (2004: 113) 
argues that King, Keohane and Verba’s advice regarding the importance of increasing the ‘n’ 
ignores the problem of ‘conceptual stretching’: ‘taking concepts that validly apply to a given 
set of cases and extending them to a domain where they do not fit’. Thus, a large-n 
approach increases the danger that inappropriate cases are selected and/or that measures 
and indicators are poorly defined (Della Porta 2008: 210).  Essentially, the trade-off between 
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the ability to make robust generalisations and achieving ‘depth’ of understanding makes it 
important to calibrate the level of analysis in relation to the objectives of the research 
project. This should inform much of the choice to be made between the adoption of 
different approaches, from small-n and medium-n variants of case-oriented studies to large-
n cross-case studies (for a discussion of the different analytical foci of research designs see 
Gerring 2007: 22-26).  
 
The potential to achieve ‘deepened understanding’ makes case studies especially useful 
when dealing with complex concepts and phenomena, because, as George and Bennett 
(2005: 19) explain, they can produce high levels of conceptual validity when dealing with 
issues that are ‘notoriously difficult to measure’. The proposed study is laced with such 
concepts (e.g. representation, inclusiveness, collaboration etc) and for this reason a 
qualitative, small-n approach was deemed necessary. This does not mean, however, that 
findings from this study cannot be extrapolated to other contexts. Rather, the basis upon 
which generalisations are made differs from the dominant quantitative understanding of 
generalisation (Ritchie and Lewis 2003a: 264-270; Flyvberg 2006). Case studies can 
contribute to the advancement of theory by standing on the shoulders of past work and, 
because they enable depth of understanding, they often reveal new phenomena or provide 
insights that lead to original lines of inquiry.  
 
Indeed, as shall be explained in the section below, the Sustainable Communities Act was 
chosen precisely because it seemed likely to reveal new things about participatory 
governance. 
3.1.2 Why the SCA? 
The Sustainable Communities Act was purposively selected for its analytically relevant 
features. As will be explained in greater detail in chapter five, it is an example of an agenda 
setting PDP which differs from similar innovations in two main ways. First, it is a rare 
example of a process which is specifically designed to allow citizens to identify and define 
problems, develop policy proposals and influence central government policy agendas. 
Second, it institutionalised a link to the policy process at higher governance tiers (in the 
form of a statutory duty for the government to ‘try to reach agreement’ on which proposals 
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to implement with a body acting as representative of process participants).16 It is very rare 
that both these qualities are present simultaneously in PDPs. On one hand, there are 
examples of PDPs with delegated authority to develop and implement policy in which 
participants define problems and set priorities. However, to the best of my knowledge, they 
operate around specific policy areas and mostly at local levels. On the other hand, processes 
that allow citizens to define problems might be set up to influence agendas at higher levels 
of authority, are usually consultative in nature (e.g. Goodin and Dryzek 2006, Dryzek 2009). 
This exacerbates concerns that public authorities might ‘cherry pick’ those 
recommendations which cohere with decisions made elsewhere (Hoppe 2011), or that PDPs 
might be used to placate demands and foreclose more contentious forms of political action 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001;  Blaug 2002; Lee and Romano 2013). Thus, because of its problem 
definition and agenda setting function as well as the breadth of institutional scales it 
spanned in connecting outcomes to policy development, the SCA differs from existing 
institutional designs in analytically relevant ways.  
 
In this sense, the SCA can be seen as a ‘paradigmatic’ (Flyvberg 2006) or ‘extreme’ (Gerring 
and Seawight 2007: 98) case. Gerring and Seawight (2007: 98) argue that such cases are 
useful for exploratory purposes. They have much to reveal but less to confirm. It was my 
judgement therefore that the production of relevant outputs would be maximised by 
focusing resources upon an intensive study of this case. One important disadvantage with 
this ‘n1’ design is that the prospects for comparative analysis are undermined. However, the 
case in question was implemented differently by a plurality of local authorities and thus 
provides opportunities for within-case comparisons at this level. The approach to selecting 
within-case cases is explained below. 
 
3.2 Casing and Sampling 
This section explains the rationale informing the research design. It begins in 3.2.1 by 
outlining the ‘casing’ (Ragin 2004) process and in 3.2.2 the approach taken to sampling 
within-case-cases as well as identifying and negotiating access with research participants. As 
will be seen, the main data sources are semi-structured interviews and SCA process 
                                                     
16
 For a more detailed account of the design of the SCA see chapter five. 
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documents, or the ‘paper trail’. The logic informing the choice of data sources methods such 
as semi-structured interviewing is explained in section 3.3. 
3.2.1’Casing’ 
For reasons explained above, the case of the Sustainable Communities Act was purposively 
selected. However, the SCA operated at two tiers (local / national) and different approaches 
were taken at each level. Because of the larger range of potential cases, the research design 
at local level is more complex and will be the focus of this section. Before local-level ‘within-
case-cases’ (local councils) were selected it was necessary to define the range of potential 
cases for study. In order to do this, potential cases were categorised according to the design 
features identified as analytically relevant in chapters two and three. In the SCA process, it is 
local councils that resource and design engagement processes with a view to developing 
policy proposals. However, they are not involved in the processes through which the 
outcomes of participation are related to policy development. It is at local level that civic 
participation occurs. Thus, analysis at this level relates to the first and second research 
questions.17 The analytical framework discussed two aspects of institutional design which it 
is necessary to consider in order to answer these: representation and participant selection 
and collaboration. For this reason, cases were categorised along these two dimensions, the 
idea being that this would enable me to map out the range of different approaches to the 
implementation of the SCA and provide the basis from which to select within-case-cases 
according to analytically relevant features (see Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 2003: 81-83; Gerring 
and Seawight 2007: 97-101). 
 
To this end, I drew upon participation process descriptions articulated by councils on ‘policy 
proposal forms’. These forms were produced by councils to communicate to government 
the proposals which they had developed through the SCA (for an example of a proposal 
form see appendix item 1). They also documented the approach taken to, and results of, 
participation processes. 197 policy proposal forms, produced by 82 out of the 100 councils 
which implemented the SCA process in 2009, were collected. Based on the process 
descriptions contained within each, forms of implementation were located within a simple 
four-cell matrix which was produced by cross-tabulating indicators of the ‘who’ and ‘how’ 
                                                     
17
 In summary, the first seeks to establish whether and how PDPs can overcome problems of elite control and 
the second how PDPs can overcome problems of low deliberativeness in the citizen initiative. 
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aspects of institutional design discussed in the previous chapter on binary categorical 
measures (high-low). The result can be seen in table 3 below. The next few paragraphs 
explain the relevant dimensions and approach taken to measuring case features. 
 
The measurement of the dimensions used to place different councils on this matrix was 
limited by the level of information provided on policy proposal forms. The limited 
information meant that rudimentary indicators of forms of participant selection and 
collaboration had to be developed in order to being to place potential cases within the 
matrix and to map out the range of cases for study. This resulted in ‘openness’ and 
‘collaboration’ measures, which were developed by separating four decision ‘stages’ of the 
SCA process at local level (i. idea raising – ii. proposal development / refinement – iii. 
proposal prioritisation – iv. decision making) and differentiating between the different 
actors involved and forms of interaction at play at each stage.  
 
Regarding collaboration, ‘low’ refers to implementation forms where there is a clear 
separation between the actors involved in the first three stages. ‘High’ refers to processes 
where a clear separation between actors involved could only be identified between up to 
two of the initial three stages. The fourth stage is not included because, since the SCA 
required that Local Authorities sponsor proposals, decision making was formally carried out 
by elected representatives in all cases. However, where information was available, I did 
differentiate between those that ‘rubber stamped’ proposals (accepting all those 
developed) and those that ‘cherry picked’ proposals. Based on the policy proposal forms, 
the four bullet points below summarise the process across these stages in the case of Kent, 
a council which scored ‘low’ collaboration: 
 
 i. Idea Raising: No SCA idea-raising process implemented: both ideas raised from 
previous consultation (2006 Sustainable Community Strategy). 
 ii. Proposal Development: No engagement on proposal development: proposal 
developed by council actors. 
 iii. Proposal Prioritisation: Surveyed the County Council’s demographically 
representative (n1077) and independently constituted ‘sounding board’ on the 
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importance of the idea for the local area, their opinions on the solution proposed 
and the appropriateness of the SCA to promote the solution. 
 iv. Decision Making: Elected representatives ‘rubber stamped’ ideas. 
There is a clear separation between three initial stages of the process, and minimal contact 
between the actors involved at each. For this reason, the council scores ‘low’ collaboration.  
 
The five bullet points below summarise the process in the case of Cambridge, a council 
which scored ‘high’ collaboration: 
 
 i. Idea Raising: Public meeting held on SCA, chaired by council’s leader, open to all 
but promoted through council-linked organisational networks. 40 attendants 
proposed ideas on ‘post-it’ notes under themes provided by Sustainable Community 
Strategy priorities. Each was given 10 votes. 
 ii. Proposal Development: A local panel of 15 volunteers from initial public meeting 
set up to consider most popular ideas, but was also able to modify these or come up 
with new ones.  
 iii. Proposal Prioritisation: Local panel chose and developed four proposals. 
 iv. Decision Making: Council scrutiny committee and leader ‘rubber stamped’ panel 
recommendations. 
There is a clear separation between processes used in just two aspects of the process, the 
initial public meeting (stage i) and the local panel (stage ii, iii) and thus Cambridge scored 
‘high’ collaboration. Essentially, the high/low difference in collaboration is a rudimentary 
measure of the division of labour at play between the different phases of the process. 
Generally speaking, those councils that tended towards engaging actors in one space scored 
‘high’ collaboration, those engaging actors separately and across different phases of 
decision scored ‘low’ collaboration.  
Regarding representation and participant selection, proposal forms did not provide 
sufficient information to differentiate between the different forms discussed in chapter 2. 
For this reason they were replaced with the more general indicator of ‘openness’: a 
measure of the opportunities offered for the discursive participation of citizens in at least 
one of the first three stages of the process. Where evidence of opportunities for the 
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discursive participation of individual citizens and members of local associations were 
provided, councils would score ‘high’, whereas those councils which provided no such 
evidence or limited opportunities to council-linked groups (e.g. local strategic partnerships 
and / or service delivery organisations) or council representatives and officials were scored 
as ‘low’. The five bullet points below summarise the process in North Yorkshire, which 
scored ‘low’ openness:  
 
 i. Idea Raising: Issued a press release and placed advert in local newspaper giving 
readers three months to respond with petitions for ideas. 
 ii. Proposal Development: Officer working group collated ideas and ‘filtered’ 
inappropriate ones. 
 iii. Proposal Prioritisation: Panel made up of representatives from council-linked 
groups (Local Strategic Partnership; Parish Councils) considered shortlist proposals 
and expressed preferences on these. 
 iv. Decision Making: Elected representatives ‘rubber stamped’ recommendations. 
Citizens could petition the council on potential ideas by responding to newspaper adverts, 
however opportunities for discursive participation were limited to council officers or 
members from council-linked groups (LSP; Parish Councils). Thus, North Yorkshire scored 
‘low’ on openness.  
The four bullet points below summarise the process in Lewisham, which scored ‘high’ 
openness:  
 i. Idea Raising: Raised ideas from a variety of sources including, individual citizens, 
local councillors and council linked groups (specific idea-raising mechanisms not 
mentioned). 
 ii. Proposal Development: Officer working group collated ideas, ‘filtered’ 
inappropriate ones and, where necessary, sought clarifications with individual 
proposers. 
 iii. Proposal Prioritisation: Independent organisation subcontracted to constitute 
randomly selected and representative local panel (composed of 15 citizens) and 
facilitate deliberations where participants expressed preferences on proposals. 
 iv. Decision Making: Elected representatives ‘rubber stamped’ recommendations. 
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The processes in North Yorkshire and Lewisham are quite similar. Nevertheless the latter 
scored ‘high’ on openness, because unlike North Yorkshire, Lewisham offered opportunities 
for the discursive participation of ordinary citizens in one of the first three stages (i.e stage 
iii). The reason for focusing only on the ‘openness’ of opportunities for discursive 
participation was because it would be misleading to class processes as ‘high’ on openness 
when opportunities for citizen participation were limited to passive and non-discursive 
forms of participation such as responding to a newspaper ad (as in North Yorkshire), or 
filling out a questionnaire (as in Kent). These provide minimal opportunities for participation 
and hardly make the process an ‘open’ one.  
 
Out of the 82 councils for which information was collected, 19 provided too little 
information for categorisation and were thus eliminated from the sample. Table 3 provides 
an initial ‘bird’s-eye view’ of the processes in the remaining 62 councils in a simple four cell 
matrix dichotomising ‘openness’ and ‘collaboration’ on high / low measures. As well as a 
base upon which to select cases, constructing the matrix in table two was also an important 
part of the ‘casing’ process of this research, whereby, as Ragin (2004: 127) explains, cases 
‘coalesce … through a systematic dialogue of ideas and evidence’. The process allowed me 
to begin to gain familiarity with different approaches to implementing the SCA, and it also 
highlighted areas where more information was needed and that should be explored further 
in interviews. The end of the ‘casing’ process is presented in section 4.2 where this 
categorisation is reproduced for the cases analysed and where, as a result of more 
information gathered through interviews, the position of some councils changes.  
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Collaboration 
 Low  High  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Openness’  
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Type 1  
 
Lambeth; York; West Lancashire; 
Birmingham; Chorley; Hastings; High Peak; 
Staffordshire-Moorlands; Darlington; 
Islington; Newcastle City; Central 
Bedfordshire; Bristol; Herefordshire; 
Lewisham; Torridge; Kingston Upon 
Thames 
 
17 CASES 
Type 2 
 
 
Exeter; Waltham Forest;  Redbridge; Essex; 
Warrington; Wycombe; Sheffield; 
Cambridge; Wiltshire 
 
 
 
9 CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Low 
Type 3 
 
North Dorset; Dorset; Redcar and 
Cleveland; Poole; Newcastle-Under-Lyme; 
South Lakeland; Norfolk; Norwich; South 
Kesteven; Windsor and Maidenhead; 
Burnley; Southend-on-Sea; Leeds; 
Hackney; Stockton-on-Tees; Kettering; 
Kent; East Lindsey; West Dorset 
 
19 CASES 
Type 4 
 
South Tyneside; Warrington; 
Hammersmith and Fulham; Pendle; 
Craven; Ryedale; Scarborough; Harrogate; 
Hambleton; Selby; Richmondshire; Bexley; 
Bath and NES; South Hams; South 
Somerset; Doncaster; North Yorkshire; 
Wirral;  
 
 
18 CASES 
Table 1: : Binary Categorical Matrix of Openness and Collaboration Measures.
18
 
3.2.2 Sampling 
Having placed the cases for which sufficient information was gathered in the matrix 
presented on table two the case selection process began. Before describing the approach 
taken to case selection, I should underline that the matrix was not intended as a rigid 
comparative framework which could form the basis upon which to perform a ‘controlled’ 
comparison. The typology is limited in terms of the variables it covers. Moreover, the 
development of a framework which covered more variables of assumed importance, or 
what George and Bennett (2005: 254) call a ‘typological theory’, was beyond the scope of 
this research and its application complicated by the lack of relevant information available on 
the cases. The approach to sampling was a softer one, rather than being designed to 
accurately measure difference and make robust causal inferences, it was intended as a 
starting point to contrast and compare the different cases with a view to identifying 
                                                     
18 Information on proposal form too limited to apply measures (19 CASES): Rother District Council; Liverpool; 
Oxford City Council; South Gloucestershire; Southampton; Cheshire West and Chester; Nottingham; Mid-
Sussex; Ashford; East Devon; Mid-Devon; Bury; West Devon; Lewes; Stroud; St. Albans; Suffolk Coastal; 
Southwark; North Somerset. 
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problematic aspects and best practice (Lewis 2003: 50-51; for a similar approach see 
Hajendijk and Irwin 2006). This section begins by explaining the approach taken to within-
case-case selection and ends by describing how participants were identified and access 
negotiated. Throughout the discussion some of the decisions that it was necessary to make 
when faced with practical difficulties are explained and justified. 
 
As already noted, the aim when selecting cases was to maximise coverage across relevant 
dimensions. As Ritchie, Lewis and Elam (2003: 83) explain, this is a popular approach to 
sampling in qualitative research. Unlike quantitative approaches that seek statistical 
representativeness, it is concerned with ‘symbolic representativeness’ whereby ‘a unit is 
chosen to ‘represent’ and ‘symbolise’ features of relevance to the population … [or] … the 
purposive representation of ‘character’. Thus, I was not primarily concerned with selecting a 
sample that was representative of the distribution across four types. Instead, my primary 
aim was to ensure maximum coverage of cases across the design features discussed in the 
‘who’ and ‘how’ aspects of the analytical framework, mapping out the full range of features 
of practice according to these two dimensions of institutional design. Gerring and Seawight 
(2007: 100-102) have called this approach to selection ‘diverse case’. They argue it is often 
applied intuitively by case study researchers and that it is to be valued for introducing 
variation on key variables of interest. 
 
The initial idea was to select two councils from each part of the matrix, resulting in eight 
cases for comparison. I felt an n-8 design would enable me to strike a good balance between 
depth and breadth. Having located cases within types (as in table 3), proposal forms were 
consulted in order to gain contact details for relevant policy officers. These provided the 
initial point of contact to negotiate access. The aim at first was to contact relevant officers in 
each council and enquire about the level of access which might be realistically expected, 
then select those cases within each type for which most access was likely to be available. 
However, as contact was initiated two practical problems became apparent; (a) in many 
councils the relevant process managers had either left, declined to participate in the 
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research, or did not respond to my invitations to participate 19 and (b) many councils could 
not disclose information of actors involved due to data protection requirements or because 
they had failed to keep appropriate records.  
 
These problems led to two main changes in research design. First, it became apparent that it 
would not be possible to gain the level of access originally deemed appropriate across eight 
cases. For this reason, the sample was widened to twenty cases: it became clear when 
initiating contact that it would not be possible to cover a smaller set of cases across types 
intensively but that it was feasible to cover a larger set across types more extensively. In this 
respect, I was looking to strike a balance between depth and breadth (Lewis 2003: 52) and 
had to take into account practical limitations when doing so. Second, I was not able to gain 
the same levels of access in those cases that I did cover. For this reason, it was necessary to 
differentiate between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ cases (as in table 4 below). ‘Primary’ cases 
include at least four interviews with both process managers and participants, and 
‘secondary’ cases one to three interviews, usually with process managers. In order to cover 
relevant dimensions, it was important to ensure the presence of at least two ‘primary’ cases 
in each type – reflecting the initial aim of covering eight cases in depth. However, this did 
not prove to be possible in ‘type 3’ cases, which are covered by just one ‘primary’ case.20 
The final cases selected are highlighted in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19
 In contacting councils I began with an e-mail to the relevant officer, followed up by a telephone call if no 
reply had been received in two weeks. 
20
 Negotiating access in ‘type 3’ (low collaboration, low openness) cases was especially difficult, since it was 
these councils that had devoted the least resources to implementing the SCA process. As such, they kept poor 
records meaning that relevant participants were harder to identify. ‘Type 2’ cases (high collaboration, high 
openness), on the other hand, devoted relatively high resource to the SCA process. Access was easier to 
negotiate, and thus they are over-represented in terms of ‘primary’ cases. 
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Collaboration 
 Low  High  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Openness’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Type 1  
 
Lambeth; York; West Lancashire; 
Birmingham; Chorley; Hastings; High Peak; 
Staffordshire-Moorlands; Darlington; 
Islington; Newcastle City; Central 
Bedfordshire;  
 
Bristol*; Herefordshire; Lewisham*; 
Torridge; Kingston Upon Thames 
 
5 / 17 cases included in final sample 
(*2 primary cases) 
Type 2 
 
 
Exeter; Waltham Forest;  Redbridge; Essex; 
Warrington; Wycombe; 
 
 
Sheffield*; Cambridge*; Wiltshire* 
 
 
3 / 9 cases included in final sample 
(*3 primary cases) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Low 
Type 3 
North Dorset; Dorset; Redcar and 
Cleveland; Poole; Newcastle-Under-Lyme; 
South Lakeland; Norfolk; Norwich; South 
Kesteven; Windsor and Maidenhead; 
Burnley; Southend-on-Sea; Leeds; 
Hackney;  
 
Stockton-on-Tees; Kettering; Kent; East 
Lindsey; West Dorset* 
 
5 / 13 cases included in final sample 
(*1 primary case) 
Type 4 
 
South Tyneside; Warrington; 
Hammersmith and Fulham; Pendle; 
Craven; Ryedale; Scarborough; Harrogate; 
Hambleton; Selby; Richmondshire;  
 
Bexley; Bath and NES; South Hams*; South 
Somerset*; Doncaster; North Yorkshire; 
Wirral;  
 
7 / 18 cases included in final sample 
(*2 primary cases) 
Table 2: Sampling Results. 
21 
Respondents were identified from preliminary document analysis and purposively selected 
for an initial round of interviews. Preliminary analysis was carried out, informing the 
identification of key topics to be further investigated in interviews with relevant actors 
identified through a snowball approach. This combination of purposive and snowball 
sampling is recommended for studies where the full network of participants is unknown 
(Tansey 2007) and an iterative approach to data collection and analysis is appropriate for 
qualitative analysis, where ‘reciprocal clarification of empirical categories and theoretical 
concepts’ occurs in the course of research (Ragin 2004: 126) 
 
However, gaining the deeper access necessary for comprehensive theoretical sampling was 
a problem especially in those councils which could not disclose participant information for 
                                                     
21 KEY:  
 highlighted = selected case 
 * = primary case 
  
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data protection reasons or due to a lack of and / or poor record keeping. For this reason, it 
was necessary to supplement the 34 interviews that had been carried out by then with 28 
interviews carried out by ‘Local Works’, a pressure group which had campaigned to 
implement the SCA relating to the 20 cases for which data had been gathered.22 These were 
useful in gathering process descriptions and also covered some similar issues to those 
covered by myself. Moreover, Local Works were able to gain greater access to participants 
by drawing on their organisational networks to attract potential respondents. Nevertheless, 
it is important to recognise that they were gathered in a different context and thus should 
be seen as complementary to, rather than a main part of, analysis. Based on this data, two 
further cases (Lewes; Brighton and Hove), Local Works had carried out several interviews 
with a plurality of actors, were added to the initial 20. 
 
A summary of interviews carried out at local level is provided below (for a full list see p. 
285): 
 
 Adrian Bua: 33 interviews (circa 21 hours): 10 with process participants and 23 with 
council officers, process managers and local councillors. 
 Local Works: 28 interviews (circa 16 hours): 16 with process participants and 12 with 
council officers, process managers and local councillors. 
The results of local public participation in local councils were integrated within policy 
development at national level. The smaller scale of the relevant population at national level 
made the sampling process a simpler one. Key participants were identified from my own 
prior knowledge of the SCA process (having worked on the Local Works campaign prior to 
undertaking this research) and relevant policy documents. The network was then further 
explored through a purposive and snowball approach (Tansey 2007). This strategy led to 
interviews with most key participants, covering almost all key actors involved in the process, 
including the Local Works campaign, the Local Government Association, relevant Labour 
government ministers and officials in the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (see chapters five and six for detailed explanations of the role of these actors 
                                                     
22
 These interviews were carried out as part of research by Local Works intended to identify best practice in 
the first round of the SCA (see Flanagan 2012)  
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in the SCA process). Relevant ministers in the current Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government declined interviews. This was something of a set-back, however, their 
involvement in the ‘first round’ if the SCA (07/2007-12/2010) was not as extensive as the 
three previous Labour government DCLG ministers with which interviews were carried out. 
 
A list of interviews conducted with national level actors is outlined below: 
 
 Total of 14 interviews (circa 14 hours): including 3 Labour government DCLG 
ministers; 1 DCLG Official; 6 Local Government Association representatives and   
policy officers; 4 Local Works Activists. 
3.3 Data Sources 
In order to fully answer the research questions, a combination of document analysis and 
interviews was deemed necessary. First, document analysis of the SCA ‘paper trail’ provided 
extensive information regarding implementation procedures used by councils. As explained 
above, this proved useful in defining the design features of the population of cases. Second, 
much of the analytical work draws upon qualitative interviews (a total of circa 51 hours). 
These were deemed necessary in order to fully explore the systems of meaning and frames 
of reference underpinning the decisions and behaviour of the actors involved. This section 
discusses these two data sources, beginning with the approach taken to designing and 
conducting semi-structured interviews (section 3.3.1) and moving onto the role of SCA 
‘paper trail’ documents (section 3.3.2) 
3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Most of the analytical work of this thesis is based on interview data. Interviews were 
deemed necessary in order to gather information regarding the SCA which would be 
unavailable in process documents, including the motivations and experience of participating 
actors (Lilleker 2003). Because of the complex nature of the kinds of issues revolving around 
the research questions, qualitative interviewing (Arksey and Knight 1999) was deemed the 
best approach.23 More specifically, a semi-structured approach to interviewing was deemed 
                                                     
23
 A structured questionnaire was considered for data collection at local level, but it was decided that 
interviews would enable me to gain more nuanced descriptions of processes, explore the logic underpinning 
these as well as interviewee’s opinions on their outcomes. I should note that I also considered the value of 
combining interviews with participant observations. However, at the local level this was not possible because 
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necessary in order to focus the interviews upon areas deemed important to the study whilst 
also leaving space for adaptation when respondents raised important unforeseen issues 
(Legard, Keegan and Ward 2003). This section begins by describing how participants were 
contacted and recruited, it then goes into some detail about the approach taken to 
interviewing and explains in more detail how the data produced related to the research 
questions. 
 
Interviewees were initially approached through e-mail or post, followed up by a telephone 
call where necessary. In these points of contact before the interview took place, it was 
important to negotiate a line between providing sufficient information regarding the aims 
and objectives of my research, as well as the respondent’s role within it, in order to gain 
informed consent without giving so much information as to influence the context within 
which interviews would be conducted (Arksey and Knight 1999: 129-131; Lewis 2003: 66-
67). The fact that cases were not selected based on resource considerations (specifically 
regarding the proximity of cases to Norwich, England from where the research was carried 
out) meant that I could not travel to some of the locations in order to carry out face-to-face 
interviews. Thus, 37 interviews were carried out via telephone. Although there has been 
little work comparing the value of telephone and face to face interviews, conventional 
wisdom suggests that face interviews are preferable because the ‘loss of visual cues via 
telephone is thought to result in loss of contextual and nonverbal data and to compromise 
rapport, probing, and interpretation of responses’ (Novick 2008). For this reason I 
endeavoured to maximise opportunities for personal interviews to be carried out. However, 
in some cases this was simply not possible. Indeed, a considerable advantage of telephone 
interviews is that they allow the researcher to maximise resources and thus ‘cast a wider 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the public engagement processes analysed were being implemented as the research was designed. Moreover, 
I also felt a more ethnographic approach would be too limiting in terms of the breadth of cases I would be able 
to cover. Increasing breadth was necessary to gain a broader picture of the dynamics of participatory-
deliberative problem definition in the SCA, and using interviews would enable me to strike the necessary 
balance between depth of understanding of cases and breadth of coverage across the range of approaches to 
implementation. At national level, an ethnographic study of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process would have 
been optimal. However, I was not able to negotiate necessary levels of access with government departments. 
Levels of access necessary for ethnographic research at such high levels of political authority were perhaps an 
unrealistic for a PhD thesis. 
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net’. Moreover, they have been found by one study to produce data which is comparable, 
even if slightly inferior, to face-to-face interviews (Knox and Burkard 2009).  
 
At the beginning of the interview process and off the record, interviewees were reminded of 
the purpose of the research and their role within it, verbal consent to participate in the 
research was sought and respondents if they would like to request anonymity or 
confidentiality.24 My aim during interviews was to allow participants, to the most 
practicable extent, to talk about the issues of interest to this research on their own terms, 
ensuring that it was ‘their’ voice that come through in transcripts. Thus, the interview guide 
was mostly composed of ‘open’ questions, supplemented by more focused questions and 
probes where necessary, and I was careful not to ‘lead’ responses. At local level, interviews 
produced data which was mainly used to answer the first two research questions, and 
related aspects of the analytical framework on collaboration, participant selection and 
representation.  Although the interview guide was not adhered to in uniform fashion, 
interviews with local process managers and process participants generally followed the 
below pattern: 
 
 Process Managers / Council Officers / Local Councillors: A first set of questions asked 
officers to describe the processes of participation. This enabled me to judge their 
familiarity with the process, identify contradictions or gaps, issues to explore in later 
questions as well as to allow me to gain familiarity with the case. As such they 
generated data which was important for ‘casing’. A second set sought to enable 
officers in their own terms to explain the logic underpinning design choices. It was 
here that questions were asked and topics explored that were more directly relevant 
to the first and second research questions, and the related parts of the analytical 
framework.  This was a delicate part of the interviews. It was important to leave 
space for new themes and categories to emerge whilst covering the issues deemed 
relevant. Thus, mostly quite general questions were asked, broadly soliciting 
respondent’s opinions on separate aspects of the process, probing their 
                                                     
24
 At both local and national level, a substantial number of participants requested anonymity and I have 
therefore made all citations anonymous. None requested full confidentiality and thus some contextual detail is 
given in citations. 
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interpretations of the meaning and purpose of the SCA and the correspondence of 
public participation processes implemented to these. Often, however, more specific 
probes were required. When probing, it was important to be careful not to mention 
key words or raise issues that might ‘lead’ responses (such as ‘representation’ or 
‘collaboration’). Thus, for example, if I wanted to explore further the logic behind the 
choice of interest group representatives, I would not ask ‘why select representatives 
from interest groups?’, but articulate the question more generally, ‘why did you 
focus on engaging interest groups?’. This approach increased the independence of 
the interviewees ‘voice’ at the cost of some gaps in the data vis-à-vis the analytical 
framework. A final set of questions sought respondent’s personal evaluations of the 
SCA process they had described – in practice, this final set of issues was closely 
linked with the second. 
 
 Process Participants: Participant interviews proceeded on a similar basis and 
according to a similar logic as described above, although exploring slightly different 
areas. A first set of open questions asked participants about the reasons for their 
involvement in the SCA and their opinions nature of the processes they were 
involved in. These elicited responses which covered areas pertinent to both relevant 
parts of the analytical framework. Respondents often spoke in general terms about 
who or what they understood to be representing, as well as what they perceived 
other participants to be representing and offered general evaluations of the forms of 
collaboration at play. Many also bought up new themes, such as the role of 
facilitation, which had not featured as prominently in the initial version of the 
analytical framework. A second set sought descriptions of the relationships between 
participants as well as between participants and public officials. These were 
especially useful in generating data which could be used to answer the second 
research question by discerning the forms of interaction in panels, the division of 
labour between different actors and the rules underpinning the processes. A third 
set of questions sought the evaluations of participants regarding the process, these 
often involved probes on issues regarding representation/ participant selection (RQ 
1) and collaboration (RQ 2) which had been raised in more general fashion 
previously. 
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 Interviews with actors at national level produced data which was mainly used to 
answer the third research question, and explore the related part of the analytical 
framework (3.3.). They followed the below pattern: Civil servants, Government 
ministers, LGA representatives and Local Works campaign activists were asked a 
series of questions intended to gain their interpretation of the ‘purpose’ and ‘spirit’ 
of the SCA. This was intended to begin to gauge their opinion of the SCA process as 
well as, more specifically, to enable me to induce the role which they felt the SCA 
had in the policy process. Responses to these quite general questions also allowed 
me to note important issues to explore further. Secondly, a series of ‘evaluative’ 
questions sought to explore the extent to which this ‘purpose’, or ‘spirit’, had been 
met in practice. This led to productive interchanges regarding the nature of policy 
proposals developed and participation processes at local level. Finally, a series of 
open questions regarding participant’s interpretations of the meaning of ‘try to 
reach agreement’ (a crucial aspect of the SCA at national level) the strategies 
through which actors involved in the process at national level could ‘try to reach 
agreement’ and the problems faced in this respect. The data produced was 
especially useful in determining the extent to which the SCA negotiated a line 
between reflexivity and responsiveness.  
It is noteworthy that many of the interviews carried were with political elites. These can be 
subject to different dynamics regarding the relationship between researcher and 
interviewee (see e.g. Lilleker 2003). In these cases it was necessary to establish rapport 
effectively by relaying to respondents of the soundness and importance of the study as well 
as their role within it, in order to motivate their participation. This sometimes involved using 
forms of language that might be considered too exclusive in other contexts. Moreover, 
some of the people in senior positions attempted to take control of the direction of the 
interview and the topics to be covered. Getting interviewees to talk about issues in their 
own terms is a sign of success. Nevertheless it was necessary to negotiate a line in this 
respect, making sure the interview stayed on track and covered all necessary themes (Ibid: 
210-213). This was especially so when interviewing elites that set aside a limited amount of 
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time to carry out the interview, as was often the case with interviewees in more senior 
positions. 25 
 
Finally, it is important to note that my use of interviews would be subject to criticism from 
an anti-realist position on grounds of the foundationalism underpinning the claim that 
interviews provide a direct ‘window’ from which reality is viewed. The criticism goes that 
this ignores the fact that nature of the data is an artefact of the interview context. 
Interviews are understood as social occasions that reflect only the particularities of the 
context within which they are carried out.  Results cannot therefore be extended beyond 
their immediate context. Moreover, the information people give in interviews may be 
tarnished by post-hoc rationalisation and self-protection. In this vein, the analysis of 
interview data is limited to discourse-analytic approaches investigating the way in which 
individuals construct the world (for an overview of this argument see Hammersley 2008: 90-
94).  
 
However, this research adopts a position between extreme relativist and naïve realist poles, 
often described as ‘critical’, ‘subtle’ or ‘scientific’ realism (e.g. Sayer 1992; Danermak et al 
2002; Snape and Spencer 2003; Shapiro 2005). In this frame, the discursive mediation of 
interview data collection is accepted, and an important aspect of the interview process is 
understood to be that of collaborative ‘meaning-making’ (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree 
2006). Thus, interviewees are not viewed as a mine from which to extract data objectively. 
However, people do ‘have unique personal experiences that they can talk about, or … 
distinctive sources of information that are not available to others’ (Hammersley 2008: 95). 
Some interviewees were uniquely positioned to provide information on the processes and 
phenomena of interest. Access to this ‘reality’ was indeed mediated in the interview process 
by language and the influence of social constructions. However, this does not mean that the 
data produced cannot be more broadly applied, especially when it coheres with, 
                                                     
25
 Moreover, it was important to change style when interviewing ‘ordinary citizens’ which participated in the 
SCA process. In this context, it became more important not to use technical language, unless absolutely 
necessary, and to speak on respondent’s own terms. For this reason, I tried to leave a reasonable time gap (at 
least one day) between interviews with participants and political elites, in order to allow me to prepare 
appropriately and minimise the use of a style inappropriate to the context. 
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contradicts, provides a fresh perspective from which to understand phenomenon, or 
interacts in some other way with data gathered in other interviews, and across cases 
(Hammersley 2008). 
3.3.2 The SCA ‘Paper Trail’ 
Interview data was supplemented by a series of ‘paper trail’ documents relating to both 
local and national levels of the SCA. These documents came from a variety of sources, 
played a secondary role in analysis, mainly serving to increase acquaintance with cases as 
well as to triangulate data obtained through interviews (Davies 2001). Each document 
source and its role is explained below. 
 
 Hansard transcripts of parliamentary readings and committee sittings relating to the 
development of the SCA legislation (2006-2007) and following implementation (2007-
2012). These were gathered in order to contribute to the ‘casing’ process, deepening 
my understanding of the different perspectives and interpretations of the SCA 
amongst government actors. Consulting these documents confirmed my initial 
‘hunch’ that the right way to frame the SCA was as a participatory-deliberative 
agenda setting process. These transcripts were also especially useful in contributing 
to the exploration of the third research question, because they allowed me to 
highlight some of the opinions of government actors (especially regarding the role of 
the SCA in the policy process) that would subsequently be explored further in 
interviews. Throughout the research (beginning in September 2009) I kept a keen 
eye on parliamentary developments regarding the SCA legislation. 
 
 Local Process Documents: Policy proposal forms provided broad information on the 
nature of policy proposals and the forms of public participation underpinning their 
development. As noted above, these enabled me to begin to define the range of 
approaches to implementation vis-a-vis the relevant features of the analytical 
framework. 197 proposal forms relating to 82 out of the 100 councils that used the 
SCA process from 2007 to 2010 were collected. 
 
 National Process Documents: There were a series of official texts which documented 
the processes through which the SCA connected outcomes of local participation to 
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policy development. These mainly consisted of publicly available agendas and notes 
form meetings between the actors involved in this process. These documents were 
useful in gaining process descriptions which contributed to answering the third 
research question and highlighted areas which could be explored further in 
interviews.  
 
 Government Response: A report published by the government in December 2010 
documented the government’s response to proposals and rationale informing 
decisions. As will be explained in section 3.3.2 a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 
2000) of this document was carried out in order to gain descriptive statistics which 
provide rough indicators of the impact of the SCA process (number of accepted 
proposals and kinds of actions proposed) and the reasons given for decisions. It 
served to begin to answer the third research question by providing a proxy for the 
policy impact of the SCA and was useful in providing cues as to the reasons why 
government accepted or rejected proposals. The results of the qualitative content 
analysis are presented in chapter six, and conclusions are carried forward in the form 
of hypotheses to be further explored in chapter nine where interview data is 
considered. 
3.4 Analysis Methods 
3.3.1 Interview Data: A Code and Retrieve Approach using NVIVO 
All interviews were fully transcribed and the analysis was carried out using a cross-sectional 
code and retrieve method, whereby the ‘researcher derives a common system of categories 
which is applied – manually or by computer – across the whole data set and used as a 
means of searching for and retrieving chunks of labelled data’ (Spencer, Ritchie and 
O’Connor 2003: 203) on NVIVO software. Although qualitative data analysis software is a 
passive tool which by no means replaces the interpretive role of the researcher, it can offer 
a useful aid in the organisation of the unwieldy ‘datasets’ that characterise qualitative 
research. Software can enables swift movement between analytical levels (Spencer, Ritchie 
and O’Connor 2003: 207-212) whilst keeping the direct context of different ‘data-bits’ (Dey 
1993) a mouse-click away.  Software also enables a more effective organisation of the 
dataset through the classification different actors, and the groupings of respondents. These 
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prove to be important in the creation of ‘sets’ which enable the researcher to isolate 
different groups of respondents and explore themes within these. These are especially 
useful in the latter stages of analysis to explore issues which might not have been covered in 
initial coding rounds through the use of Boolean text searches. As noted above, qualitative 
research is a highly iterative process, which can make it quite time-consuming and 
frustrating at times, especially in its initial stages. CAQDAS does not solve these issues but 
enables the researcher to deal with them more efficiently. Although CAQDAS is 
interpretively neutral, it ‘frees’ the researcher from some of the more frustrating and time 
consuming aspects of qualitative data management. In doing so, it enables the researcher to 
gain a better perspective on data. Although substantial time was spent gaining fluency with 
the NVIVO package, I believe this was ultimately worth it (see e.g. Basit 2003).  
 
Interview transcripts at local and national level were loaded on the software, organised, 
classified and analysed through a series of coding cycles. A large variety of texts offer useful 
introductions to different approaches to coding (Dey 1993; Bryman and Burgess 1994; Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Ritchie and Spencer 1994; Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor 2003; 
Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Charmas 2006; Saldaña 2009; Birks and Mills 2011). 
However, no one can claim to know the best way to code. Indeed, it is usually an 
‘idiosyncratic’ combination of approaches (e.g. Glesne 2006: 153) that the meets the 
requirements of research objectives (Saldaña 2009). I therefore developed a practically 
focused combination of approaches to coding.  
 
A grounded theory approach was deemed unnecessary for the research, since rather than 
theory building, the main objective is to develop understanding of the case in question in 
reference to an established theoretical framework (chapter 3). Thus, I make no apologies for 
theoretically informed codes and analytic notes. My approach to coding was not ‘grounded’ 
in the data because the objective was to develop understanding of the case in question in 
reference to the research questions and the analytical framework. Mayring (2000) has called 
this approach ‘deductive category application’. Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1281) argue it is 
appropriate for studies where ‘existing theory or prior research exists about a phenomenon 
that is incomplete or would benefit from further description’ (see also Zhang and 
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Wildemuth 2009). Thus, although coding was initially directed by the analytical framework, 
space was left for the emergence of new themes and categories from the data. 
 
As shall be explained below, coding cycles proceeded firstly through high-order ‘structural 
codes’ containing much information and principally ordered according to the relevance of 
transcript segments to the levels of analysis (local / national) and themes derived from the 
analytical framework. The second coding cycle broke these down into hierarchically 
structured codes, which move closer to the specifics of the data. It should be noted, 
however, that this was not a linear process. Code hierarchies were tentatively developed in 
the first cycle, changed, and reapplied across the dataset in an iterative process. Analytic 
notes were developed throughout, identifying possible new themes and categories and 
possible associations between phenomena. These would be further explored initially 
through subsequent interviews or in the broader dataset through the use of coding queries. 
New themes sometimes led to a re-examination of parts of the literature.  
 
This was at times a frustratingly slow and very iterative process of conversation between the 
data and analytical framework. However, it served to refine the approach and was greatly 
productive in revealing important areas to explore. For example, this iteration led to the 
emergence of the ‘facilitation’ category from transcripts. As noted in the previous chapter 
this is an important, but relatively under-covered, aspect of the literature on democratic 
innovation (e.g. Smith 2009; Moore 2012; Dillard 2013), and the initial review of the 
literature on democratic innovation and agenda setting reflected this limitation. However, 
following coding cycles this aspect was made more prominent in the literature review 
section covering pluralism and power asymmetries.  Thus, although initial ‘structural’ 
categories were developed according to the analytical framework, bottom-up codes were 
also developed which allowed for the emergence of new themes and categories not covered 
by the theoretical framework. The coding frame thus underwent substantial change, as 
coding schemes were re-designed and re-applied to best ‘fit’ the meanings in the data. This 
had an important impact upon the substance of findings as well as the narrative structure of 
the thesis. 
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Having outlined the approach to coding in broad terms, a more detailed description of the 
process is provided. 
 
(a) Constructing and Applying ‘Structural’ Codes 
 
A structural coding frame that reflected the issues explored in the analytical framework (e.g. 
collaboration, participant selection, transmission), interviews (e.g. interpretations of ‘spirit’ 
of SCA, motivations for participation) as well as the levels of analysis (local / national) was 
developed and applied across the dataset, to label the relation of different interview 
segments to these aspects of the analysis. This was useful in organising the data and 
developing familiarity. During this process, notes were taken on potential connections, ideas 
and relationships (which had begun to be developed during transcription of interviews), to 
look out for, or to verify in further interviews and throughout the data. Throughout the 
process, codes, themes and categories were redefined and reapplied in an iterative process 
of adjustment. As noted above, this process also involved the incorporation of themes 
which were either not present, or not prominent, in the analytical framework. 
 
The first coding cycle also served to separate elements from interviews that asked for 
‘factual’ descriptions of public participation processes. These did contribute to interpretive 
work, however, they initially served as a basis from which a descriptive ‘framework matrix’ 
was developed, where four different types of approaches to implementation were 
summarised across three phases of engagement (agenda setting / proposal development / 
decision making). This underpinned the production of a table (see section 4.2) which 
provides a birds-eye view of implementation processes across cases, in more detail than in 
the sampling matrix outlined in this chapter (see tables 3 and 4). Thus, it was around this 
point that the ‘casing’ process came to an end, dovetailing with the initiation of analysis. 
The table produced by the ‘framework matrix’ was also a useful reference point throughout 
the research process when moving between levels of abstraction in comparing different 
approaches to implementation at local level.26 
                                                     
26
 A ‘framework matrix’ provides the basic thematic structure for the ‘framework’ code and retrieve approach 
to qualitative analysis developed by researchers at the UK National Centre for Social Research (see Ritchie and 
Spencer 1994; Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 2003). Although I did not follow the ‘framework’ approach, the 
development of a framework matrix was a useful tool for familiarisation regarding approaches to 
implementation. 
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(b)  Breaking up ‘Structural’ Codes into Hierarchies 
The second phase involved taking each ‘structural code’ into account separately, and 
breaking down the segments into code hierarchies. This process had already initiated in the 
forms of notes taken on potential lower-order codes, during the first stage of the coding 
process. During this phase codes and categories, such as ‘facilitation’, also began to emerge 
from the data. Their emergence sometimes required a re-initiation of the process from 
stage (a). Indeed, much of the analysis process is one of iteration between stages (a) and 
(b), until a code structure emerges which best captures the relevance of meanings 
embedded in the data vis-à-vis the research questions. 
 
(c) Generating Summary Statements Within Code Hierarchies 
 
Having developed what could be seen as the ‘skeleton’ of analysis, through the code 
hierarchies developed in stages (a) and (b), summary statements were generated and 
attached to each code, working from the bottom-up in terms of generality. NVIVO allows 
the creation of ‘links’ to relevant segments, permitting the researcher to stay close to the 
data whilst making abstractions and interpretations. This stage is especially productive in 
beginning to think about analytic notes which abstract from data to a higher interpretive 
level. However, since this is essentially the last phase in data management and 
familiarisation, the language used in analytic notes was fairly close to that of the data 
(Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 2003: 229). It was also around this point that I began to 
think more systematically about possible conclusions, relations to the framework and 
broader literature and began to envisage a narrative structure which would allow me to best 
present findings. 
 
  (d) Developing descriptive and explanatory accounts 
 
Once the familiarisation and data management process has ended (a-c), the analytical work 
began in the development of descriptive and explanatory accounts. Descriptive accounts 
involve ‘detection, categorisation and classification’ and explanatory accounts involve 
searching for patterns or associations in the data across the dataset (Ritchie, Spencer and 
O’Connor 2003: 237). The latter is especially facilitated in NVIVO by the use of coding 
queries. This involved looking through the summary statements created, as well as the 
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preliminary analytical notes taken through (a) to (c) and modifying, merging or separating 
these to create more detailed analytical notes that more clearly relate to the research 
questions. This was a complex process, which in the latter stages dovetailed with writing 
preliminary drafts of analysis chapters. Essentially, analytic notes – although they were 
highly personalised - contained a few basic elements: 
 
 Where relevant, numbers, or weightings of occurrences or opinions. 
 Relationships between summary statements, at different levels of analysis. 
 Differentiations between notes / themes relevant different types of cases (at local 
level) to guide comparative analysis and begin to shape conclusions. 
 Links to relevant literature. 
 
These notes precede and facilitate the write-up process, and are in an important sense 
separate to it. However, the transition from familiarisation (‘a’ to ‘c’) to analysis (‘d’) and 
then write up is not a linear one. To a great extent, stages (a) – (d) occur concomitantly, or 
at least merge into each other – especially once a certain degree of familiarisation with the 
data is achieved. Moreover, much ‘write-up’ also takes place during analysis, as well as in 
conversations with supervisors, friends and colleagues and presentations of research. 
Nevertheless, in as much as the analysis / write up transition can be rationalised and 
presented as linear, this is the best illustration of the approach. 
 
3.3.2 Qualitative Content Analysis of Government Response Document 
A qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000; Kohlbacher 2006) of the government response 
document was carried out. As explained above, this was an important part of answering the 
third research question. As Mayring (2000) explains, qualitative content analysis seeks ‘to 
preserve the advantages of quantitative content analysis for a more qualitative text 
interpretation’. Following an approach which Mayring calls ‘inductive category application’, 
categories were developed inductively because my intention was to capture the meaning of 
the government’s response as expressed in the document (see also Kondracki, Wellman and 
Amundson 2002). This would contribute to answering the third research question by 
providing an initial indication of the SCA’s impact and the rationale informing the 
government’s response to the process.  
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A coding frame was developed through an iterative process involving the application and 
refinement of codes to segments of the document. The document presented responses 
separately for individual proposals (see DCLG 2010) and thus the units of analysis were 
proposals and their responses. 
 
Once a coding frame that captured all meaning relevant to the third research question had 
been developed, a consistency check (consisting of percentage agreement between original 
coding and twenty randomly selected proposals) was carried out and, having verified 
consistency, the coding frame applied across the entire document. The codes were 
submitted for a final agreement check, after the successful completion of which data 
analysis begun in earnest (see Mayring 2000 for a summary of this process).  
 
The usual procedure to establish agreement in traditional content analysis would be to carry 
out an inter-coder agreement test. However, appropriate coding of the material was 
dependent upon very detailed knowledge of the SCA process and its context. Carrying out 
inter-coder agreement tests successfully would require ‘training’ to a level which resource 
limitations did not permit. Thus, an intra-coder agreement test was carried out on 10% of 
cases two months after coding finished to prevent ‘coding habits’ from influencing the level 
of agreement (for a similar approach see Graham 2009: 63-64). Reliability checks using 
Cohen’s Kappa were applied to 87 randomly selected cases across the three codes (29 per 
code) and delivered coefficients between 0.717 and 0.756. Vieira and Garret (2005: 362) 
consider 0.61-0.80 to be ‘substantial agreement’ (with 0.80-0.99 being ‘almost perfect 
agreement’). Although scores within the ‘substantial agreement’ range might be considered 
too low for traditional content analysis, in the qualitative approach a 0.7 Kappa coefficient is 
considered the minimum for reliability (see Mayring 2000: Sect. 3).  
 
Three categories were coded for in the response document. A detailed account of the codes 
used and examples of how the coding frame was applied are provided in appendix item 2, 
this section provides a more general description of the three main categories and the 
rationale for their development. In order to begin to gauge the impact of the SCA, the 
nature of the action committed to by government in response to the proposal was coded 
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for. Five categories applied to this code (legislate / direct implement, initiate advisory 
process, deliberate further, advise council, no action) and the Kappa coefficient was 0.746. 
 
However, this category by itself provided a rather poor indicator of impact for two reasons. 
First, the government might not be acting as a result of but in spite of the SCA. Second, the 
government might commit to an action which differs from that advocated by the proposal. 
For these reasons two further categories were added to the coding frame. First, ‘relation of 
action to request’ looked for an explicit connection made in the response document 
between the proposal and the action committed to by the government. Where one was 
made the response was coded ‘action inspired by request’ where none was made, or the 
government linked the action to another policy (whether in development or already 
implemented), the response was coded ‘action despite request’, where there was no action 
committed to, the response was coded ‘no action’. Reliability checks on 10% of cases on this 
code (n29) using Kappa delivered a 0.717 coefficient. 
 
Finally, a category intending to capture the logic given by the government was added. This 
included a total of 11 codes, which will not be revisited here, capturing the reasons given by 
the government for the response. For example, when explaining actions committed to 
‘despite request’, the government often pointed out that it planned to solve the issue 
underpinning the proposal differently or through a different mechanism. The ‘rationale’ 
would be coded as ‘alternative aim / act’ (see appendix 2 for a more complete account of 
codes). Reliability checks using Cohen’s Kappa delivered a coefficient of 0.756 on this code.  
 
Having carried out the final reliability checks, the data was transferred from Excel to an SPSS 
dataset and the relationship between the codes explored. The descriptive statistics 
produced provided a rudimentary picture of the SCA’s impact and its role within the policy 
process. Of course, the government response by itself is a rather limited proxy for the 
impact of the SCA, and does not serve as a basis upon which to answer the third research 
question. Instead, the conclusions derived from the content analysis were carried forward 
as hypotheses for further exploration and also served to triangulate the analysis in chapter 
nine where interview data was brought to bear on this question. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter three established a theoretical framework used to evaluate the SCA process, this 
chapter has presented an outline of the methods used to gather and analyse data to this 
end. Thus, so far, the thesis has essentially introduced the relevant literature and presented 
the approach taken to analysis. As I have explained, qualitative research is best 
characterised as an ‘iterative’ and ‘emergent’ process. Its development might be best 
communicated to an audience through the use of a disjointed narrative structure. However, 
for the sake of clarity the chapter has presented the development of the research as quite a 
linear process. Throughout this account the design and method choices made from the 
beginning in response to challenges which arose during research have been explained. 
Throughout the research process, although some practical obstacles did sometimes get in 
the way, I have endeavoured to be problem-oriented when making design and method 
choices (Shapiro 2005; Hancke 2008), designing an approach which best answers the 
research questions. 
 
The following two chapters provide overviews of the design of the SCA (chapter five) and of 
its implementation from 2007 to 2010 (chapter six). Having set this context, analysis 
chapters provide in depth accounts of the forms of representation and participant selection 
(chapter seven), the forms of collaboration at play in proposal development (chapter eight) 
and of the integration of proposals within the policy 
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4. An Overview of the First Round of the SCA 
Chapter two reviewed three aspects of institutional design. These can be summarised as 
‘who participates?’, ‘how is participation organised’ and ‘how are results incorporated 
within policy development?’. Each of these themes cut across cases and are to be 
considered in chapters seven, eight and nine respectively. This helps gain in analytical clarity 
but comes at the cost of narrative flow. For this reason, this chapter provides an overview of 
the implementation of the SCA from 2007 to 2010, building upon the description of the 
design of the SCA process and the context of its development in chapter five. The chapter 
describes in detail the implementation of different aspects of the process and introduces 
the nature of the roles fulfilled by different actors involved - the Local Works organisation, 
Local Authorities, the LGA and central government. It begins in section 4.1 by describing the 
nature of role played by Local Works coalition played in the process. As explained in chapter 
one, Local Works played a key role in the design and implementation of the SCA legislation 
and process which is similar to that which Fung (2005) and Kadlec and Friedman (2007) refer 
to as ‘deliberative activists’. Section 4.2 provides a birds-eye view of the proposal 
development processes implemented by local councils. Drawing upon interview data, it 
begins to add detail to the comparative matrix used to select cases (section 4.2) by 
describing more fully the participant selection methods and forms of collaboration at play in 
local implementation processes. Finally, section 4.3 and 4.4 respectively outline a 
description of the processes through which the LGA developed selection criteria and the 
requirement to ‘try to reach an agreement’ at national level was operationalised. The latter 
presents the results of a content analysis of the government response document, presenting 
a rudimentary indication of the impact of the SCA as well as its role within policy 
development. 
4.1 Local Works: Campaigning to Implement the SCA 
This thesis is primarily preoccupied with evaluating the institutional design of the SCA 
process, but, in order to understand the nature of the SCA, it is crucial to look at the role of 
the Local Works campaign. As described in section 5.3.2 Local Works was instrumental in 
the realisation of NEFs original idea for a ‘Local Communities Sustainability Bill’. However, 
their advocacy for the SCA did not end there. After the passing of the legislation, Local 
Works continued to play a central role promoting the process to local communities and 
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councils and scrutinising the actions of actors involved throughout. In this sense, Local 
Works played a role which is in many ways similar to that of ‘deliberative activists’: their 
main objective was not to promote a particular set of interests or policy, but the uptake and 
impact of a PDP (Fung 2005: Kadlec and Fiedman 2007). This section begins by describing 
their approach to promoting the SCA (section 4.1.1) and shall conclude by offering some 
thoughts on how their activities affected the nature of the process (4.1.2). This section 
provides an initial discussion as well as a point of reference for analysis chapters (seven, 
eight and nine), where the contribution Local Works made at different points of the process 
is explored, and the conclusion (chapter ten), which evaluates Local Work’s approach to 
advocacy and outlines lessons that that can be learnt the SCA regarding the role of 
deliberative activists in PDPs. 
 
4.1.1 After the Bill Became the Act: Campaigning to Implement the SCA 
Following success in getting the Sustainable Communities Bill through parliament, Local 
Works began to focus upon the important work of campaigning for its implementation. As 
campaigners at Local Works understood it, the process which the Sustainable Communities 
Act set up faced two main challenges. First and foremost, they were preoccupied about the 
possibility that the SCA might pale into insignificance due to lack of use of the process by 
councils. Secondly, they were preoccupied to ensure that the SCA was taken seriously by 
policy makers, and was incorporated into policy development in a more meaningful fashion 
than consultation. 
 
Local Works devised a strategy to mitigate these issues. However, although it leads coalition 
of over 100 organisations, it is itself an organisation of relatively modest means. For this 
reason when devising a strategy they had to strictly prioritise objectives in a fashion which 
they understood to be most conducive to overcoming the problems outlined above. The 
campaign’s priorities were to ensure the use of the process by councils and, once proposals 
had been developed, upon maximising the impact of the process upon policy development. 
In the Words of a Local Works campaigner: 
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The first thing was promotion. We needed to promote it ourselves 
because the government was not going to do it basically, or it certainly 
looked like that …  the second objective was making sure the 
government … implemented it properly, a concern arising from the 
resistance we had had from senior civil servants during the process 
through parliament. The fact will always remain that this challenges the 
status quo of how governance is done and so it has opponents at the 
centre …  [for this reason] the second objective to watch government 
and to continue to mobilise citizens and MPs to urge government to 
implement it properly and that became particularly important once the 
proposals had been submitted (Interview 40, Local Works Campaigner). 
 
Thus, the campaign had different priorities at different stages of the process. First, to 
maximise process use and second to scrutinise the processes used to integrate proposals 
and maximise impact. Each of these is to be treated in turn. 
 
Regarding the maximisation of use, it is important tone that it was not obligatory for 
councils to use the SCA, rather councils’ could opt-in our out of the process. Thus. Local 
Works campaigners were concerned that, if the process was not promoted properly, 
councils and potential participants might choose not to use it, interpreting as a ‘gimmick’ or 
postponing judgement on its usefulness until the process could be evaluated in terms of 
policy impact. Councils wanted confirmation that the SCA was not a ‘toothless tiger’. This 
preoccupation was exacerbated by what campaigners understood to be the government’s 
failure to promote the powers afforded by the process adequately, placing the onus on the 
campaign to do promotion work.  Moreover, although Local Works began promoting the Act 
to local councils immediately following royal assent in October 2007, the government did 
not issue an invitation for proposals or publish guidelines for the implementation of the SCA 
until October 2008. This delay complicated Local Work’s task. The SCA process was largely 
untested and this substantial delay must have  indicated that the government was ‘dragging 
its feet’, sending a strong signal to councils that there was little political will to give serious 
consideration to SCA proposals 
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In order to overcome these issues, the campaign took a two-pronged approach. First, Local 
Works sought to demonstrate to councils that there was a viable chance of government 
action should they choose to invest valuable resources in implementing the SCA process. In 
order to do this Local Works staff identified key decision makers in local councils throughout 
England and sought to promote the Act directly to them at key moments of the decision 
making process. Campaigners travelled the country giving presentations to council officers 
and councillors, promoting the powers which the Act afforded to them.  A key aspect in 
Local Works’ promotion of the SCA revolved around highlighting the powers afforded to the 
process by the statutory requirement to ‘try to reach agreement’ on which proposals to 
implement. In speeches at public meetings Local Works campaigners often closed by stating 
highlighted this as a crucial aspect of the SCA, for the government would not be able to 
ignore but would have to have to try to reach agreement.27 Second, Local Works 
campaigners sought to pressure councils to opt-in through the development of local 
grassroots support for the Act throughout England. To this end, the campaign mobilised 
supporters, sending out leaflets and posters to be left in strategic areas of cities, towns and 
villages throughout England and also encouraged coalition organisations to do the same. 
Local Works campaigners also organised public meetings to raise awareness of the Act and 
catalyse enthusiasm about the powers which the Act afforded to citizens and communities. 
Local Works sought to host such meetings in collaboration with local public officials, aiming 
to mobilise their support network to ensure maximum attendance at these meetings.  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such tactics were effective in creating a sense of 
expediency around the Act. A Liberal Democrat Party councillor from Bath and North East 
Somerset Council who would subsequently adopt a central role in the selector panel 
remembers positivity about the Act during Liberal Democrat conferences in 2008 and 2009:  
 
… there was at least two presentations at Lib Dem conferences which had 
loads of very enthusiastic people, which might have had something to do with 
the fact that they were selling strong local ale somewhere at the back! But 
                                                     
27
 Observed from participation in public meetings and seminars with local citizens, councillors and council 
officers held throughout England in 2007-08. 
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someone told me that a public meeting on the SCA in Dorset had filled the 
town hall, with people listening in from outside! (Interview 46).  
 
The LW campaign was largely effective in its promotion of the SCA process. Their initial 
objective was to gain the commitment of around 50 councils to use the process, and they 
surpassed this target. By July 31st 2009, 100 councils (out of a total of 328 English principal 
local authorities at the time) had submitted a 301 policy proposals, with a further 45 
councils committing to use the Act should future rounds be held.  
 
However, once proposals had been submitted Local Works campaigners turned their 
attention upon scrutinising the integration of proposals in policy development through the 
duty to ‘try to reach agreement’. Their endeavours were complicated by the fact that those 
meetings in which decisions were made were held in private and off the record, an aspect of 
the process about which, as shall be explained further in chapter nine, they were highly 
critical of. Nevertheless, the campaign endeavoured to mobilise decision makers in councils 
which had submitted proposals to participate in mass mail-based lobbying activity. They also 
identified and collaborated with supportive MPs, providing these with parliamentary 
questions to table, early day motions to submit. 
 
A final strategy was central in both maximising impact and securing the future of the 
process. The SCA legislation left it up to government to issue a further invitation for the 
submission of proposals. For this reason, the campaign drafted an Amendment Act which 
was taken up by the government in the wash-up just before the May 2010 general election. 
The amendment changed the Act into an on-going process whereby councils could submit 
proposals without a formal invitation and also widened the scope of the process to include 
parish councils. Beyond securing the Act’s future, the amendment served a further 
objective. The ‘try to reach agreement’ process had been developed slowly and 
campaigners felt that the government were dragging their feet. They felt that passing the 
amendment would motivate the government to speed up the decision making process, 
since it would seem illogical to respond to further proposals until those submitted under the 
first round had been agreed on.  
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4.1.2 The Prioritisation of Process Use and Impact over Quality 
Local Works campaigners predicted that the SCA would come up against resistance from 
Whitehall, and devised a strategy to mitigate for this. As explained above, the first aspect of 
their approach revolved around maximising process use by local councils. A Local Works 
campaigner explained the adoption of this objective well: 
 
… the Act will not succeed if it is not used, particularly at the start. It would 
make it easier for its opponents at the center to say ... ‘well you know, no 
one is really interested in this’ (Interview 40, Local Works Campaigner) 
 
The maximisation of use was seen as a necessary strategy to demonstrate the viability of the 
SCA process. For this reason, it was prioritised over other important objectives, such as 
ensuring the quality of participation process. A respondent from Local Works put this quite 
clearly: 
 
To have had a very small number use it, but use it brilliantly … would have 
been a failure with regards to the overall process, because the reaction from 
national politicians would have been, ‘well this initiative is a waste of time, 
maybe we should not bother with this again’ … We were not guaranteed a 
second round … So as campaigners we always had to think about the Act, the 
Act is a vulnerable child in its first few years and if it is not cared for it could 
die. So that is why right up until the deadline [for the submission of 
proposals] that was the number one priority (Interview 40, Local Works 
Campaigner) 
 
Campaigners expected that, by creating a sense of expediency around the act, maximising 
use would complement their lobbying activity aimed at increasing impact. This would also 
enable the campaign to demonstrate to councils and communities in future rounds that it 
was worth using the SCA.  In this respect, Local Works campaigners were preoccupied with 
developing a ‘demonstration effect’, something found to be key to success in other cases of 
participatory governance (Abers 1998: 138).  
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Although Local Works were relatively successful in ensuring wide process use, the 
prioritisation of process use over quality might be problematic because it diverted resources 
away from acting as a more effective check upon the quality of engagement procedures 
used by councils to develop proposals.  Local Works can be understood as ‘deliberative 
activists’ in so far as their aim was to promote the uptake of a PDP and maximise 
subsequent impact. However, as will be demonstrated in chapters seven and eight, many 
public authorities implemented questionable forms of public participation that fell short of 
the spirit of the legislation. Thus, from a perspective of deliberative democracy, low levels of 
procedural legitimacy generated by many participation processes weakened the claim that 
the SCA could make to influence policy proposals and undermined the legitimacy of Local 
Works’ advocacy. Low process quality (which will be become more apparent analysis of local 
engagement processes in chapters seven and eight) is an important problem. One might 
argue that if we are to understand ‘Local Works’ as ‘deliberative activists’ and not a 
traditional pressure group then their number one priority should be maximising process 
quality. However, further consideration will be given to Local Works’ advocacy and its 
implications for our understanding of deliberative activism in chapters nine and the 
conclusion, where the thesis considers in more detail the importance of competing priorities 
such as maximisation of process quality, use and impact for our understanding of 
‘deliberative activists’. For now, however, it is important to continue overviewing the 
implementation of the SCA. 
4.2 Implementation at Local Level: An Overview  
There was a relatively high degree of consensus regarding the laudable aims of the 
legislation amongst respondents. The SCA was seen as an original attempt to allow citizens 
to explore problems, think through potential solutions and influence policy agendas. 
However, such references were usually made in regard to the aims of the act, equally 
prevalent throughout interviews were notions that the Acts participatory spirit had not 
been met, or that it had served different functions in practice. This might not be too 
surprising. As we have seen in chapter five, as the Sustainable Communities Bill proceeded 
through the legislative process it took on new meanings and purposes, reflecting ‘issue 
expansion’ dynamics characteristic of agenda setting processes (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009).  
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Similarly, departure from the intentions of designers is to be expected in the 
implementation of the process. Analyses of public participation initiatives at local level have 
established that the impacts of locally distinctive institutional cultures mean that 
participation exercises often differ substantially from the intentions of designers (Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker 2006a; Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007). Attempts at institutional 
reform are to a degree path-dependent on existing configurations, meaning that radical 
change is rare. This is clearly identifiable in the SCA. Councils used the Act for different 
purposes and responded in different ways to the requirements of the legislation, leading to 
a very high diversity of the processes used to develop policy proposals. This had important 
consequences upon the ways in which policy proposals were developed, upon the kinds of 
opportunities created for people to engage in the SCA and, ultimately, upon the nature of 
the contribution which the SCA made to governance.  This section provides an overview of 
the different approaches used to implement the SCA and introduces the rationale 
underpinning these approaches. The aim is to lay the foundations, and provide a reference 
point, for more detailed analysis in chapters six and seven. 
 
The development of policy proposals throughout my cases are split according to three 
stages of decision making: problem definition; option formation and decision making28. 
Different actors were engaged and different kinds of processes were used at each stage. 
Table two in chapter three combined binary (high/low) measures on two design features 
(collaboration / openness) to produce a four space matrix differentiating between ‘types’ of 
cases and mapping their features to inform case selection. Table three below cross-
tabulates the four ‘types’ of cases identified there with three decision stages. It gives 
examples of four different approaches to implementation across these three stages of the 
process for one case in each type. 
 
Table three, presented overleaf, essentially adds details drawn from interview data to the 
matrix in 4.2.1 and can be seen as the final stage of ‘casing’ (Ragin 2004). The high degree of 
variation in approaches taken, with many nuanced differences, has made a clearer 
                                                     
28
 ‘Problem definition’ relates to the definition of the subject and the framing of the issue in question; ‘option 
formation’ relates to the definition and prioritisation of alternatives for binding decision; ‘decision making’ 
relates to the degree of influence which participation has over binding decision. 
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categorisation impossible. There is some overlap between cases and categories meaning 
that some cases appear in more than one category. However, despite some overlap, the 
four different approaches in the table are broadly characteristic of the variance across the 
22 cases. The labels applied to each category will be explained as their design features are 
described.  
 
In that group of councils described as using the SCA as ‘council lobbying tool’, 
implementation was characterised by minimal attempts to reach agreement and very 
narrow engagement. Local authorities essentially instrumentalised the Act to lobby for 
agendas which the council had advocated for some time, or had been raised by previous 
local consultations, but required action by central government. The SCA thus became 
essentially a ‘lobbying tool’ for councils. Unsurprisingly there was minimal public 
involvement in developing policy proposals in these cases. This much can be seen by the 
description provided regarding the case of Kent, that used the SCA to promote two issues 
which had been important to the council for a long time (problem definition), and offered 
minimal opportunities for citizens to participate neither in the development of proposals 
(option formation) nor in decision making. Arguments in favour of such approaches 
emphasize close proximity between council representatives and communities, noting that 
electoral bonds between local residents and elected members legitimise the use of the 
process in this way. However, as shall be elaborated in chapters seven and eight, the 
minimal civic influence over policy proposal development in these cases decreased the 
legitimacy of the SCA in influencing policy agendas. 
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Council Problem Definition (Idea-Raising) Option Development (Proposal Formation)  Decision Making Similar Cases 
 
‘Analytic-
Deliberative’ 
 
e.g. Sheffield 
 
(High 
Collaboration; High 
Openness) 
Open public event advertised in local press 
release, targeted members of voluntary, 
private and public sector as well as cross 
section of interest groups. (e.g. green, 
youth, ethnic, retired, disabled, gay). Circa 
150 citizens attended, broken into groups 
of 10 and raised ideas following open 
space engagement method. 31 Ideas were 
produced. 
Panel of circa 35 citizens recruited from idea raising event 
met bi-monthly to discuss and refine ideas. Discussion 
chaired by leader of the council and supported by 
specialist policy officers. Ideas discussed and refined in 
iterative process between participant discussions and 
feedback from officer research
29
, this resulted in the 
recommendation of 4 policy proposals. 
Decisions effectively made 
collaboratively during panel 
meetings although the four 
proposals required formal 
approval by the council.  
 
Cambridge, 
Wiltshire 
 
‘Sophisticated 
Consultation’ 
 
e.g. Bristol 
 
(Low Collaboration; 
High Openness) 
Held an open day and SCA launch event to 
raise ideas.  The event was advertised in 
the local press referring readers to an SCA 
webpage created as an information hub. 
The council also invited representatives 
from LSP groups, third sector organisations 
and single issue groups on the councils e-
mailing list. 151 ideas were produced. 
The ideas were sifted by the council's legal team to 
determine appropriateness under the Act
30
, resulting in a 
long-list of 71. The panel sub-contracted an independent 
organisation to form and facilitate a panel of 30 citizens, 
broadly representative of the demographic make-up of 
the area. These met on two occasions and prioritised 10 
ideas. Policy officers then fleshed out the ideas based on 
research into the proposal where possible in consultation 
with the original proposers. 
The council's cabinet met to 
discuss the proposals and 
agreed to submit the 10 
proposals recommended by 
the panel. 
 
Herefordshire, 
Lewisham, Kingston 
Upon Thames 
‘Expert-Elite 
Problem Solving’ 
 
e.g. West Dorset 
 
(High 
Collaboration; Low 
Openness) 
Issued press release in council’s newspaper 
and asked Local Strategic Partnership 
groups as well as local groups linked to the 
council’s community planning processes 
(e.g. transition towns) to submit ideas. 
Produced 18 ideas. 
Officer task group filtered ideas according to requirement 
of the Act, where necessary and possible contacting 
proposers for clarification on key points. A group of 35-40 
representatives from Local Strategic Partnership groups 
convened to consider the resulting shortlist, drawing on 
expertise of representatives to flesh out proposals, or 
modify where deemed necessary. 
The council leadership was 
represented on the panel and 
agreed to submit all proposals. 
Some submitted in partnership 
with the areas county council 
Brighton; Torridge; 
Wirral; South Hams; 
South Somerset; 
Lewes; Bath and 
NES; Wirral; 
Stockton; North 
Yorkshire 
‘Council Lobbying 
Tool’ 
 
e.g. Kent 
 
(Low Collaboration; 
Low Openness) 
Drew upon 2 ideas arising from prior 
consultations and council campaigns (local 
transfer of skills agency functions and 
building of lorry-park on M 22); published 
article in councils newspaper but received 
no response 
Surveyed Council Sounding Board, N1200 and 
demographically representative. Questions sought to 
establish suitability of Act as mechanism to advance 
proposals  
Councils cabinet chose to 
advance two proposals through 
the SCA process 
 
 
East Lindsey, 
Kettering; Bexley 
 
 
Table 3: Process Descriptions in Four Local Councils.
                                                     
29
 Specialist officer-led research was deemed necessary to establish the relation of emerging idea to existing legislation as well as fulfilment by idea of SCA criteria, i.e. that 
proposal requires central government action and advances local economic, social or environmental sustainability.  
30
 Ibid. 
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A second group are described as a ‘sophisticated consultation’, because participants 
developed and expressed preferences regarding proposals through deliberative 
engagement processes, but had little opportunities to participate neither in the 
development of proposals nor in decision making. Initial problem definition occurred 
by raising ideas for proposals through local press releases and website adverts 
(Herefordshire, Lewisham), contacting third sector networks related to the council 
(Kingston Upon Thames) or a combination of these approaches with an open public 
meeting where attendees could submit proposals (Bristol). Regarding ‘option 
formation’, all councils created a local citizens panel which, through could discursive 
participation, developed preferences regarding ideas and made recommendations as 
to which should be taken through. Process managers in in Bristol, Lewisham and 
Kingston upon Thames specified to independent agencies contracted to constitute 
local panels that they should be representative of the demographic make-up of the 
local community. In Herefordshire, the council sent an invitation to members of its 
demographically representative consumer panel to participate in five focus groups. 
In all four cases panels were, at most, made up of a couple dozen participants. Thus, 
statistical representativeness was replaced by the weaker notion of ensuring the 
presence of cross-section of the local population. Panel participants were engaged in 
an independently facilitated one-off event. They considered ideas which had been 
raised previously and recommendations were put to councils through a report 
drafted by researchers from the facilitating organisation. In two cases the council 
cherry picked from these recommendations, and in two cases the council rubber 
stamped the proposals recommended by the panel. 31  
 
Third, in most cases opportunities to participate in the SCA were limited to local 
elites, such as members of council-linked governance networks, local public officials 
and professional stakeholders, thus resembling processes that Fung and Wright 
(2003) describe as ‘expert-elite problem solving’. In these cases the SCA panels 
became closely related to the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). LSPs are usually 
                                                     
31
 Due to data protection reasons, I was not able to carry out interviews with panel participants in 
these cases. Interviews in these cases are limited to process managers and citizens who had proposed 
ideas for consideration by panels, two of which presented their ideas to panels in person. 
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made up of a mixture of representatives from public, private and voluntary 
organisations and were central to the previous New Labour government’s approach 
to collaborative governance and local community engagement (Geddes 2006; 
Durose and Rees 2012). However, the structure and membership of LSPs is highly 
variable across local contexts (Sullivan and Howard 2005) and thus the ‘openness’ of 
panels was dependent on local circumstance. Some councils (e.g. Wiltshire) 
supplemented LSP bodies by targeting representatives from groups which the 
council considered to be under-represented in local politics. LSP partners have an 
established history of local collaboration between themselves and council actors and 
SCA processes could thus be implemented according to the traditions developed by 
these bodies. For this reason, proposals were developed through relatively high 
collaboration between panel participants and local public officials.  
 
Councils drawing on the LSP to raise and develop ideas tended to produce policy 
proposals which reflected issues of national relevance identified through previous 
LSP-led consultations such as Sustainable Community Strategies.32 Thus, different 
groups involved in these initiatives often used the SCA as a means through which to 
articulate to central government issues identified through these consultations that 
went beyond the remit of local authorities. Chapters seven and eight argue that 
there is value in the SCA acting as a mechanism to propose nationally relevant issues 
arising out of local consultations. This might contribute to improving the flow of 
information between local governance structures and higher tiers of government. 
Nevertheless, the reliance on LSP bodies is criticised for being too exclusive of the 
local population. It operated according to a narrow understanding of expertise and 
often failed to include the kinds of local knowledge by which the designers of the Act 
intended the development of policy proposals to be underpinned. 
 
A final group of cases implemented panels with similar characteristics to ‘analytic-
deliberative’ processes (e.g. Burgess et al 2007) in so far as ‘ordinary’ citizens 
                                                     
32
 Sustainable Community Strategies are designed to develop a long term vision for changes in the 
local area in consultation with local people. The process was co-ordinated by Local Authorities and 
Local Strategic Partnerships in each area. 
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collaborated closely with local public officials and policy experts.  Sheffield is 
especially notable because it made the most concerted attempt to engage 
representatives from under-represented groups and to reach an agreement with the 
local panel. The first major city which committed to using the SCA, Sheffield raised 
ideas through a day long open public event at the town hall, attended by circa 150 
local citizens. Following an ‘open space’ engagement method (e.g. Wright, C. 2005), 
these were split into groups of ten and asked to ‘brainstorm’ ideas and consider 
potential proposals in order to establish an agenda. 34 ideas were selected by the 
group at the end of the event for consideration by the SCA panel. The resulting ideas 
were put to a panel of circa 35 citizens. The panel met on a weekly basis over a 
period of six months and was constituted to ‘make sure it was as representative as 
possible of the city as a whole, and try and avoid the use of usual suspects’ 
(interview 54, Process Manager, Sheffield). To this end, the designers of the process 
drew upon a list of volunteers from the initial event, targeting interest group 
spokespeople to represent excluded interests, individuals based on demographic 
traits as well as stakeholders from local public, private and third sector 
organisations. Importantly, proposals in Sheffield were developed through close 
collaboration between the panel and policy experts and officials employed by the 
council.  
 
Cambridge, on the other hand, relied on group representation without focusing on 
maximising descriptive representativeness. Ideas were raised at an open public 
event which according to the process manager was mainly attended by local interest 
groups which had a specific interest in the SCA, especially environmentalist groups. 
The council structured the idea raising process according to three themes from its 
sustainable community strategy, participants would write ideas on post it notes and 
stick them under relevant themes. Categorised ideas were then put to a panel 
composed of 15 participants who had volunteered to take part in the idea raising 
event and which was facilitated by staff from the council’s community development 
team. The panel met on several occasions over a period of circa five months and 
could modify ideas or come up with new ones. 
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As will be explained in greater detail in chapters seven and eight, out of the four 
approaches, the latter is broadly the most appropriate for the SCA. Participants in 
local panels in Sheffield and Cambridge spent considerable time debating, fleshing 
out, adapting and reforming policy proposals, supported by specialist officers in the 
council, leading to a more effective co-production of policy proposals, underpinned 
by a relatively comprehensive exploration of local problems. Nevertheless, chapter 
eight also highlights some problems relating to power asymmetries between 
participants in these more continuous and collaborative approaches.  
4.3 The LGA Selection Process 
The 100 local councils which implemented the SCA process developed a total of 301 
proposals. A report by the National Foundation for Educational Research divided 
these according to the policy objectives and the levers of change underpinning 
proposals. A summary of their findings in provided below (see Hetherington et al 
2009): 
In terms of policy objectives Hetherington et al identified 10 main groupings: 
 Measures to reduce non sustainable sources or wastage of energy; 
 Reduction of industrial and household waste; 
 Promotion of eco-friendly transport and travel; 
 Local Authority control and maintenance of housing stock (including the 
retention of rents); 
 Improving transport infrastructure;  
 Approaching social deprivation through the provision of affordable housing 
 Improving and maintaining access to public services; 
 LA retention of business rates in order to re-invest in local priorities; 
 Avoiding derelict properties and abandoned land; 
 Increasing local decision making power in the planning system. 
 
The report also identified the following ‘levers for change’: 
 
 43% of proposals sought devolution of powers to a local level via finance or 
decision making. 
 25% sought better outcomes through changes to existing or additional 
legislation. 
 18% of proposals sought to prioritise issues through funding, programmes 
and initiatives. 
 12% of proposals sought to use legislation to incentivise individuals or 
groups. 
 7% sought a relaxation of regulations to allow for more flexibility. 
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As explained in chapter one, the LGA selector panel was set up to filter policy 
proposals, and represent councils in the national try to reach agreement process. In 
order to carry out this role, the selector panel developed more fine-grained criteria 
than the general requirements in the SCA (see chapter one). This process is 
described in section 4.1.1 below, before moving onto describing the 
operationalisation of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process. 
4.3.1 Developing Selection Criteria 
As explained in chapter one, the SCA legislation required the creation of a ‘selector 
panel’ to filter proposals according to the requirements of the Act and produce a 
shortlist of these before co-operating with government in the try to reach an 
agreement process. However, it did not specify how these requirements might be 
implemented. Thus, the first task for the selector panel was to develop both a 
process and criteria for the assessment of policy proposals. This was an iterative 
process taking place throughout 2008 and 2009. Initially, LGA policy officers 
organised a series of consultative seminars, workshops and conferences with local 
councils, organisations interested in the SCA and government officials to begin to 
develop selection criteria (interview 38) to be applied alongside the requirements for 
valid proposals set out by the SCA legislation. From these meetings three key areas 
were identified as the basis for criteria.33 
 
1. A scope and coverage domain, which covers the scale and impact of an 
individual SCA proposal in terms of population affected and geographic area 
covered.   
2. A better outcomes domain, which measures (insofar as is realistically 
possible) the economic, social and environmental benefits of a proposal, and 
the extent to which it helps participation in civic and political activity. These 
are the four legs of the Act, outlined in the first clause of the primary 
legislation.  
                                                     
33
 The description of the development of the selection process below is drawn mainly from the 
agendas and notes of the first three selector panel meetings held on (9/03/2009; 08/05/2009 and 
25/09/2009) provided to me by the Local Government Association. Copies are available on request. 
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3. A viability domain, which would take account of the scale of institutional 
change required. Levels of support locally would also be a factor. It would 
also include any assessment of likely Government policy reaction (positive or 
negative). 
In a series of meetings occurring from March to September 2009, the selector panel 
met to consider these criteria and design a selection process.34 The initial idea was to 
constitute an assessment matrix where proposals could be scored on these criteria. 
However, although selector panel members broadly agreed with the above criteria, 
they argued that a rigid evaluation framework might lock them into a process of 
selection which did not ‘fit’ proposals. They therefore decided that decisions would 
be made by a majority voting, without a deciding vote for the chairman. They chose 
to develop looser criteria on the basis outlined above and called for the LGA to 
consult further with local councils and organisations interested in the SCA to refine 
these. As a result the LGA organised a workshop attended by over 20 councils and 
sustainability organisations to refine selection criteria. Those consulted also criticised 
the rigid nature of the initially proposed framework. Moreover, it was felt that 
centrally defined criteria would not be appropriate and that proposals should 
instead be evaluated according to local need, for which it was argued provisions in 
local sustainable community strategies provided adequate measures. Those 
consulted accepted that the LGA would have to ensure that the basic requirements 
of the legislation were met by proposals. However, they expressed concerns that 
positioning the LGA as an ‘assessor’ of proposals, rather than a ‘champion’ of local 
government, might undermine the strength with which the LGA played its important 
role of representing councils that used the SCA process in negotiations with 
government.  
 
Nevertheless, the ‘assessor’ role seems to have been that which the government was 
expecting the selector panel to carry out. For example, the agenda for a meeting 
held on 09/03/2009 quotes a technical letter sent by CLG to the LGA in October 2008 
as explaining that the selector should prioritise the kinds of proposals likely to prove 
                                                     
34
 Ibid. 
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‘acceptable’ to government, specifically noting it should take account of a ‘broad 
cost-benefit analysis, existing positions for which government is accountable and 
economies of scale in implementing proposals’.35 Government recommendations 
were accommodated by the incorporation of a ‘viability and credibility’ criterion, 
essentially taking into account the technical and juridical viability of proposals, the 
scale of their impact, the level of institutional change demanded and their relation to 
government policy. Meeting notes suggest that panel members were concerned with 
ensuring ‘political realism’, essentially defined as ensuring that proposals did not 
make large scale challenges to government policy and thus stood a chance of being 
accepted. 
 
The LGA had thus to negotiate with a rather different set of expectations coming 
from both sides. As will be explained in section 9.1, having to mediate between 
these different interests and expectations put the LGA in a sensitive position and 
seems to have impacted negatively upon its performance in this part of the process. 
Nevertheless, the LGA attempted to conciliate concerns articulated at the workshop 
by councils and sustainability organisations with government advice. This resulted in 
the crystallisation of their commitment to use a less rigid approach to assessment, 
described as a ‘critical friend / peer review’ approach, and an agreement was 
reached that meetings would be public in order to increase transparency. Moreover, 
it was decided that, as well as covering the basic requirements of the legislation, 
policy proposal forms submitted by councils, the main basis upon which proposals 
were initially considered, would ask for information regarding ‘how the proposal 
promotes sustainability and impacts on better outcomes as defined in the act and 
locally within key plans and strategies’.36 A local component was thus incorporated 
into the requirement to demonstrate in which ways the proposal promoted the four 
aspects of sustainability as defined in the legislation. Finally, panel members also 
highlighted the notion that the LGA might draw upon its collective expertise to 
strengthen proposals, collaborate with councils on their development, act as a locus 
                                                     
35
 Agenda Document for Selector Panel Meeting held on 09/03/2009. Copy available on request. 
36
 See appendix item 1 for an example of a policy proposal form developed by Sheffield. 
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for information and advice for councils seeking to use the SCA as well as adopt a 
lobbying role in regard to proposals.37  
 
Following this process, the selector panel committed to using the following criteria 
for the evaluation of policy proposals: 
 ‘Viability and credibility’ responded to government concerns described 
above essentially regarding the scope of proposals. 
 ‘Impact on Sustainability’ involved assessment of the extent to which 
proposals could be deemed to sustainably advance the environmental, social 
and economic well-being of local communities (responding to clause two of 
the legislation). 
 ‘Assistance from the Secretary of State’ relates to the requirement that the 
implementation of proposals lie beyond the scope of existing local 
government powers, or is blocked at national level (by e.g. funding processes, 
legislation, regulation, policy). 
 ‘Consultation Requirements’ relates to meeting public participation criteria 
(articulated in clause two and five of the legislation (SCA 2007) as well as 
regulations (SI. No 2697) and guidance (DCLG 2008) regarding attempt to 
reach agreement and the representation of under-represented groups in 
local panels. 
The selection criteria can be split into two groups – those relating to substance of 
proposals and those relating to the processes through proposals were developed. 
The table below splits these according to whether they originate in the SCA 
legislation, or as a result of the process used by the selector to develop additional 
criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
37
 The role of the LGA was described in similar terms by the two policy officers I interviewed 
(interview 37; 38).  
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 Proposed in Legislation and 
Guidance 
Developed by LGA 
Process Consultation Requirements  
None 
Substance Assistance from SoS 
 Impact on Sustainability 
 
Viability and Credibility 
Table 4: Origins of Selection Process Criteria 
These criteria informed the selection of proposals that took place prior to the 
initiation of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process. The section below describes how 
the selection process was conducted. 
4.3.2 An Outline of the Selection Process: July to December 2009  
Having outlined the broad principles and approach to be applied to selection, the 
selector panel moved onto the task of devising a selection process. The agreed 
process is broadly summarised in diagram one and the discussion below describes 
how the process occurred in practice. 
 
Diagram 5: Proposal Selection Process. 
By July 2009 100 councils had developed a total of 301 policy proposals. Before the 
selector panel met, LGA officers collated the 301 proposals and carried out a 
preliminary evaluation of these (Stage 2). Where they were unsure of their suitability 
to the SCA, officers would gather further information from the relevant local 
authority and seek specialist advice from within the LGA, or, if necessary, externally 
(stage 2a). When a proposal was deemed not to meet requirements, it would be 
eliminated from the process and advice provided to the sponsoring council on how 
best to proceed to meet objectives (stage 2b). In the course of this process, policy 
officers identified proposals with common objectives and proceeded to put councils 
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in touch with each other with a view to strengthening and encouraging the 
development of joint proposals, or to create synergies and enhance working 
relations which might benefit communities and councils beyond the SCA process. 
This was seen as an especially helpful role which the LGA played in the process. The 
selector panel provided a basis for the dissemination of information and a platform 
for policy learning across councils. Moreover, policy officers developed a series of 
themes to categorise the different proposals. These categorisations provided an 
initial structure for selector panel meetings (stage three), allowed selector panel 
members to consider the interrelation between proposals and highlighted common 
areas of concern across councils. 
 
The selector panel met four times (23/10/2009; 11/11/2009; 20/11/2009; 
22/12/2009)38 to consider the categorised proposals and devise a shortlist to take 
forward for government consideration. Summaries of themes and policy proposals 
were presented to selector panel members in the form of briefing documents 
provided as pre-reading material. Each theme had been contextualised by a brief 
report produced by LGA officers on the relevant policy framework and relevant 
issues which officers had considered important to take into account. It is notable 
that, as well as evaluating the suitability to the legislation in stage 2, LGA policy 
officers had sought government views on the proposals. Results from these inquiries 
were fed into the preliminary briefings developed by LGA officers on proposals which 
would form the pre-reading material for selector panel members, presented as an 
‘informal’ view from government as to the desirability of these. CLG officials 
consulted policy teams across government to get initial views on four key areas:  
 
(a) whether the proposal is already within the powers of local authorities to 
implement;  
(b) whether the proposal requires additional public expenditure;  
(c) what costs / benefits the proposal would involve; 
(d) how the proposal fits with the governments existing policy position. 
                                                     
38
 Copies of agendas and minutes are available on request. 
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It is notable that only area ‘a’ reflects the SCA criteria for a valid proposal. The rest 
relate to concerns which government might have in relation to proposals. as will be 
explained in more detail in section 7.1, the tasks carried out by LGA officers by 
initially sifting through proposals and then producing briefings for selector panel 
members meant that they had a high degree of framing influence over the selection 
process. This might be problematic, because it seems briefings were mainly 
composed of government’s views on proposals. The selector panel meeting agendas 
and notes repeatedly highlight decisions that the selector panel would take 
government views into account, but ultimately evaluate policy proposals based on 
the principles outlined above. However, it is possible that the process was highly 
sensitive to government concerns from the very beginning. 
 
By 22/12/2009, the selector panel concluded the selection process. Since individual 
proposals made separate requests which might or might not meet LGA criteria, the 
LGA separated ‘requests’ within proposals. This meant that some proposals were 
partially accepted. In total, the LGA subdivided proposals into 356 requests, 
accepting 58.4% (208) of these and eliminating 41.6% (148). The table below 
provides a breakdown of the reasons given for the rejection of the 148 rejected 
requests, as articulated in the LGA response document (LGA 2009). Some requests 
were eliminated on the basis of more than one criterion and thus the total count of 
criteria use is higher than the number of requests. 
 
Rationale for Rejection Instances / % 
Viability and Credibility 92 (48.4%) 
Does Not Require Government Assistance 60 (31.6%) 
Impact on Sustainability 22 (11.6%)  
Consultation Requirements 14 (7.4%)  
Proposal Withdrawn by Council 2 (1.1%)  
Total 190 (100%) 
Table 5: Instances and Percentages of Selector Panel Rejection Rationales 
Notable from the table above is the high use of ‘viability and credibility’ criteria, 
applied in 48.4% instances criteria, and the relatively low application of ‘consultation 
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requirements’ in just7.4% of instances. This suggests that the selector panel was very 
sensitive to government concerns about proposals, but did not place so much 
attention upon the engagement processes underpinning proposals. This possibility, 
and its implications, is explored further in chapter nine. For now, it is important to 
move onto describing the operationalisation of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process 
at national level. 
4.4 Try to Reach Agreement at National Level 
The try to reach agreement clause of the legislation is central to the SCA. It is by 
virtue of this requirement that the SCA can claim to go ‘beyond’ consultation and 
this aspect of the SCA was heavily referred to by the Local Works organisation when 
promoting the Act. Local Works sought to highlight the notion that that the 
outcomes of the process at local level would have a greater degree of impact upon 
national policy than that of consultative approaches. However, the SCA was not very 
prescriptive about which kinds of processes could be said to constitute attempts at 
agreement. Thus, much like the selection process, participating actors had to devise 
an approach to reaching agreement. This section begins by describing how the 
agreement process was designed and implemented (section 4.4.1). It then presents 
results of a content analysis of document where the government responded to the 
proposals submitted by the selector panel (DCLG 2010) in order to begin to gauge 
the impact of the SCA and understand its role within policy development (section 
4.4.2). These sections essentially set the context for more detailed analysis in 
chapter nine. 
4.4.1 The Try to Reach Agreement Process: A Short Description  
As explained in section 4.3, the selector panel consulted the government when 
developing an approach to selection. Part of these communications also involved 
establishing an approach through which the selector panel and the government 
could attempt to reach agreement on the implementation of policy proposals. The 
DCLG initially proposed a process whereby DCLG officials would review proposals, 
ask ministerial opinion where necessary and provide the selector panel with a list of 
proposals it was willing to implement. The selector panel could then represent its 
case to ministers in writing and the department would inform the LGA of decision 
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following reconsideration. According to notes taken at a selector panel meeting held 
on the 25/09/2009, selector panel members objected to the proposed process on 
the grounds that it was a too un-reflexive and purely paper-based exercise.39 They 
felt that a more iterative process which gave more opportunities for face to face 
dialogue with ministers would be necessary in order to deal more effectively with 
contentious issues. Thus, the LGA proposed that roundtable discussions between 
ministers, the LGA and policy officials should occur at various points, in between 
more continuous interactions between officers in the LGA and CLG. The lack of 
timescales in the CLG model was also noted as problematic, the selector proposed a 
timetable to government, highlighting this was essential for maintaining both the 
momentum and credibility of the process. 
 
In the meantime, officials in LGA and the DCLG had been in communication exploring 
areas of agreement and disagreement to set agendas for any future meetings. As will 
be explained in greater detail in chapter nine, this was a relatively intensive process, 
with civil servants having to communicate extensively with other government 
departments to get their position on proposals. The process culminated in a series of 
meetings between officers in January that established which proposals could be 
implemented at that point and more contentious proposals that required further 
consideration.40 However, the process was interrupted by the onset of May 2010 
general election and it seems that around February, the SCA process came to a halt. 
The only movement on the process in this period was a statement made to the 
House of Commons by John Denham, the Labour minister for Communities and Local 
Government, highlighting ten proposals that the government would be willing to 
implement if re-elected.41 
 
                                                     
39
.Notes for Selector Panel Meeting Held on 25/09/2009. Copy available on request. 
40
 Agendas and Notes for meetings between LGA officers, selector panel members and DCLG civil 
servants held on 21
st
, 26
th
 and 29
th
 of January 2010 are available on request. 
41
 Rt. Hon. John Denham MP, in a statement made to the House of Commons on the 6
th
 April 2010, 
transcript available at -
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100406/wmstext/100406m0001.
htm – last accessed 09/08/2013) 
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Following the election, the process was essentially re-initiated. The SCA was given a 
degree of continuity by the officials in CLG who had dealt with the process under the 
previous Labour government. Perhaps because the Conservative party had strongly 
supported the SCA whilst in opposition, the coalition took a more positive stance to 
the SCA, implementing an approach that more closely reflected the selector panels 
initial proposals of what the ‘try to reach agreement’ process might look like. A 
series of meetings between the selector panel and the relevant minister took place 
that explored those areas which had been identified by officers as needing greater 
attention. These occurred behind closed doors and no agendas or minutes have 
been published, something which was heavily criticised by Local Works campaigners. 
The process ended in December 2010 with the publication of the government 
response to the proposals developed under the first round of the SCA (DCLG 2010). 
The contents of this document are analysed in the final section of this chapter. 
4.4.2 The Government Response: Proposals, Actions and Rationales 
The final section of this chapter begins to assess the impact of the SCA and to 
describe what role the process played in policy development. Given the high degree 
of equifinality characteristic of policy making processes at high governance tiers 
establishing impact with precision is highly problematic (Chess and Purcell 1999; 
Goodin and Dryzek 2006). The kind of ‘process tracing’ (George and Bennett 2005) 
which would be necessary for a comprehensive impact analysis is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, it is important to try to understand how proposals related to 
policy development. Much of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process was not 
documented.  Thus, apart from interviews with relevant actors, the results of which 
are presented in chapter nine, there were few data sources available. This section 
draws upon a content analysis of the government response document (DCLG 2010), 
where the government essentially communicated its policy intentions in response to 
proposals, and provided rationales for decision. The data produced provides a 
rudimentary picture of the impact of the SCA and contextualises the more detailed 
discussion in chapter nine.  
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The focus is upon three aspects of integration, a brief description of each is provided 
below. For more detail on these confer upon the coding dictionary (appendix item 
2), and for the ways in which the categories were developed upon section 4.4.2. 
 
1. ‘Type of Action’: Relates to the kind action which the government committed 
to in response to a request. Five codes have been developed here – direct 
action or new legislation; formal advisory process (consultation, policy 
review, pilot); deliberate further; collaborate with, or advise the council to 
solve the problem in a different way; and no action. 
2. ‘Action Relation to Request’ regards the connection between the request and 
the action committed to. Three codes apply: responses ‘inspired by’ the 
request, where the response indicates that the request itself is the reason for 
the action; responses ‘despite request’, where the government makes no 
such indication or points to action which was already planned; and ‘no 
action’. 
3. Finally, eleven codes describe the ‘rationale’ underpinning the response (for a 
detailed list of codes see appendix item 2). 
The bar chart below gives an overview of the actions which the government 
committed to in response to each request.42  
                                                     
42
 Policy proposals developed through the SCA often made multiple ‘requests’. The units of analysis 
are ‘requests’ within proposals. Where the response differentiated between different ‘requests’, the 
proposal has been subdivided into these and coded accordingly.  
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Chart 1: Type of Actions Committed to by Government 
The government declined to commit to action in 129 cases, thus effectively rejecting 
44.18% of requests. However, in 73 cases (25%) the government committed to act 
directly or to legislate to implement the request; in 30 (10.27%) cases to considering 
the request in light of an advisory process such as a consultation, policy review or a 
pilot; in 16 (5.48%) instances the government made a softer commitment to 
continue to deliberate as to whether to implement the request; and in 44 (15.07%) 
cases it invited the council to co-operate with government in order to solve concerns 
underpinning the request, or to provide advice to this end. Thus, in over half the 
cases the response can be seen as a ‘positive’ one, committing to some form of 
action in response to the request.  
 
However, it would be premature to draw conclusions from this because it should not 
be assumed that it was the SCA which motivated these decisions. For this reason, 
when coding response types a distinction was made between actions ‘inspired by the 
request’ (where the government made it clear in the response that its actions were 
motivated by the proposal), and actions ‘despite’ the request (where the 
government essentially pointed to policies in development that were deemed to 
deal with the issue underpinning the proposal). The reason for making this 
distinction was to begin gauge to what extent the SCA exerted an original influence 
upon policy development. By cross-tabulating the codes for ‘type of action’ with 
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those for ‘relation of action to request’ in the 163 cases where the response 
committed to some form of action a more nuanced picture of the impact of the SCA 
emerges: 
 
 
Chart 2: Relation of Action Types to Requests 
There are a few things to note in chart two. First, the blue bars represent instances 
in which the response indicated that the action committed to was ‘inspired by’ the 
request, a total of 73 requests (44.8 %, of accepted requests). Commitments to 
actions ‘despite’ the request, represented by the green bars, were slightly more 
popular (55.2% of cases), placing a question mark over the extent to which the SCA 
exerted an original influence upon policy development. Second, the nature of the 
actions committed to ‘despite’ proposals differ quite starkly from the nature of 
commitments ‘inspired by’ proposals. Regarding the former, in the majority of cases 
where the response committed to ‘legislation or direct action’ to implement the 
request it did so ‘despite’ the request (71/73 cases) – represented by the tallest 
green bar – suggesting the SCA had little influence over these decisions. Regarding 
the latter, the most popular action ‘inspired by’ the request was to ‘invite’ the 
council to collaborate to solve the issue underpinning proposal, or to ‘advise’ the 
council to this end, without necessarily committing to implement a specific policy 
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(44/73 cases, represented by the tallest blue bar). Commitments to advise or 
collaborate with proposing councils are a relatively weak response when compared 
to other forms of action such as initiating a formal advisory process or legislating. 
Thus, commitments made ‘despite’ the request most often involved stronger forms 
of action than those ‘inspired by’ the request. This can be seen very clearly in the line 
graph below, which charts the percentage of actions coded as ‘inspired by request’ 
against different types of actions committed to. 
 
 
Graph 1: Percentage of Actions ‘Inspired by Request’ per Action Type: 
Whereas 100% of commitments to advise, or collaborate with, councils were 
inspired by request, the same was so in just 2.74% of responses committing to 
legislate or to directly implement proposals. Thus, from the line graph it can be seen 
that the original influence of the SCA (measured by the action ‘inspired by’/‘despite’ 
indicator) decreases as the strength of the action committed to by government 
increases. The popularity of invitations to collaborate or to advise portray 
government reticence to commit to directly implementing proposals on the basis of 
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the SCA alone suggesting that, rather than seeing the SCA as a determinant of policy, 
the government saw the process as exerting a recommendatory influence and/or a 
platform for communication between local communities, local authorities and 
national government. 
 
A rudimentary picture of the governments’ logic emerges by considering the 
rationales given in the response in justification of different actions. Table eight 
below outlines the most popular rationales given in support of decisions to 
implement proposals directly or to legislate ‘despite’ the proposals. 
 
Action Frequency Percent 
Same/Similar Aim/Act 
Different Aim/Act 
Total 
48 
23 
71 
67.6 
32.4 
100 
Table 6: Government Rationales for Legislation or Direct Action ‘Despite’ Proposal 
67.6% of cases within this category were coded as ‘same/similar aim/ act’, meaning 
that the government pointed to plans to implement (excluding minutiae) the same 
policy to that being proposed. For example, in response to seven proposals calling 
for government to allow councils to increase retention of revenue from their local 
housing stock43, and five proposals calling for government to allow councils to 
increase their influence on the setting of non-domestic rate taxation44,  the 
government pointed out that it had already planned to implement these policies 
through legislation in development (the Localism Bill) as part of its broader objective 
to increase the financial independence of local councils. In such cases, it is dubious 
to what extent the SCA influenced policy making, since it seems that the decision 
had already been taken. Moreover, it should be noted that committing to legislate 
was no guarantee that the ‘request’ would be implemented as intended by the 
proposal.  Proposed legislation would clearly be subject to changes which might 
impact upon the proposal as it proceeded through the parliamentary process.  
 
Second, commitment to direct action or legislation ‘despite request’ often pointed to 
a different approach to tackling the issue than that which requests called for. In the 
32.4% of cases coded as ‘different aim/act’ the government noted it was planning to 
                                                     
43
 Proposing authorities: Cambridge, York, East Devon, Hampshire, South Kesteven, South Lakeland, 
Warwick District. 
44
 Proposing authorities: Brighton and Hove, Doncaster, Lambeth, South Hams and Waltham Forest. 
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meet the request’s objectives in a different way. For example, South Hams submitted 
a proposal asking the government to legislate in order to give councils a duty to 
transfer poorly used local assets to community organisations that make a sound 
business case and can demonstrate community support. The government responded 
that it did not want to implement a ‘duty’, but that it would be making it easier, 
again through the localism bill, for local communities to bid to take over assets and 
would place a duty on councils to publish lists of assets of community value. This is a 
softer approach. The proposal essentially called for a right of community asset 
transfer, whereas the government is committing to facilitate the process of 
tendering for such transfers, where community groups might have to compete with 
other bids. 
 
A similar dynamic can be seen in table nine below, outlining the rationales informing 
commitments made ‘despite’ proposals to consider these in light of on-going 
‘advisory processes’, such as consultations or policy reviews. As depicted in the 
table, a popular way in which the government justified this response (‘Keep on 
Radar’ - 53.3% of cases within this category) was by explaining that it was exploring 
solutions to the issue, often pointing to an on-going consultative process, and would 
respond to the action proposed following the end of these processes. For example, 
in response to three proposals put forward by Liverpool and Doncaster to 
decentralise management of local post office networks to local strategic 
partnerships and civic associations, the response noted that it would consider the 
proposals ‘in light of results’ (DCLG 2010: 21) of a pilot scheme initiated in response 
to a similar proposal made by Sheffield, exploring possibilities for greater 
involvement by local authorities. Thus, the government deferred decision to a later 
point by relating the proposal to an on-going pilot project. 
Action Frequency Percent 
Keep on Radar 
Different Aim/Act 
Other 
Total 
8 
6 
1 
16 
53.3 
37.5 
4.3 
100 
Table 7: Government Rationale for Advisory Process ‘Despite’ Request 
In 6 cases (Different Aim / Act, 37.5% of responses within this category), the 
response recognised the importance of the issue underpinning the request, whilst 
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noting plans to act in a different fashion to the policy called for. For example, in 
response to a proposal by Westminster City Council to ring-fence some of the 
revenue raised by local business rates for re-investment in local economic 
development initiatives, the government noted that it would look at business rates 
as part of a broader review of the local government finance system. This would 
consider the localisation of business rate retention, thus eliminating the need for 
ring-fencing. In this case, the response linked the proposal to a broader agenda as 
well as an advisory process where the government would consider acting differently 
to tackle the issue underpinning the proposal. 
 
In terms of actions ‘inspired by’ the request, the tallest dark bar in chart 2  showed 
that by far the most popular response was to invite the council to collaborate with 
government, or to advise the council on how to solve the problem underpinning the 
request. This was so in 44 out of the 73 instances (60.3%) in which the government 
committed to action ‘inspired by’ the request. Often, the response expressed 
recognition of the importance of the problem underpinning the proposal, but 
disagreed with some aspect of it and stated intentions to find alternative solutions, 
or to advise councils how to work within existing powers to this end. This much is 
evidenced by the three main rationales informing this response, outlined in table ten 
below: 
 
Action Frequency Percent 
No Need to Act 
Keep on Radar 
Different Aim / Act 
Other 
Total 
16 
11 
8 
9 
44 
34.4 
25.0 
18.2 
20.4 
100 
 
Table 8: Government Rationale for ‘Inspired By’ Invite / Advise Responses 
First, 34.4% in of cases the response stated that there was no need to act in the 
fashion indicated by the proposal, since the request could already be implemented 
within existing powers, and the government proposed to advise the council on how 
they could do this. For example, Brighton and Hove made a proposal to change the 
legislation on allotments to enable the sale of grown produce to allow holders to sell 
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surpluses to local businesses. In response, the government pointed out that current 
legislation prohibits selling allotment produce for commercial reasons but that it 
does not prohibit selling genuine surpluses, and offered to discuss the details with 
the council. Second, in 25% of cases the response noted the need for more 
information before making a decision. As in the cases of Sheffield, Doncaster and 
Liverpool cited above, this often related to results from an on-going advisory 
process, but unlike these cases, the responses compounded this with an invitation to 
local authorities to collaborate with the government in the development of solutions 
in the meantime. Finally, a third rationale (Different Aim/Act – 18.2%) for 
‘invite/advise’ was that the government had already committed to an alternative 
action, and invited to advise the council as to how it might act differently to solve 
the problem underpinning the proposal (for examples of these codes see appendix 
item 2). 
 
These responses ‘inspired by’ requests are arguably rather weak and non-committal, 
offering simply to advise the council on alternative forms of action or to consult the 
council, without any guarantees. Indeed, as shall be discussed in chapter nine, 
interview evidence suggests that local councils had some problems in ensuring that 
the government followed through on these commitments meaningfully. 
 
The next most popular actions ‘inspired by’ request was for the government to 
commit to initiate an advisory process, such as a policy review, consultation or pilot 
project – summarised in table eleven below. In these 15 cases, the response 
indicated that the SCA had triggered a policy development processes. As seen in the 
table below, in all cases the rationale was coded as ‘government learns / agrees’, 
meaning that the government accepted the proposal and expressed in its response 
that the proposal communicated an original issue. 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Government Learns / Agrees 
Total 
15 
15 
100 
100 
Table 9: Government Rationale for Advisory Process ‘Inspired by’ Request 
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Often, it was a certain aspect of the request that the response indicated as the 
reason for acceptance, such as the importance of the issue, or the level of support / 
coherence of the request with those submitted by other councils. Most notably, 
these codes relates to proposals by ten local authorities (DCLG 2010: 34-35)45 calling 
for the localisation of revenue (or a proportion of the revenue) generated by non-
domestic rate taxation. According to the response document, due to the popularity 
of the request the government committed to considering the idea as part of a future 
local government resource review. Similarly, in the case of three requests calling for 
the restriction restrictive covenants on local amenities such as public houses, the 
response document recognised the importance of the issue and expressed a 
commitment to holding a consultation on the matter (Ibid: 25). 
 
Finally, it was just in two cases that the government was ‘inspired by’ the request to 
commit to implementing the proposal directly. Unsurprisingly, the rationale given in 
these four cases was coded as ‘government learns / agrees’ – as above. Both these 
cases were relatively small scale proposals, which made very clear asks and required 
relatively little legislative change. The first example is a proposal calling for a solution 
to the problem of ‘garden grabbing’. This is a practice whereby developers acquire 
houses with large gardens and apply for building permission on these. They are able 
take advantage of a legislative loophole whereby gardens are defined as ‘brownfield 
land’ (in the same use class as derelict industrial property, for example), targeted for 
new housing development by UK planning regulations. In response to a proposal by 
Chorley Borough Council, the response noted that the government had taken 
‘decisive action to implement Chorley’s proposal’ and amended planning legislation. 
In regards to the second case, the government responded positively to a proposal by 
Southend-on-Sea asking for a year-long extension of a capital grant to a local social 
enterprise – St. Luke’s Healthy Living Centre. 
 
                                                     
45
 Proposing authorities: Borough of Poole, Chorley Borough Council, East Lindsey District Council, 
Islington Borough Council, Kingston Upon Thames Royal Borough Council, Liverpool City Council, City 
of York Council, Southend-on-Sea Borough Council, St Albans City and District Council and Warwick 
District Council. 
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What conclusions does this analysis point towards? First, it is clear that the 
government was much more likely to act directly or pass new legislation ‘despite’ the 
request. The coherence of the proposal with extant policy agendas seems to have 
had an important influence over the nature of the governments’ response. Thus, 
although the response document provides a limited proxy for policy influence, it 
seems safe to say that government commitments to act upon requests made under 
the SCA often reflected policy decisions that were made elsewhere. Second, most 
action taken ‘inspired by’ the request was an invitation to collaborate with, or to 
advise, the council on solving the issue underpinning a request (44 cases), or to 
commit to initiating an advisory process such as a consultation or pilot project (14 
cases). It was only in two cases that the government claimed that action to 
implement a request or legislate was motivated by the proposals themselves. Thus, 
it seems clear that SCA proposals, even when accepted, exerted a recommendatory 
influence upon policy development. Policy makers seem to have responded to it as a 
source of ideas and as a platform for policy communication between central and 
local government, rather than as a determinant of policy.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of those aspects of the process which it 
is important to consider, providing a basis for a more detailed analysis in the 
following three chapters. First, although this thesis is primarily concerned with 
evaluating the process which the Act set up, it is important when doing this to take 
into account the activities of the Local Works organisation. Although they were 
fundamental to the implementation of the SCA process, there were some aspects of 
their approach that arguably needed improving. The concluding chapter shall 
provide some further thoughts on whether Local Work’s approach might be 
justifiable and on whether it says something new about ‘deliberative activism’.  
 
Second, it should be clear from the discussion in section 4.2 that many councils 
implemented processes which fell quite short of the ‘spirit’ of the SCA legislation, 
either instrumentalising the opportunities offered by the SCA or limiting 
participation to members council-linked governance  networks. Chapters seven and 
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eight shall expand upon the description provided in section 4.2 and evaluate these 
processes in further detail, with a view to developing conclusions as to what 
implications the experience in these cases have for the ability of PDPs to mitigate the 
elite control and low deliberativeness of problem definition associated with the 
initiative.  
 
Third, section 4.3 described the processes through which the SCA abstracted from 
the results of local participation and connected outcomes to policy making at higher 
tiers of government. The analysis so far does not bode well, it seems from the 
description provided that the SCA in this respect became a relatively cumbersome 
and bureaucratic process. The data produced by a content analysis of the 
government response document has important implications for ‘integration’. The 
analysis points towards two conclusions: (a) the importance of coherence with 
extant policy agendas for acceptance of proposals and (b) that the SCA process 
exerted a recommendatory influence upon policy development. However, further 
judgement should be deferred until a more detailed consideration is given to 
‘integration’ in chapter nine. 
 
Following this overview of the implementation of the SCA the following three 
chapters focus more closely upon the design features deemed important in the 
analytical framework, i.e. ‘who participates?’, ‘how is participation organised?’ and 
‘how are results incorporated within policy development?’. 
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5. Representation and Participant Selection 
 
Sometimes we create civic society in our own image. 
 (Interview 16, Participant, Bristol) 
 
Having provided a broad description of the development and implementation of the 
SCA, the following three chapters draw upon the analytical framework and interview 
data to more directly answer the research questions.  My interest in the SCA arose 
because it is a rare example of a PDP which has been specifically designed to set 
policy agendas at high governance tiers. Section 2.2 outlined three areas of design 
which it is important to consider when evaluating the SCA’s potential to democratise 
agenda setting processes. This chapter deals with the first of these, an area which 
deals with how local councils that implemented the SCA approached participant 
selection, and what kinds of representative claims where being made when making 
selection choices. To recap: the analysis chapters will seek to answer the following 
questions: 
 (RQ 1a) Did the constitution of SCA panels overcome problems of 
participation bias?  
  (RQ 1b) On what grounds where different participant selection choices 
made? 
Building upon the different participant selection methods and formed of 
representation described in the analytical framework this chapter sets out to answer 
these questions. The first thing to note in this respect is that the statutory duty 
placed by the Act upon councils to ‘try to reach an agreement’ with panels implies 
that proposals are developed through consensus oriented participation. The 
requirements of the kinds of discursive interaction necessary to this end limit 
opportunities for the direct participation of the ‘general public’. In order to make 
discursive interaction possible, local panels were constituted by subsets of the 
population (apart from Kent, where panel participants were surveyed). Thus, actors 
designing SCA processes had important decisions to make in defining the boundaries 
of legitimate membership for local panels.  
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It is worth noting here that the SCA itself pointed councils in the direction of a 
specific approach. SCA guidance defined ‘local person’ as anyone who might have an 
interest in, or be affected by, a proposal (DCLG 2008). This mirrors the ‘all affected 
interests’ principle common to deliberative theory (Goodin 2007). Moreover, the 
inclusion of affected or interested persons was supplemented by a requirement that 
councils make efforts to elicit the participation of representatives of ‘under-
represented’ groups. Mirroring an approach based on representation through civil 
society groups described in chapter 2, guidance recommended that civil groups 
might provide adequate representatives. Nevertheless, the SCA legislation 
essentially left it up to councils to determine if the criteria outlined in the legislation 
and regulations had been met. Very little specification of minimum standards was 
given and, beyond the advice provided in guidance documents, how councils might 
go about identifying affected interests and engaging under-represented groups was 
left as an open question. Perhaps as a result of this, there was a high degree of 
diversity in the constitution of panels throughout the cases considered here, as will 
become clear.  
 
This chapter analyses who participated in the SCA and provides an account of the 
logic informing their participation. Section 5.1 describes and evaluates the objects of 
representation which underpinned participant selection choices. This is an important 
endeavour because, as explained in chapter 2, the shaping of constituencies for 
participation begins to influence who, or what, is to be included or excluded (Saward 
2006; Marochi 2009). Section, 5.2 goes onto outlining the different participant 
selection methods deployed in local panels. It assesses the strength of the claims 
made of participants by process managers when making selection choices, the 
suitability of different forms of participant selection to a problem definition context 
and the success of each in avoiding problems of elite control. Finally, section 5.3 
brings the analysis together offer concluding thoughts regarding the extent to which 
different approaches avoided problems of elite control and participation bias 
ubiquitous. 
5.1 Representing ‘The Local Community’ 
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The SCA legislation required that councils set up panels of representatives of local 
people, and defined ‘local people’ as those likely to be affected by, or have an 
interest in, proposals. Nevertheless, my respondents rarely spoke directly in terms of 
‘affected interests’ and mainly spoke about notions of representing the ‘community’. 
‘Community’ is a problematic term because it can be understood, or ‘imagined’ 
(Anderson 2006), in different ways. Indeed, those affected by, or interested in, an 
issue might be defined as a ‘community’. However, as covered in the section below, 
this general aim to represent ‘the community’, likely due to the role which local 
councils played in resourcing engagement processes and ‘sponsoring’ proposals, was 
mainly understood in terms of individuals and groups within the geographical area 
governed by the local authority. This was expressed through concerns at finding 
appropriate ways to engage ‘residents’ and defining who could legitimately be said 
to a ‘member’ of the local area. Second, many process managers and participants 
opined that it was important that processes engage ordinary members of the local 
public. However, will be explained in section 5.1.3, the most ubiquitous way in which 
process managers and participants felt the ‘local community’ could be represented 
was by ensuring that the SCA process communicated ‘locally important issues’ to 
government.  
5.1.1 The ‘Local Area’ 
Since proposals were ‘sponsored’ by local authorities, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the main way in which the ‘community’ was understood was in terms of the 
geographical area governed by the council. Thus, reflecting critically on the failure of 
the local panel in Lewes to adequately represent the local population, a process 
manager reported that: 
… we ended up with a panel that was lopsided in its geographical 
representation …  I don’t feel that it fulfilled the spirit of the Act, 
which was to represent different groups and geography within the 
area (Interview 33, Process Manager, Lewes) 
 
Some expressed concerns regarding who could legitimately be said to be a ‘member’ 
of the local area. For example, a participant in West Dorset noted feeling anxious 
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that, because she was not a resident in West Dorset but commuted to work there, 
she was a somewhat illegitimate member of the panel. In her own words: 
… truthfully, it should have been a member of the community that 
had gone as a representative … if you are going to represent a 
geographical area then logically you should live or work, or you should 
preferably live in that geographical area (Interview 70, Participant, 
West Dorset) 
A participant in Sheffield expressed similar concerns: 
I’ve been here 20 years but I’m really a York man, I’m not really a 
Sheffield person (Interview 49, Participant, Sheffield) 
 
A preoccupation with what it is that should be represented within the local area 
came across strongly in interviews. Difficulties in defining this precisely are due to 
the fact that people’s experiences of the political system and the problems they 
encounter do not relate neatly to boundaries of political authority. Moreover, within 
local areas different constituencies and objects of representation can be defined. 
There were two main ways in which my respondents understood this could be done, 
which are considered below. 
5.1.2 ‘Every Day People’ vs. the ‘Usual Suspects’ 
Concerns with engaging members of the ‘general public’ are present throughout 
cases. This logic was mostly expressed by participants and council officers expressing 
the importance of representing ‘ordinary’ citizens. The concept was expressed in a 
variety of different ways, for example: 
… they didn’t take the common man forward (Interview 58, 
Participant, South Hams) 
 
We didn’t really get that sort of huge response from Joe Bloggs … we 
didn’t have that completely grassroots idea from people off the 
streets (Interview 61, Process Manager, South Somerset) 
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… people on the ground, just average people just living their normal 
life (Interview 73, Participant, Wiltshire) 
 
These concerns are equivalent to those found by Parkinson (2006) in his case studies 
of deliberative processes in the UK. The flip side of the coin to the perceived 
importance of representing ordinary members of the local public was a 
preoccupation with avoiding the ‘usual suspects’. As Parkinson (2006: 68) explains, 
‘when a group is identified as ‘the people’, it is only done by reference, often hostile, 
to another group that can be labelled not the people’. When defining ‘ordinariness’ 
as the legitimate constituency of representation many of my respondents made this 
kind of distinction: 
It was mainly people working in organisations on behalf of those 
people rather than the actual people (Interview 73, Participant, 
Wiltshire) 
 
… the LSP is a group of organisations, it is not real people (Interview 
27, Process Manager, Herefordshire) 
 
I don’t think I’m the most typical person, I think there are people who 
would be more useful than me (Interview 49, Participant, Sheffield) 
 
Thus, participants and process managers often expressed the need to avoid those 
parts of the population that are usually the first to take advantage of opportunities 
for participation, leaving a residual preoccupation with finding ways to represent the 
needs and concerns of individuals who are defined as ‘typical’, ‘common’ (etc) purely 
because of their non-participation. The problem here is that representatives of the 
‘typical person’ are impossible to find. Thus, if avoiding highly active sections of the 
population is important, Parkinson (2006: 69-72) is correct in arguing that it makes 
more sense for designers of PDPs to attempt to recruit statistically representative 
samples of the population, than to embark on the snipe hunt of finding ways to 
represent the ‘common man’.  
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Nevertheless, an important concern underpinning the avoidance of the ‘usual 
suspects’ is the idea that the SCA should specifically seek to provide opportunities 
for the participation of those who do not usually participate. This logic also came 
through strongly in interviews with those respondents who felt that avoiding the 
‘usual suspects’ was an important thing for the SCA to do: 
I think the idea of it is wonderful because it gives ordinary people a 
chance to have a say in what happens (Interview 67, Local Councillor, 
West Dorset) 
 
… try and avoid the use of usual suspects, or try and make sure people 
who weren’t usually involved were involved (Interview 54, Process 
Manager, Sheffield) 
 
In this respect, providing a channel for the participation of that part of the 
population which does not usually participate is understood as an important aspect 
of improving the legitimacy of the SCA process. Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason 
that, whilst the legislation was being formulated, political representatives engaging 
in parliamentary debates highlighted the importance that the SCA engage groups 
which are ‘under-represented’ in civic political activity. Julia Goldsworthy, the then 
Liberal Democrat MP for Falmouth and Cambourne argued that a beneficial aspect 
of the process was that it ‘will create a climate in which they feel that their [under-
represented groups] views will be taken on board—something which may have been 
more difficult for them in the past’.46 In a similar vein, Clive Efford MP, Labour Party 
MP for Eltham and Plumstead, argued that ‘the test of the Bill … is whether it 
empowers those sections of the community that do not engage in our democratic 
processes and civic structures’. 47 
 
Finally, engaging the usually inactive was also understood as a way of improving the 
basis upon which policy proposals would be developed. An important concern 
                                                     
46
 See House of Commons Debate, Sustainable Communities Bill, Second Reading, 19
th
 January 2007, 
column 1056. 
47
 See House of Commons Debate, Sustainable Communities Bill, Third Reading, 15
th
 June, 2007, 
column 1025. 
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underpinning the perceived need to avoid ‘usual suspects’ is that limiting 
participation to those highly active sectors of the population meant that the 
development of policy proposals became bound up with the dynamics of conflict 
between groups, preventing a more original exploration of local problems from 
arising: 
 
I don’t know that you necessarily had the people there who are what I 
call everyday people who might have interjected with innovative 
ideas. Because sometimes you can be in so many groups together that 
have been discussing the same things for a long time that you’re not 
gonna change (Interview 58, Participant, South Hams) 
… (people) came with very open minds, they weren’t there to push for 
this group or that group or this action or that action, that didn’t 
happen (Interview 56, Councillor, Sheffield) 
 
Thus, ensuring that panels are made up of ‘ordinary’ individuals is seen as a way to 
allow the panel to, as one process manager in Stockton put it, ‘think outside the box’ 
(Interview 62, Process Manager, Stockton). Moreover, inactive sectors of the 
population can hold different understandings of social and political phenomena 
which provide a fresh angle from which to approach proposal development. On this 
basis one might argue that the inclusion of the inactive or excluded will provide a 
more fertile context for problem definition processes, underpinned by a more 
comprehensive exploration of local problems and ultimately leading to the 
development of more innovative and original policy proposals. 
5.1.3 Locally Important Issues 
The focus on representing ‘the local community’ was perhaps most closely 
associated with finding ways of identifying and articulating ‘locally important issues’ 
or ‘problems’. This was expressed in different ways by respondents. In a small 
minority of cases making sure that local issues which the council had identified as 
being of great importance were being put through the process was deemed to 
legitimate the implementation of rather narrow engagement processes. Indeed, 
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respondents from councils identified as using the SCA as a ‘lobbying tool’ in section 
4.2, essentially justified their approach in this fashion. Moreover, as will be explained 
in section 5.2, ensuring that ‘locally important issues’ were being represented in the 
SCA process was seen as a way of avoiding the difficulties in forming a panel for the 
specific purpose of the SCA. For example in Kettering, the perceived resource 
intensiveness of  implementing a ‘fresh’ engagement process across the whole area 
led to the council drawing upon issues and ideas which had arisen from previous 
consultations, or, as the chief executive put it, from ‘conversations which had been 
on-going at the local level’ (Interview 29, Senior Council Officer, Kettering). 
 
However, ‘representing locally important issues’ was also deemed important by 
respondents in cases which made greater attempts to involve citizens in problem 
definition. This was often related to issues which had been identified as being of 
local importance through Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS) consultations. For 
example, Cambridge held an initial idea-raising event, open to all the public, where 
attendees would write their initial ideas on post-its and stick them under themes 
which had been developed from sustainable community strategy priorities. Linking 
the raising of ideas to SCS priorities was seen by some as a way to ensure that the 
SCA process was genuinely reflecting the priorities of local communities: 
 
… sometimes people are quite singlish to, come and use it as a 
lobbying tool to get the idea raised up the agenda. You know, whereas 
we can say, sixteen year old voting … there is a link to our children and 
young people in the community strategy because we are trying to get 
young people to participate and take leadership in their society 
(Interview 1, Process Manager, Bath NES) 
 
we actually looked at whether the proposals fitted with the priorities 
in the sustainable community strategy, because if it was identified in 
there as something that was really high priority then it was something 
that you know the working group would say, well yes, that is 
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something that we should definitely put forward (Interview 61, 
Process Manager, South Somerset) 
 
Community strategies were an important aspect of the approach to local governance 
promoted by New Labour and are closely related to Local Strategic Partnerships 
(LSP), which, as will be explained in section 5.2.3, were deemed by many 
respondents to provide a natural ‘home’ for the SCA locally. They are ostensibly 
developed through consultation with local citizens and stakeholders and thus 
respondents understood the degree to which an idea matched SCS priorities as a 
good measure of its local importance and thus its suitability for its development into 
a policy proposal to submit under the SCA.  
 
Finally, some interviewees who proposed an idea through the SCA, especially where 
those ideas had come from established local agendas usually advocated by local 
associations, saw themselves as representing the people where they lived by 
promoting issues which they understood to be important to local citizens. For 
example, a participant in West Dorset noted that he was confident that his proposal 
to alleviate ‘the chronic or acute shortage of affordable housing for local people’ 
would gain a lot of support because it was ‘an issue that concerns a huge number of 
people who live and work in West Dorset’ (Interview 69, Participant, West Dorset). 
As section 5.2.4 will explain, in contrast to the views expressed by some respondents 
regarding the need to avoid the ‘usual suspects’, the knowledge and expertise held 
by members of civil organisations about the problems which affected local people 
was deemed by some process managers and participants to legitimate their 
involvement in proposing ideas. 
5.1.4 Problems with Locality-based Constituencies? 
These objects of representation are far from mutually exclusive. In fact, they were 
often related to each other. For example, as explained above, defining the ‘local 
community’ in terms of ‘ordinary residents’ (understood as those who do not usually 
participate in local politics), was often seen as a way to ensure that issues of local 
importance were being raised. Thus, they are all examples of, potentially 
complementary, understandings of what it is within the local community that is 
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being represented by the SCA process. This ‘local’ focus is something they have in 
common and thus before moving onto participant selection it is important to 
consider if there are any problems with ‘locality-based’ objects of representation.  
As explained in chapter 2, Parkinson (2006) and Smith (2009b: 261) have argued that 
limiting participatory governance to local issues is problematic because it leaves 
important issues off the agenda. However, this criticism does not necessarily apply 
to the SCA, for it is a process which although focused on the locality, is specifically 
designed to transcend local/national divisions. In the SCA people were being asked 
to think locally about problems which needed national action, and so the focus on 
locality does not lead to such an agenda limitation. Indeed, issues decidable at the 
local level do not meet the requirements of the legislation for a proposal to be put 
through the process.  
 
It is still a possibility, however, that the local focus of SCA panels led to the 
development of policy proposals which are responsive to particular local contexts, 
but which could impinge negatively upon other areas if implemented at larger scales. 
This is clearly an issue which goes to the heart of the SCA. Interests might be 
excluded from the development of proposals that might nevertheless be affected by 
their implementation. This is one of the main reasons why the SCA was not intended 
to determine policy. It is the role of policy makers in representative institutions to 
take these considerations into account when deciding whether or not to accept 
policy proposals. 
 
It might be argued that if this problem is to be avoided, local councils are perhaps 
not the appropriate agencies to resource public engagement and sponsor policy 
proposals. There are other possible approaches that could provide a more inclusive 
basis for problem definition. However, the consideration of these is left for the 
conclusion of the thesis (chapter eight). For now, it is necessary to focus specifically 
at what can be learnt from the selection processes implemented by local councils 
and the logic underpinning these. 
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Indeed, many councils using the SCA covered relatively large-scale areas with diverse 
populations which may mitigate these concerns. Thus, the extent to which panels 
might exclude certain interests shall therefore depend on participant selection 
methods, at least as much as upon the scale of the area which councils administer. It 
is therefore pertinent to give further consideration to which groups and/or 
individuals were identified as appropriate representatives of the locality and what 
processes were used to attract their participation in the local panels. The chapter 
now turns to these issues. 
5.2 Participant Selection Forms: Raising Ideas and the Constitution of Panels 
This section describes the different ways in which ‘the locality’ was represented. The 
lack of direct observation limits the ability to consider representative claims made by 
participants during the process of panel participation (see e.g. Marochi 2009), but 
greater consideration can be given to the strength of representation claims made of 
participants by process designers when making selection choices. Councils relied 
upon eclectic combinations of different approaches, and engaged different actors 
across different stages of the process, throwing into doubt the neat distinctions 
made between the different forms in chapter 2. The only way to present all 
configurations would be by describing processes on a case by case basis, however, 
this would be far too unwieldy. Instead the section is organised thematically in order 
to draw out more fully the contrasts between different approaches to constituting 
implementing the SCA. Since some councils drew upon various approaches some 
cases might appear in more than one section. 
5.2.1 The SCA as a ‘Lobbying Tool’ 
A small minority of councils saw the Act as an opportunity for them to advance 
campaigns which they had advocated for some time. In the case of Kent, a policy 
officer noted that the Local Works campaign had convinced the council’s leadership 
to use the SCA by highlighting the devolutionary potential of the process. Kent thus 
saw the SCA principally as a mechanism through which to lobby for transfer of 
functions. In the words of a Kent process manager: 
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They [the leadership] saw the act as principally a mechanism by which 
they could seek and position themselves or lobby for transfer of 
functions from central government and its associated quangos and 
executive agencies implicated into Kent on the grounds that the 
authority is in a better strategic position to design policies and 
strategies on those service areas than national government (Interview 
28, Process Manager, Kent) 
 
In a similar fashion, Kettering decided to use the process to promote issues which 
either the council had identified or which had arisen through previous local 
consultations. Thus, a senior manager noted:  
 
we were opportunistic in that we saw the act as an opportunity to try 
to solve a problem that we had already thought about (Interview 29, 
Senior Council Officer, Kettering) 
 
In these cases there was minimal or no collaboration between citizens or between 
citizens and public officials in the raising, development or prioritisation of policy 
proposals. As noted in section 4.2, Kettering convened no local panel and relied 
instead on the provision of evidence that proposals had arisen through past 
consultations to justify submission of proposals. Kent put ideas to its 
demographically representative citizens panel in the form of a survey designed to 
measure the perceived importance of the proposals as well as the suitability of the 
SCA as the process through which to propose the ideas. In both cases, panel 
participants had no influence over the development of the proposal. Moreover, the 
exercise was entirely consultative, with the final decision on which policies to 
propose being taken by the council’s leadership. 
 
It is clear that these processes stray considerably from what the original advocates of 
the SCA intended (see section 5.1). Nevertheless, two arguments might be made in 
defence of these approaches. First, it might be argued that bonds of authorisation 
and accountability between local residents and elected members legitimise the use 
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of the process by the council in this way. Second, it might also be argued that, 
despite the low levels of civic influence, councils proposed ideas which are of great 
importance to those affected. A policy officer from the LGA put both these points 
well: 
Q. But is it [the SCA] for local people or local councils? 
A. I do not see them as necessarily different things, your local 
councillor is a resident, and he or she is your representative. So I do 
not see it as completely different, I see them as working together to 
do that. I do not see it as a confrontational type relationship but as a 
very collaborative relationship, so usually your local councillor is 
speaking on behalf of what his / her local residents want to say. So I 
do not think it is that different (Interview 37, LGA Policy Officer) 
 
This opinion is perhaps to be expected from a policy officer at the LGA. The ‘raison 
d’etre’ of this organisation is precisely to represent and champion local authorities. It 
is of course true that principal-agent bonds exist between councillors and the local 
electorate. However, claims of shared experience are more tenuous. There is a sense 
in which the very purpose of the SCA is to give representation to locally important 
issues at higher tiers of government. If it can be established that local councils are in 
the best position to understand and represent local problems, arguably this is a 
favourable approach. Nevertheless, chapter eight argues that proposing issues which 
are readily identifiable through the SCA is not a problem as long as panels are able to 
reject these or modify them in reflexive agenda setting processes and thus 
contribute to their development into SCA policy proposals. The idea being that panel 
deliberations might add something to proposal development. This clearly could not 
occur in councils using the SCA as a ‘lobbying tool’. Finally, much of the ‘democratic 
malaise’ which innovations are seen as a potential ‘cure’ for (Geissel and Newton 
2012) arises from the civic expectation that ‘democracy’ should mean more than 
electoral representation (Dalton 2004; Power Inquiry 2006). Democratic innovations 
will clearly not make a contribution to ‘curing the malaise’ if the opportunities to 
participate are limited to representatives. In fact, there is no reason to call them 
innovations at all! 
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5.2.2 The ‘Mini-Public’ Approach: Descriptive Representativeness and Random 
Selection 
As argued above, the statutory duty placed by the Act upon councils to ‘try to reach 
an agreement’ with local panels implies a degree of interaction between local panels 
and decision makers in the council. Thus, local panels were mostly constituted by 
subsets of the local population. A popular way in which the ‘legitimacy problems’ 
(Parkinson 2003; 2006) associated with processes relying on the participation of 
unelected sub-sets of the population have been mitigated is through the use 
selection techniques that result in the formation of ‘mini-publics’. To this end, 
random stratified sampling is used to identify and invite a group of participants 
which is in some way (depending on the variables used) descriptively representative 
of the make-up of the population from which they are drawn. This approach was 
present in six cases where officers identified constituting descriptively representative 
panels as a key aim. Within these, just Kent engaged a panel which could be said to 
meet standards of statistical representativeness. As seen in section 4.2, Kent used an 
electronic survey allowing its demographically representative citizen’s panel to 
express preferences on policy proposals which had been formulated by the council 
itself.48 Kent’s approach gave no opportunities for the contribution of the panel to 
the development and formation of the ideas. Thus, the panel played a minor role in 
the proposal development process and for this reason the rest of this section focuses 
on the remaining five (Lewisham, Sheffield, Herefordshire, Kingston Upon Thames, 
Bristol). 
 
The first objection that might be raised against these approaches is that the size of 
the panels fell way short of the numbers needed to guarantee statistical 
representativeness. Panels were composed of circa fifteen to thirty-five citizens, and 
thus statistical representativeness was replaced with the aim of recruiting a ‘cross-
section’ of the local population. This was noted by some respondents as a problem:  
                                                     
48
 South Hams and South Somerset also involved consumer panels in the SCA process. However, they 
did not play the function of the main panel, instead the LSP subgroups debated ideas and formed 
recommendations which were vetted by surveying consumer panels. 
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I, for one, I don’t know whether a panel of 15 people is necessarily 
that representative … there were disabled people there and it did, I 
think, broadly represent the ethnic mix of the borough; it [the council] 
made an effort on that count. My main concern was the number 15 
personally (Interview 35, Participant, Lewisham). 
 
The other difficulty I suppose is to have a meeting that is small enough 
to manage and big enough to be representative (Interview 48, 
Participant, Sheffield). 
 
I think getting a panel of 10 people is not that representative … 
(Interview 60, Council Officer, South Hams). 
 
In deliberative polls, for example, a ‘microcosm’ of the population is formed through 
quota sampling to ensure the statistical representation of the population, at least on 
the criteria which the group was chosen, and it is generally accepted that an 
appropriately selected sample of at least 200 is necessary to approach statistical 
representativeness, the general ‘rule of thumb’ being the bigger the sample, the 
better (Siu 2010). Thus, if full statistical representativeness is a crucial part of 
participation in ‘mini-publics’, the legitimacy of the processes in these cases might be 
said to be seriously lacking. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the sizes of the 
samples required to construct statistically representative groups are too high for 
deliberation to occur between all participants anyway. It was this trade-off which the 
Sheffield respondent referred to in terms of making panels ‘manageable’. Thus, the 
importance of meeting statistical representativeness needs to be weighed against 
the requirements of discursive, or deliberative, interactions. One might argue that if 
it improves deliberation, recruiting a smaller panel which is broadly representative is 
an adequate compromise. 
 
There are other more fundamental problems, however, with the approach taken by 
these councils. First, in the cases of Herefordshire and Sheffield there was a strong 
element of self-selection which may have undermined the representativeness of 
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panels. In Herefordshire, participants were invited from the councils’ statistically 
representative and randomly selected sounding board (circa N1200). In Sheffield, 
process managers did constitute a panel which they deemed to be roughly 
descriptively representative, but the panel was constituted from a selection of 
volunteers from an initial open public meeting held to gain ideas. In both cases, 
although most acutely in Sheffield, these approaches to selecting participants are 
likely to have led to an over-representation of those with the disposition to 
participate in exercises like the SCA.  
 
Second, a problem with descriptive representativeness which applies to all these 
cases is that if we understand the process of participation to be constitutive of 
preferences and identity (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007), this might lead to 
representative claims being made which divert from the original criteria upon which 
different individuals were selected. Moreover, the random selection procedures 
through which mini-publics are constituted are seen as an important way to ensure 
that the ‘usual suspects’ are not over-represented. However, it has been found that 
the process of participation, especially in more intensive and continuous processes, 
can turn the ‘mini-public’ into a ‘sub-elite’ with similar features and trajectories to 
those of the ‘usual suspects’ (Talpin 2011). Although it is reasonable to assume that 
the one-off nature of the events which these councils implemented might have 
prevented this from occurring, this is likely to become a problem in more continuous 
processes. 
 
There are, despite these problems, important things to be said in favour of these 
approaches. First, the fact that participants in Bristol, Lewisham and Kingston upon 
Thames,49 were selected randomly might have increased the pluralism of panels, 
leading to a richer epistemic basis upon which to develop policy proposals. Second, 
as Parkinson (2006: 76) argues, ‘randomness can have a circuit-breaker role, helping 
move debates on when politics as usual, conducted between competing interests 
                                                     
49
 Herefordshire is excluded because as noted above, the council invited members of its 
demographically representative consumer sounding board to participate and thus there is an 
important element of self-selection at play here. 
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and networks, has broken down’. Although deliberative theorists differ on this 
matter, there is evidence to suggests that partisan attachments can hamper 
deliberation (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold 2007; Muirhead 2010; Gaynor 2011). 
Indeed, as will be explained below, this was a concern to some respondents in cases 
where interest groups played an important role in panels. Thus random selection 
might be an important way in which to increase the quality of deliberation.  
 
Finally, it is also noteworthy that descriptive representativeness seems to be deeply 
embedded as a ‘common sense’ legitimator of non-electoral forms of participation. 
Indeed, although designers of local processes in most cases did not implement 
processes which can make a strong claim to descriptive representativeness, 
references to the importance of ‘representative panels’ were made by council 
officers (interviews 1; 6 and 22) and participants (interviews 8; 35; 48 and 70) 
offering apologetic justifications for, or noting their frustration at, what they 
perceived to be panels which were unrepresentative of the local population. Thus, 
descriptive representativeness and random selection is arguably an important aspect 
of increasing the ‘trust’ necessary if a wider role is to be accepted for mini-publics in 
governance (McKenzie and Warren 2012).  
 
5.2.3 LSP-Based Panels  
In the majority of my cases (14/22) panels were constituted mainly by non-state 
actors closely related to the council through local strategic partnership bodies.50 
Using the LSP was seen as a relatively inexpensive way of implementing the SCA. Aware 
that constituting more inclusive panels and engaging participants in collaborative 
fashion would be beyond their means, officers affirmed the need to shape the SCA 
process based on existing governance structures, highlighting the importance of 
working with groups they already have relationships with (interviews 1; 3; 22; 23; 25; 
60; 61; 68; 72). An officer in West Dorset articulated this logic well: 
 
                                                     
50
 Groups could be service delivery partners or other kinds of public, private and third sector 
organisations with a link to the council. 
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… the guidance was saying you must ask your local communities what 
their issues are, which we already do through our community planning 
processes. I am a community planning officer, so I coordinate our LSP. So 
I was very conscious that I did not want to set up anything in duplication, 
we have lots of people involved in our partnership and it made sense to 
link that process to the SCA (Interview 68, Process Manager, West 
Dorset) 
 
Indeed, references to resource limitation or the need to avoid ‘duplication’ were made 
by most council officers interviewed across these fourteen cases. Interestingly, a few 
officers within this group noted that the council had based design choices on a ‘cost-
benefit’ analysis. Local designers were aware that the SCA was an untried process, and 
were sceptical about the chances of achieving impact. As one officer in Bexley put it, ‘we 
did not want to invest too much resource and not generate a return on investment’ 
(Interview 3, Process Manager, Bexley). Relying on established structures was seen 
as a way to minimise potential losses associated with investing resources in an 
‘untested’ process. Moreover, officers in six councils felt that the networks which the 
LSP had in place would provide a valuable resource for the SCA process and offered a 
good way to research community views (interviews 23; 43; 61; 62; 64; 25). A process 
manager in Stockton put this well: 
 
We have representatives who have … if you get my expression … they 
have lots of ‘hats’ on, so they will go to one meeting and then they 
will pick information up, and go to another meeting, raise a point and 
pass the word on that way and we felt that was the really effective 
way of actually finding out what the community wants and what they 
would submit into the SCA (Interview 62, Process Manager, Stockton) 
 
Thus, LSP representatives were deemed to have a good understanding of the problems 
and concerns faced by people in the local area. Moreover, LSP-based panels engaged 
highly active and aware citizens as well as other state and non-state actors with 
considerable levels of professional knowledge. Thus, process managers felt they could 
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trust these to ‘keep up’ with the process and not ‘flood’ them with poor ideas. For 
this reason, a policy officer in Wiltshire (Interview 75, Process Manager, Wiltshire) 
lamented not having limited the process more narrowly to professional groups 
arguing that such an approach would be more effective in terms of resource 
maximisation and would be more conducive to developing good quality proposals. 
Indeed, the high levels of ‘expertise’ present on LSP bodies was seen as a valuable asset 
to the SCA process in giving effective representation to the needs of the local 
community. As a participant in Wilshire put it 
 
I think it was just using the expertise of the people that were on that 
board and from their own experiences from within their own 
organisations just to make sure that anything that was put forward 
was, you know, was actually not just a kind of what a strong individual 
view and was actually that tied in with what we knew about the area 
and what was a priority (Interview 74, Participant, Wiltshire) 
 
Essentially, the LSP and the community planning processes which they lead on were 
widely seen as the ‘natural home’ of the SCA at local level. Officers in this group of 
cases repeatedly justified their approach in reference to established ways of carrying 
out public engagement. Since it was often officers involved in community planning 
which were leading on the SCA in my case studies, it is not surprising that LSP’s had 
such a prominent role. Nine officers across seven cases explicitly noted that the SCA 
was a natural complement to these processes, allowing councils to communicate to 
government obstacles they faced in realising their SCS priorities. As a council officer in 
West Dorset put it: 
  
we'd already asked communities what their local issues are through our 
community planning process. But I guess the SCA process looked at more 
the issues that we could not deal with locally because we needed 
national changes (Interview 72, Process Manager, West Dorset) 
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Since the local SCS was developed through consultation with local citizens and 
stakeholders, linking the SCA to the SCS was seen as a way to ensure that policy 
proposals were responsive to the priorities of local citizens.  
 
Some valuable ideas may have been raised by connecting nationally relevant outcomes 
of local community planning processes to the SCA. Although the campaigners advocating 
the process were critical of these approaches for not implementing what they 
understood to be appropriate levels of engagement, it could be argued that the SCA 
functions best as a process seeking to increase the flow of information between local 
participatory processes and higher tiers of government. If so, community planning teams 
within local councils and local LSP bodies may indeed have been an appropriate home 
for the SCA locally. There are however, some important problems with viewing the SCA 
as a means of communicating nationally relevant outcomes of SCS consultations to 
central government. The government’s own evaluations of SCS’s suggest that the 
quality of public engagement used in their formation is highly variable (Wells and 
Goudie 2005: 20-23) and the relationship between the evidence produced through 
consultation and the definition of local priorities has been found to be unclear in 
some cases (Wells 2006). Thus, the extent to which they provided an appropriate 
proxy for the priorities of local citizens is questionable.  
 
Moreover, a distinction must be made between drawing on the LSP to raise initial ideas, 
and constituting a panel, where ideas are developed into policy proposals, which is 
made up mainly of LSP members. Although some clear advantages have been identified 
with the former, the latter is a questionable approach to implementing the SCA. LSP-
based panels engaged actors with very close ties to the council and many argued that 
these could make poor claims to represent local citizens: 
 
 … a huge disadvantage was that it really wasn’t rooted in the 
community. We have some really active groups and they are well 
networked, but they can’t be said to be representative of the 
community (Interview 22, Process Manager, Doncaster) 
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… a lot of their work is about delivering public services, so there is a 
strong representation on there from public agencies and not so much 
from you know, community representatives (interview 1, Process 
Manager, Bath NES) 
 
Thus claims to the effect that LSP-based panels were ‘un-representative’ (Interviews 1; 
22; 33; 61), that they primarily involved the ‘the usual suspects’, (or words to that effect 
- interviews 8; 22; 57; 58; 61; 70; 72; 73) and that they failed to engage excluded groups 
(interviews 2; 65; 70)  were common in these cases. This relatively low level of 
inclusiveness was deemed by some respondents to have impacted negatively upon the 
development of policy proposals. For example, a participant in South Hams explained 
the failure of the process to generate ‘innovative ideas’ in reference to the exclusive 
nature of the panels’ make up: 
 
… I think the people who came to the table were the people who had 
good ideas maybe, though not the new ideas, they are just the ideas 
of the moment … I don’t think that there was necessarily engagement 
to see if there was anything different that could be done  (Interview 
58, Participant, South Hams). 
 
The make-up of LSP’s is highly varied throughout the UK (Sullivan and Howard 2005). 
Where LSP structures leaned further towards more inclusive arrangements the SCA 
might have benefitted. However, according to my respondents, in most cases the 
opposite seems to have been the case, with local elites effectively dominating the 
opportunities which the SCA offered. LSP This is an important limitation, since, as shall 
be explained in chapter eight, it seems to have impinged negatively upon the 
collaborative dynamics within panels, preventing a more original and comprehensive 
exploration of problems faced by ‘local persons’.  
 
Citing urban regime theory literature (Stone 1989) Somerville (2005: 123) distinguishes 
between ‘oligarchy’ and a ‘participatory democratic regime’ based on the extent to 
which ‘awareness of interdependence and common interest has been expanded – to an 
elite minority or to the community as a whole’. In LSP-based panels the exploration of 
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common interests and definition of local problems was limited to elites from public, 
private and voluntary sectors featuring on LSP networks.  The development of LSPs can 
be viewed as an ‘expansion of the ruling elite’ (Somerville 2005: 124-28) and on this 
basis the SCA can be seen as an ‘oligarchic’, rather than a participatory, process in these 
cases. 
5.2.4 Civil Society Representation 
Interest groups and civic associations of many different kinds played an important 
role in the SCA process. As noted in chapter five, the SCA was advocated by a 
coalition of interest groups and civic associations led by the umbrella group ‘Local 
Works’. Moreover, most councils raised ideas for consideration in local panels 
through ‘passive’ means, they did little to purposively seek out submissions from 
different parts of the population. This was done either through an open public 
meeting or through what were essentially petitioning processes – issuing press 
releases or placing ads in local newspapers and on the council’s website. There is 
reason to believe that in councils which took these approaches local interest groups 
widely used the opportunity to submit ideas to the SCA. This was the case in both 
interviews carried out with idea proposers in Bristol (Interview 13) and in Lewisham 
(Interview 35). Moreover, as part of the campaign to implement the SCA process, 
Local Works specifically targeted local interest groups to promote the opportunities 
offered by the SCA to submit ideas to promote their campaigns.51 Indeed, a member 
of the selector panel described the SCA as ‘a culmination of campaigns of changes 
people wanted to make’ (Interview 47, Selector Panel Member) implying that many 
of the ideas developed through the process were pre-existing campaigns of groups 
interested in the process.  
 
A high level of interest group involvement is a problem for the SCA. Those with 
greater organisational capacity can be expected to exploit opportunities to a greater 
extent and it might be argued that the fact that ideas reflect existing campaigns 
                                                     
51
 One prominent example regards the involvement of the Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) in the first 
round of the process. CAMRA was interested in the for the opportunities it offered to protect 
independently owned pubs and local beer production. Thus, CAMRA promoted opportunities 
advanced by the SCA to propose policies restricting, or banning, the use of restrictive covenants in the 
first round (see CAMRA 2011).  
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limits opportunities for a more original exploration of problems. Thus, arguably 
councils should have been more proactive in ensuring that wider parts of the local 
population submitted ideas. However, for reasons that will be explained in chapter 
eight, there is space for permissiveness in terms of where ideas come from, as long 
as panels implement reflexive agenda setting processes, giving panel participants 
opportunities to reject, modify and come up with new ideas. Moreover, council 
officers often complained at being flooded by ideas submitted by individual citizens 
which had no relevance to the SCA. This was often to do with the un-interactive 
nature of petitioning processes meaning that citizens had given little thought to their 
submissions. Raising ideas though local interest groups (as well as LSP’s) went some 
way towards ensuring that the initial submission of reasonably well thought through 
ideas. These provided a good basis upon which to focus deliberation in panels. 
Indeed, raising ideas by outcomes of SCS consultations and through local interest 
groups might provide an adequate kind of ‘agenda filter’ for local panels which 
scholars such as Bohman (1996: 139) have argued to be necessary for quality 
deliberation. 
 
Of greater importance is the role of interest groups within local panels. Civic 
associations of many kinds are often present on LSP-based panels. Panels in five 
cases which carried out ‘civil society representation’ (Lewes, Brighton and Hove, 
Wiltshire, Cambridge and Sheffield) drew to some extent upon groups external to 
LSP structures to constitute panels. Interest group involvement was most acute in 
Cambridge where panel participants were selected from a list of volunteers taken 
from an initial open public meeting. Participants at the event could raise potential 
ideas and volunteer to participate in local panels, process managers then selected 
from the list of volunteers. A similar approach was taken in Sheffield, although 
officers here were also concerned with making the panel descriptively 
representative. Thus, group representatives participated alongside individual citizens 
acting as spokespeople for civic groups representing different demographic, ethnic 
and social positions. Cambridge, on the other hand, relied on group representation 
without focusing on maximising descriptive representativeness. The initial idea 
raising event was mainly attended by local groups with a specific interest in the SCA, 
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which were, according to the process manager, mainly environmentalist groups, and 
the panel was composed of activists and employees from these organisations.  
 
These panels are open to similar objections to those raised in section 5.1.1 about the 
negative influence of partisanship upon deliberation. In this vein, one respondent 
from Bath criticised some of the panel members who ‘were quite confrontational 
about the issues’ and argued that this might be ‘because they were lobbying for their 
issues, and weren’t necessarily feeling that their issues were understood by the 
people they were talking to’ (Interview 1, Process Manager, Bath NES). A process 
manager in Sheffield seemed to have been aware of this potential problem. He 
recalled highlighting to participants that ‘no one is here to represent an organisation, 
but to represent yourselves as citizens of Sheffield’. He further noted that ‘if people 
felt that there was lobby going on for certain action … the group exercise stopped it’  
(Interview 54, Process Manager A, Sheffield). Thus, the potential partisanship of 
group representatives was understood by some respondents as potentially negative 
for the process, although in Sheffield process managers seemed to think that the 
group discussions managed to limit the influence of partisanship upon deliberations. 
 
A final argument often made against group based representation is that the 
representation claims which interest group spokespeople make are often tenuous. 
For this reason Parkinson (2006: 89) concludes that interest group spokespeople 
should only play a legitimate role in the process of deliberation if they can 
demonstrate shared experience, or ideally, are bound by principal-agent bonds. 
Although data is limited to seven interviews out of the circa 65 participants in local 
panels across both cases, six out of the seven participants interviewed across 
Sheffield and Cambridge linked themselves to a voluntary organisation of some kind 
and three to interest groups. Out of these, just one had been elected to his position, 
the rest were self-appointed, nominated or had salaried managerial or 
administrative positions in the organisation. Thus, just one out of seven panel 
participants interviewed was bound by principal-agent links to his/her constituency. 
According to Parkinson’s criteria, the strength of the claims made by these 
interviewees seems rather weak.  
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However, it is perhaps unfair to judge the representativeness of group spokespeople 
on standards of electoral representation (Buth 2013). According to council officers in 
Sheffield, one of the bases upon which interest group ‘spokespeople’ were targeted 
was maximising descriptive representativeness. Group members / supporters were 
identified as potential spokespeople for groups with which they shared demographic 
traits, thus maximising the descriptive representativeness of panels. Along similar 
lines to LSP-based panels, officers and participants also argued that group 
representatives often had knowledge which would be useful for the SCA. Indeed, 
process managers in South Hams and Cambridge argued that they felt it would be 
beneficial to engage people with a specific interest in the SCA and interest groups 
provided potential panel members who were readily identifiable in this respect. This 
was most pronounced in regard to ‘green’ or environmental sustainability issues: 
 
There was lots of passion especially around certain areas, for example 
many parts of our community are passionate about green issues, so it 
is right that proposals came forward form that area of our community 
(Interview 60, South Hams, Process Manager) 
 
we could also target groups that we felt would be particularly 
interested (Interview 18, Cambridge, Process Manager) 
 
Fung (2003: 345) has argued that ‘hot’ deliberations (between partisan actors) might 
be appropriate in certain contexts because participants might be prepared to invest 
more time and commit more forcefully to oversee the implementation of the 
outcomes of deliberation. It is also possible that interest groups activists might have 
developed the kinds of experience and knowledge of ‘the rules of the game’ that 
provide a counter-weight to the potential for commissioning authorities to control 
‘micro-deliberative’ process through framing and design.   
 
This argument finds some support in in my data. Some respondents argued that 
panel participants failed to challenge what they perceived to be too a high degree of 
158 
 
 
 
influence by public officials over the structure and direction of the proposal 
development (Interview 51, Participant, Sheffield; Interview 8, Participant, Brighton 
and Hove). But it seems that the group activists that made up the Cambridge panel 
challenged attempts by the council to control the process. One participant in 
Cambridge recollects identifying an attempt by council actors to control the process 
through agenda setting, and remembers how the panel rejected this idea and being 
far too unambitious. She recollects that in response to the proposition that the panel 
should form a proposal calling for a banning of plastic bags:  
 
there was a kind of snort from about 6 of us in the room, and I said I 
think, I was thinking we were going to be doing something much 
deeper than this, that we were going to look at really important 
issues, that we could take to government and tell them we want 
change in these areas … so then about 3 or 4 other people who 
snorted at the same time as me, said yeah, yeah, yeah, that is what I 
was thinking! (Interview 15, Participant, Cambridge) 
 
This suggests that ‘usual suspects’ might be able to participate on a more equal 
footing with public officials. Indeed, it is possible that process managers refer to 
these pejoratively as ‘usual suspects’, rather than positively as, for example, 
‘concerned citizens’, because of this! One might speculate that had the Cambridge 
panel been composed of less experienced individuals, this reported attempt at 
agenda setting might have succeeded, leading to the development of a rather 
generic and unambitious proposal.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the implications that the implementation of the SCA has 
regarding the question of whether and how deliberative agenda setting processes 
can overcome problems of elite control and participation bias. In the citizen initiative 
process the resource requirements associated with successfully developing a 
proposal mean that problem definition is usually the prerogative of social and 
political elites. Moreover, once a proposal is successful, differential turnout rates 
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across social groups mean that non-active groups are excluded from decision 
making. In the SCA context these problems were also present but manifested in 
different ways. One of the most valuable aspects of the ‘full scale’ citizen initiative is 
that, at least formally, it offers opportunities for universal participation in decision 
making. In the SCA decision making power remains with political elites in 
government. As explained in chapter one, however, the duty to ‘try to reach an 
agreement’ was intended to ensure a more meaningful influence for participants 
than in consultation. How it performed is a question left to chapter nine. This 
chapter has focused more specifically on determining to what extent participation 
bias and elite control affected problem definition, or the implementation of the SCA 
at local level. 
 
It is important to begin by making a distinction between the actors involved in raising 
ideas, and the actors involved in developing these into policy proposals. In terms of 
raising ideas, the mostly ‘passive’ approaches taken by councils to attract 
submissions might have led to a bias in favour of the more motivated and organised 
parts of the local population. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that local interest 
groups were especially involved in this aspect of the process. Moreover, those 
councils that actively sought out submissions limited opportunities to propose ideas 
to actors in local partnership governance networks. Overall, a degree of elite control 
and participation bias can be expected at idea raising stage and it seems the SCA 
would benefit from greater attempts by councils to target certain groups and 
purposively seek out submission. However, local associations can draw on existing 
campaigns to come up with relatively detailed ideas which can provide an agenda 
‘filter’ (Bohman 1996: 139) that can give an important initial focus to deliberation 
and catalyse the further exploration of local problems in panels. I believe therefore 
that there is a potentially important role for LSP’s and local associations to 
participate at idea raising stage, as long as local panels are then able to modify or 
reject these. 
 
The constitution of panels, where these ideas are developed and decided upon is 
another matter. In this respect it is clear that many approaches did not overcome 
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problems of elite control or participation bias. This is definitely the case in those 
councils using the SCA as a lobbying tool, where it was essentially public officials that 
had the greatest influence over the development of policy proposals. It is also the 
case,  even if to a lesser degree, in LSP-based panels. This approach was justified on 
the grounds that actors from LSPs can draw on organisational networks, expertise 
and understanding of local problems (arising from their involvement in leading 
community planning consultations) to represent the local area. However, there are 
problems with the assumption that the policy priorities derived from community 
planning processes provide a basis from which to understand local problems (Wells 
and Goudie 2005: 20-23; Wells 2006) and LSP based panels were heavily criticised for 
being unrepresentative of the local community, limiting opportunities to participate 
in problem definition to local elites. 
 
It might be argued similar problems were present in panels which were composed by 
members of local associations and interest group activists. There are, however, some 
important things to be said in favour of interest group involvement. Activists can use 
their awareness of the ‘rules of the game’ to provide a counter-weight to the 
sometimes pejorative influence of actors from sponsoring bodies, and can draw 
upon substantial expertise and knowledge to represent and champion the interests 
of constituencies.  Nevertheless, I think that constituting a panel with only activists 
might be problematic. Although Fung (2003) proposes that ‘hot’ deliberations could 
have advantages, empirical research suggests he is mistaken, deliberation has been 
found to suffer in ‘hot’ exchanges (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold 2007). Moreover, if 
interest group representatives are to participate alongside ‘ordinary’ citizens their 
presence might impact negatively upon dialogic dynamics. My evidence is limited 
here, but even if it is true that interest group activists can champion the interests of 
constituents and participate on an equal footing with public officials, it stands to 
reason that their involvement might introduce power asymmetries vis-à-vis less 
active or experienced members of local panels. Overall, therefore, I believe a general 
rule of thumb should be for interest group representatives to be excluded from 
panels, although if their participation is the only way to ensure the representation of 
important parts of the local population they might have a role to play. This does not 
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mean that they are to be excluded from other parts of the process. As noted above, 
groups can still propose ideas and might be even called upon to explain their merits 
to panel participants, acting as ‘expert witnesses.’ 
 
It was the use of descriptive representativeness and random selection that seemed 
the most promising in terms of reducing problems of elite control and participation 
bias. This is because it is the selection form which minimises the influence of 
individual dispositions to participate the most. To be sure, invitations can be rejected 
and thus random selection procedures can have an element of self-selection. 
However, this problem can be mitigated through the provision of incentives, an 
approach taken by Kingston Upon Thames and Bristol. Moreover, although problems 
have been highlighted with this model regarding the conflation of 
representativeness and the substantive act of representation, descriptive 
representativeness is the best, even if imperfect, way to maximise the inclusion of 
different social groups and interests. As I will argue in the next chapter, as well as 
mitigating problems of participation bias and elite control, we can expect this to 
provide a richer epistemic basis upon which to define policy problems. Thus, local 
panels should be able to make a broad claim to ‘mirroring’ (Saward 2008: 13) the 
make-up of the local population and should be selected randomly. Finally, it is 
important to consider whether statistically reliable samples are preferable over 
weaker notions of descriptively representing a ‘cross-section’ of the target 
population. In this respect the analysis suggests that the benefits of statistical 
representativeness need to be weighed against the requirements for discursive 
interactions. If samples are to be broken up into smaller groups to deliberate, it is 
not clear what statistical representativeness adds which weaker forms of descriptive 
representativeness do not.  
 
I want to close the chapter by noting that problems of elite control are not entirely 
solved through selection procedures, the dynamics of discursive interactions also 
have important consequences for the issue of elite control. Paraphrasing Escobar 
(2012a), one might say that this chapter has that descriptive representativeness and 
random selection offers the best way of ensuring that places ‘at the table’ are fairly 
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distributed, but the point is also to avoid exclusionary practices amongst voices 
‘around the table’. This issue shall be considered in the following chapter. 
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6. Division of Labour and Collaboration 
In chapter one it was argued that an important aspect of the ‘deepening’ of 
democracy is the provision of opportunities for citizens to identify, define and 
articulate policy problems. This is related to the moral principle of equality, but it is 
also of instrumental importance. If ‘lay’ or ‘local’ understandings of social and 
political phenomena are excluded from policy development, ineffectual and even 
harmful policies can be expected (Sen 1992; Scott 1998). It is therefore important 
that governance and policy making processes mobilise what Lindblom (1965) 
referred to as the ‘intelligence of democracy’. As argued in chapter two, institutional 
design plays an important role here, by designing collaboration between citizens as 
well as between citizens and public officials PDPs can lead to the ‘co-production of 
expertise’.  One of the primary reasons why the SCA was selected for analysis is due 
to the potential of its design to create a space where local knowledge and 
understandings can influence policy agendas. In order to explore what the SCA can 
teach us about the potential to integrate local knowledge within policy making. This 
chapter seeks to do this by exploring the two ‘how’ questions raised in chapter 2: 
 
 (RQ 2a) Through what processes were proposals developed in the SCA?  
 (RQ 2b) What forms of interaction were present between participating actors 
and which was most effective in co-producing expertise? 
Drawing upon the different forms of division of labour and collaboration described in 
the analytical framework, section 6.1 compares the benefits and drawbacks of 
different approaches taken by my cases. The analysis suggests that a combination of 
‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ forms of collaboration (see chapter 2) are best suited to 
problem definition, especially in cases where inclusive panels were constituted. 
However, problems relating to power asymmetries between participants seemed 
especially pronounced in cases that followed this approach. It is therefore important 
also to consider how forms of division of labour and collaboration relate to issues of 
elite control. Section 6.2 the role of facilitation in mitigating problems of power 
asymmetries and elite control. Finally, the chapter ends in section 6.3 by considering 
what the analysis implies for the design of deliberative problem definition. 
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6.1 Forms of Collaboration 
It is crucial to consider the different forms of collaboration at play between the 
actors involved in the SCA process at local level. These impinge strongly upon the 
fulfilment of the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ and the extent to which local 
panels influenced the development of policy proposals. Moreover, the development 
of a fully formed proposal was, as an LGA policy officer put it, ‘no mean feat’ 
(Interview 37, LGA Policy Officer). As has been explained in chapter five, SCA 
guidance required that policy proposals submitted to government should be backed 
up with evidence of the problem being defined and clearly delineate the nature of 
proposed government action. This required detailed knowledge of relevant policy 
and legislative frameworks. Developing a ‘quality’ proposal was thus a relatively 
intense process which required competence in relevant areas. As explained in 
chapter 2, collaboration should lead to the ‘co-production of expertise’ between the 
actors involved (Sirianni 2009; Fischer 2009). This would be of great value to the 
proposals developed under the Sustainable Communities Act.  
 
It is worth reiterating that the forms of collaboration outlined in chapter 2 are ideal 
types and by no means mutually exclusive. Indeed, they were often used 
simultaneously or across different stages of the engagement process. For this reason 
councils might appear in more than one category. For example, in Wiltshire ideas 
were raised by leaving leaflets in local spaces which citizens could fill in with their 
proposals. These were collated by council officers and put to a panel made up mainly 
of LSP group representatives that collaborated in their development and 
prioritisation. Wiltshire thus ‘serialised’ idea-raising with proposal development and 
prioritisation, but implemented convergent processes at proposal development 
stage. Moreover, iterative and convergent forms of collaboration were most often 
present simultaneously. For example, Cambridge’s panel raised and developed ideas 
through discursive interaction between civic participants and a council officer who 
facilitated meetings but who also contributed substantially to the development of 
ideas within the panel. At the same time, the council officer would consult with 
policy colleagues and carry out research into issues emerging from discussions in 
panels and feed these results back into future panel meetings.  
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6.1.1 The SCA as a ‘Lobbying Tool’: Minimal Participation 
As explained in section 4.1.1, a small minority of councils used the SCA to develop 
policy proposals on the basis of the issues which they had identified as being of great 
local importance. Councils such as Kettering and East Lindsey proposed ideas which 
they had identified from previous consultations at local level. Those designing the 
process therefore felt it would be unnecessary to implement a ‘fresh’ round of public 
engagement and they justified their limited approach to reaching agreement on this 
basis. As explained in the previously, the LGA selector panel deemed this to be 
sufficient legitimation for the acceptance of the policy proposals developed by these 
councils. However, this deviates too far from the ‘spirit’ of the legislation. The 
purpose of the SCA is not limited to developing ‘good ideas’, where ideas come from 
and how they are developed also matters. Reflecting upon the use of the SCA in this 
limited fashion, Local Works campaigners argued along these lines: 
 
You are asking someone’s opinion on an issue but not in the context 
of the SCA … and that is almost certainly going to bring about new 
ideas, because you are asking a different question basically (Interview 
42, Local Works Campaigner B) 
 
What they do have to do, if they are going to use the existing 
structures, is ask the different and new question. (Interview 42, Local 
Works Campaigner A) 
 
The notion of ‘asking a new question’ is crucial. It suggests a more original 
exploration of public problems and the potential development of more innovative 
ideas. The problem with relying solely on ‘established agendas’, or issues of local 
importance which are readily identifiable by councils, to represent the interests of 
the local people is that this leaves no room for an original exploration in panels. One 
of the most innovative aspects of the SCA is that it provided a space where problem 
definition is not preliminary to, but a fundamental part of participation: deliberation 
might add something to problem definition. However, the processes in Kettering and 
Kent clearly failed to live up to this. Even if locally poignant issues were 
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communicated to government, these were not developed through collaboration in 
local panels. 
 
6.1.2 Serialised Collaboration 
SCA engagement processes in councils that were classed in section 6.2 as 
implementing ‘sophisticated consultations’ (Herefordshire, Lewisham, Kingston 
Upon Thames, Bristol) were characterised by a ‘serialised’ division of labour. In these 
cases separate processes were used to raise ideas, constitute local panels and to 
decide which proposals to submit. Moreover, panels had no influence over the 
development of policy proposals and their role was limited to prioritising proposals 
which had been raised and developed elsewhere. Some serialisation between idea 
raising and proposal development stages was also evident in councils which relied on 
LSP structures to form panels, as described in chapter seven in the case of Wiltshire 
(see also 6.2). 
 
The first objection to be made of these processes is that non-interactive idea raising 
methods did little to ensure sustained reflection or learning on the part of 
participants before submitting a proposal, and consequently officers expressed 
frustration at being ‘flooded’ by inappropriate proposals. An officer in Herefordshire 
noted that the SCA was a ‘difficult Act to communicate on’ (Interview 26, Process 
Manager, Herefodshire) and thus some of the participants had not understood 
which kinds of ideas were suitable to the process. This was a complaint made by 
many other process managers who argued that many citizens had used the process 
as an opportunity to raise any issue with the council,52 leading to a degree of 
frustration on the part of council officers who felt their time was being wasted sifting 
through hundreds of inappropriate policy proposals. In the words of policy officers in 
Lewisham and Wiltshire, respectively:  
 
                                                     
52
 Especially, Interview 18, Process Manager, Cambridge; Interview 34, Process Manager, Lewisham; 
Interview 43, Process Manager, North Yorkshire; Interview 61, Process Manager, South Somerset; 
Interview 62, Process Manager, Stockton; Interview 68, Process Manager, West Dorset, Interview 75, 
Process Manager, Wiltshire 
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it was quite a difficult process actually because some of them were 
just completely crazy really, like genuinely never had a chance of ever 
happening … you know, put another 20 billion into tackling ‘X’. You 
have a limited budget and it would require quadrupling your council 
tax … (Interview 36, Process Manager, Lewisham) 
 
there was a requirement on the Act that you had to have a knowledge 
of, not only the issue, but of the legislation that is causing the issue 
and of course if you do not work in that environment unless some 
legislation or policy area has a direct impact upon you, like housing or 
planning, that means that you have as a result learnt about that 
legislation, the majority of people that submitted ideas just don’t 
understand why a piece of legislation exists, or if it is legislation or just 
policy … So there was quite a few ideas that came through, but 
although you could see the person’s logic in what they were saying, 
actually to have submitted it as part of the act would have been really 
inappropriate (Interview 75, Process Manager, Wiltshire) 
 
For these reasons, the process manager in Wiltshire lamented not limiting the idea 
raising process to professionals in local organisations that could draw upon their 
expertise to articulate ideas suitable to the SCA. References to poor ideas were 
mostly noted in councils that implemented non-interactive idea raising processes 
that were separate from, and preliminary to, proposal development and 
prioritisation. Non-interactive or ‘passive’ forms of idea raising were attractive to 
councils because they tended not to require substantial resource commitment; it 
costs a lot more to stage an event intended to explain to those attending the nature 
of the SCA process than to place an advert on the website or in the local paper. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the resources saved by using non-interactive idea 
raising methods were offset by the substantial time being spent sifting through 
inappropriate ideas.  
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Developing a proposal was a complex endeavour and non-interactive idea raising 
methods seem to have provided insufficient support to participants thinking of 
submitting an idea, adding to the tally of inappropriate proposals. For example, a 
participant in Brighton and Hove became engaged with the SCA as an activist in a 
local housing cooperative movement which received the council’s invitation. She 
took up the opportunity to propose an idea to give local councils control over future 
and accumulated capital receipts from the sale of council housing. Although she was 
convinced about the principle of her idea, she felt unsure about her knowledge of 
the legal background of the proposal: 
 
I’m simply an activist, I’ve not got any specific training and I don’t fully 
understand how the housing revenue account works … I knew that 
what I was doing was the right thing to do, in terms of bringing back 
the revenue under local control, but the full legal background to 
whether that was going to be possible or not, I don’t understand 
(Interview 5, Participant, Brighton and Hove)  
 
As it turned out, the idea submitted was one which had been advocated by the 
housing co-op to which she belonged and she could thus draw upon the collective 
expertise of this organisation to formulate it. Moreover, she had the time and ability 
to conduct considerable personal research, mainly using the internet, to develop her 
idea. She was therefore able to submit an idea which did not require major 
modifications to become a policy proposal which met SCA requirements.  
Nevertheless, she noted that she would have appreciated some ‘mentoring’ from a 
relevant policy specialist in the council when drafting her proposal. As will be argued 
in section 6.1.4, in councils implementing more collaborative approaches to the 
development of ideas, participants could draw upon the kinds of support structures 
which were missing in this case to ensure the development of ‘technically’ viable 
proposals. 
 
Moreover, it seems plausible that the anxiety displayed by the participant in 
Brighton and Hove above regarding the necessary competence and knowledge 
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required to develop a worthy proposal might have led many other participants to 
opt out. Thus, it is possible that relying on what were essentially ‘petitioning’ 
processes for raising ideas places an expectation upon idea proposers that may have 
excluded significant parts of the community, favouring relatively knowledgeable and 
active individuals, who have the capacity, disposition and/or necessary networks to 
develop a proposal fit to put through the SCA process. Indeed, as pointed out in 
chapter seven, there is reason to believe that the more developed ideas had been 
put forward by highly active members of the community such as those involved in 
local interest groups seeking to use the Act to promote their campaigns, or LSP 
bodies promoting issues arising from community planning consultations. This did not 
bode well for the council in terms of meeting the requirement to engage ‘under-
represented’ groups and it might be argued that the fact that ideas reflect existing 
campaigns limits opportunities for a more original exploration of problems.  
 
In response to this criticism, it was argued in chapter seven that the involvement of 
interest or LSP groups at idea raising stage is not necessarily detrimental, as long as 
panels are not limited to expressing preferences and have the ability to contribute 
the development of proposals through reflexive agenda setting processes. This leads 
me to the most important problem with councils that serialised the process heavily; 
that in these cases non-interactive idea raising methods were serialised with panels 
whose role was limited to expressing their preferences on proposals which had been 
developed elsewhere.  
 
This is a problem for a number of reasons. First, before being submitted for 
consideration by panels, proposals were often ‘fleshed out’ by policy officers with 
relevant policy expertise, in consultation with proposers. It is possible this gave 
council policy officers undue influence over the development of proposals. Second, 
panels then discussed the ideas and developed their preferences in regard to them 
in independently facilitated meetings.  Participants only met on a one-off occasion 
for a few hours, and thus could not devote much time to the important stages of 
‘breaking down barriers, expressing emotions freely, and searching for mutual 
understanding that occur in longer, more intensive processes’ (Parkinson 2006:78). 
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Thus, it is doubtful as to what extent panel participation, which was already limited 
to developing preferences on pre-structured themes, led to a comprehensive 
exploration of local problems and the development of innovative ideas. This would 
also have hampered the process even if the panel had had the ability to contribute 
to the development of proposals.  
 
Finally, the one-off nature of the event limited the possibility for more collaborative 
processes that might have constituted a greater attempt to ‘try to reach an 
agreement’. Indeed, apart from the prioritisation of proposals in local panels, neither 
idea proposers nor local panels were involved in any interactions with the council’s 
leadership which might be said to constitute an attempt at agreement. In the end, 
the council’s leadership either ‘cherry picked’ or ‘rubber stamped’ proposals. 
Reflecting on this limitation in Lewisham a participant who put an idea intended to 
restrict the proliferation of betting shops argued that ‘it would be useful if someone 
could put some thinking … into how can we make sure for example that there is a 
proper negotiation with residents, that we can empower residents to the extent that 
they feel they are in that position’ (Interview 35, Participant, Lewisham). 
 
In the following sections I shall argue that councils which implemented more 
continuous processes, characterised by a combination of ‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ 
collaboration, were more likely to enable a collaborative exploration of problems 
within panels. This allowed the collective knowledge of the panel to inform the 
development of policy proposals to a greater extent and increased opportunities for 
attempts at agreement between the council and the panel to be made. 
 
6.1.3 Iterative and Convergent Collaboration 1: ‘Expert-Elite Problem Solving’ 
Chapter six argued that there was an important role for LSP bodies to play at idea 
raising stages of the SCA process. Councils which drew upon LSP networks to raise 
ideas tended to receive ideas which were inspired by issues arising from community 
planning consultations, but which the council could not act upon without some 
action from central government. These were usually well developed and relevant to 
171 
 
 
 
the SCA, and problems regarding poor quality ideas present in non-interactive 
processes were substantially mitigated.   
 
Relying on LSP’s to constitute panels, however, is another matter. LSP-based panels 
were composed of highly active state and non-state actors with considerable 
professional knowledge. This meant they could contribute positively to the 
development of proposals with minimal resource implications for local authorities. 
The relationship between officers and the panel operated smoothly. As a participant 
in Wiltshire recollects: 
 
it was very much that the board was setting the strategic direction 
and kind of going ‘Ok well, this is what should happen, this is how it 
should work and how we want to talk to people’, and the officers 
were seen as the people who did the day to day work, who went out 
and designed the postcards, who went to set up panel meetings and 
contacted agencies and stuff. So it felt a little bit, and it was not like 
this really, but it felt a little bit like we were having board of trustees 
and team of managers. Like we do the general stuff and then they 
actually put the stuff into place (Interview 73, Participant, Wiltshire). 
 
Thus, a division of labour emerged whereby panel participants set goals and public 
officials used technical expertise to design processes through which objectives could 
be achieved.  
 
Reliance on the LSP was an attractive option for those in charge of designing public 
engagement processes for the SCA. LSP’s offered a clear structure within which the 
SCA could be easily interpreted and accommodated. Meetings often ran according to 
the traditions and rules developed in LSP boards and SCA issues could be integrated 
within on-going LSP meetings. As a result, more continuous processes, which 
enabled iterative forms of collaboration between the council and the panel were 
present in these cases. Moreover, collaborative governance research suggests that a 
history of successful cooperation ‘can create social capital and high levels of trust 
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that produce a virtuous cycle of collaboration’ (Ansell and Gash 2007: 552) and thus 
the fact that organisations on the LSP have a history of co-operation on such tasks as 
community planning might be expected to have facilitated collaboration on the 
development of SCA proposals.  
 
Nevertheless, the exclusive constitution of panels in most of these cases (depending 
on the make-up of the LSP) prioritised ‘expertise’ in a narrower, professional sense 
and it is doubtful whether policy proposals in these cases had been co-produced 
through a ‘mix’ (Sirianni 2009: 49) of professional expertise and local knowledge, 
especially of excluded groups. Essentially, in LSP-based panels, high levels of 
collaboration were enabled by limiting participation to individuals with very close 
ties to the council. This resembles the kind of collaborative governance that Fung 
and Wright (2003: 262) call ‘expert-elite problem solving’, which, unlike the more 
pluralist ‘empowered participatory governance’, shares many characteristics with 
traditional and technocratic forms of decision making. Lowndes and Squires (2012) 
have argued that ‘respectful engagement from deep difference’, is precisely what is 
missing from the partnership table. Thus, LSP-based panels might have thus lacked 
the ‘agonist’ dynamics necessary for a more original and comprehensive exploration 
of problems faced by local persons. 
 
In fact, the exclusive constitution of panels exerted a strong influence on the kinds of 
proposals developed, creating suspicions that the SCA was being dominated by 
elites. Citing a proposal developed by South Gloucestershire to abolish the regional 
spatial strategy, a civil servant in DCLG noted: 
 
 there were a lot of proposals which seemed very ‘Local Authority’ 
based … there is no way there has been a conversation started by the 
community … so there was a little discrepancy in the aims of the Act 
and what actually came through in the proposals (Interview 19, DCLG 
Civil Servant) 
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Similarly, a DCLG minister expressed disappointment that more innovative ideas did 
not come up: 
 
Q. What was your opinion of the ideas developed by the SCA?  
 
A. They were a mixed bag of old agendas about local taxation or 
council tax or planning laws or things of that sort with things … that 
seemed to me probably to have arisen genuinely from a local 
discussion … What you did not tend to get … [were] … radical areas of 
social policy delivery … the people engaged in the SCA did not seem to 
be terribly interested in those types of things. 
 
Q. Why do you think that might have been? 
 
A. Because of the people it attracted 
(Interview 20, DLCG Minister) 
 
Thus, national actors became suspicious that local elites were unduly influencing the SCA 
and that the SCA at local level did not necessarily represent the priorities of local 
persons. It is perhaps naive to take such comments at face value. Politicians and civil 
servants might have rejected proposals for reasons which they may not want to 
disclose. Nevertheless, the point remains that exclusive proposal development 
processes prevented an original exploration of local problems and substantially 
decreased the strength of the claim that the SCA can legitimately influence policy 
agendas. Panels need to be more inclusive. 
6.1.4 Iterative and Convergent Collaboration 2: ‘Analytic-Deliberative’ Type 
Approaches 
The cases of Sheffield and Cambridge are notable in so far as they implemented 
‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ forms of collaboration whilst constituting relatively 
inclusive panels. Panels were constituted by local interest group activists with a 
specific interest in the SCA (Cambridge), or a mixture of group activists, with self-
selected representatives from local public, private and voluntary organisations and 
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individuals invited on the basis of demographic traits (Sheffield). There is a strong 
element of self-selection in both cases, which may have led to those more active 
sections of the population dominating the process. However, Sheffield committed 
considerable resource to raising awareness of the opportunities offered by the SCA, 
and most respondents praised Sheffield’s panel for being relatively descriptively 
representative of the local population. The experience in Cambridge, on the other 
hand, suggests that reliance on interest group activists alone to constitute panels 
might have excluded important parts of the community.  
 
This section focuses on the division of labour and forms of collaboration in these 
cases. In this respect, a key feature of what Fung and Wright (2003: 263) call 
‘empowered participatory governance’ (EPG) is ‘cooperation between parties and 
interests that frequently find themselves on opposite sides of political and social 
questions’, and there is reason to believe that it was these cases that approximated 
EPG. Sheffield and Cambridge constituted relatively inclusive panels. Compounded 
by substantial resource commitment and provision of participant support structures, 
which councils carrying out ‘serialised’ processes were criticised for lacking, this 
enabled panels to approach the kinds of agonist dynamics valued by Fung and 
Wright to a greater extent than those that have been considered heretofore.  
 
Thus, a key difference between these councils and those implementing ‘elite 
problem solving’ were deliberations carried out on a pluralist basis. The high degree 
of diversity in the panels was noted positively by respondents in both Sheffield and 
Cambridge.  
 
I was coming in with environmental ideas … but you know there were 
people from housing associations with a completely different ‘hat’ on, 
supporting people who need housing and there were groups like 
disability groups, so that meant that it was quite a thoughtful, active 
group (Interview 15, Participant, Cambridge). 
It wasn’t just one interest group lobbying for ideas. I think the 
interesting bit was we had to sort of wider group of people …  it 
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wasn’t just a group of people involved in the refugees or people 
lobbying for the environment …  we wanted a balance of interest. So it 
wasn’t like we want certain things for X community, something has 
got a wider implication to the whole of the city, that was quite 
interesting (Interview 52, Participant, Sheffield). 
 
it’s an opportunity to be involved with a group of people who are 
thinking constructively about their communities …  there were people 
from very different backgrounds  and perspectives who were able to 
reach quite a level of agreement (Interview 55, Participant, Sheffield) . 
 
It is not possible to judge from interview data alone to what extent panel discussions 
constituted the ‘agonist’ dynamics lacking in LSP-based panels. However, it is notable 
that it is precisely the kind of ‘mix’ of specialisation in different epistemic contexts 
alluded to by these respondents that scholars such as Sirianni (2009: 49) have argued 
is necessary for the ‘co-production of expertise’ (see also Fischer 2009).   
 
Another difference between these cases and those carrying out mainly ‘serialised’ 
processes is that these engaged panels in more long term and continuous processes 
and provided substantial support structures for panel participants. This had some 
important consequences. First, when raising potential ideas, officers could ensure 
that participants understood the process, review ideas as they came up and, where 
appropriate, ask participants to modify them. For this reason, the problem of officers 
receiving inappropriately developed policy proposals was substantially mitigated.  
Second, participants in these cases also articulated concerns regarding their lack of 
knowledge about relevant legislative and policy frameworks. For example, a 
Sheffield panel member explained that although participants had clear ideas of the 
kinds of problems faced by their area, ‘the practicalities of putting these into practice 
was something … that the members of the panel were less knowledgeable about’ 
(interview 48). However, a group of specialist policy officers was assigned to support 
the panel and their role was deemed by most respondents to be instrumental in 
176 
 
 
 
enabling lay citizens to effectively develop policy proposals.53 Officers carried out 
important logistical duties, such as designing seating plans in ways that would 
maximise the inclusion of participants or drafting and disseminating reading material 
relevant to proposals. As well as providing ‘on-the-spot’ support for panel 
participants, where deemed necessary, council officers would carry out research into 
proposals in development. This involved drawing on the policy expertise of 
colleagues within the council, conducting desk based research and feeding the 
results into the agenda for the panel’s next meeting. 
 
Thus, Cambridge and especially Sheffield are instructive cases in so far as they 
implemented collaborative processes, with a relatively reflexive agenda, that 
allowed for a great deal of iteration between public officials and the panel in the 
development of policy proposals. This allowed participants and public officials to 
pool their knowledge and ‘co-produce’ policy proposals on this basis. Such processes 
are more likely to meet the challenge posed by the complexity of contemporary 
policy issues. Indeed, as argued above, one of the reasons why process managers 
drew upon LSP structures was the perception that LSP members, unlike lay citizens, 
would be able to ‘keep up’ with the process and make positive contributions at 
minimal resource expenditure. Nevertheless, a policy officer in Sheffield suggested 
that civic participants were not lacking in this sense: 
 
… there is this assumption or feeling that members of the public are 
not able to deal with or handle complex issues, when actually, we 
found via the process that people were more than capable of doing 
that. Getting engaged in things like the post office submission that we 
put in, some of that is pretty complicated stuff about how the postal 
network works and people were challenging us and asking really 
usefully important questions. There was one discussion around 
                                                     
53
 Positive references to the importance and effectiveness of officer support structures in Sheffield 
were made by 7/8 people interviewed (2 council officers, 1 council leader, and 4 participants). 
However, it should be noted that two panel participants criticised the role of officers on the panel 
arguing that the structure of panel meetings might have intimidated participants and gave council 
officers too much influence over the development of ideas (interview # 51). These issues shall be 
subject to further consideration in section 6.2. 
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exclusive development zones and incremental financing some of that 
is incredibly complex, but the panel participants were more than 
capable of keeping up. (Interview 53, Process Manager, Sheffield). 
 
This officers’ comments suggests the possibility that civic political capacity is not a 
predetermined phenomenon, but that its manifestation and development depends 
on process. Collaborative designs, in ideal form, enable professional expertise to be 
deployed in ways that empower lay participants as decision makers (Sirianni 2009). 
This would be highly valuable to the SCA, with ideas being raised and developed in 
the context of a more inclusive and deliberative process, likely to enable a more 
original and comprehensive exploration of the problems faced by ‘local persons’.  
 
Without direct observation my evidence is limited in this respect. However, 
interviewee responses, especially in the case of Sheffield, alluded to the emergence 
of a sense of participant collective ownership of panel deliberations. For example, 
one respondent noted the resolve of the panel to develop ‘quality’ ideas was 
galvanised by the lack of guarantee of impact at national level:  
 
… we felt quite strongly it was a worthwhile thing and it was therefore 
worthwhile making a good case …. [and we felt] … that we need to be 
fairly clear and assertive in what we were saying because we needed 
to persuade someone at government level (Interview 48, Participant, 
Sheffield). 
 
Another compared the SCA positively with his previous experiences of consultation: 
 
 … that’s the first time I’ve ever felt truly engaged … you could tell it’s 
something happening there … rather than just something that was ‘oh 
yeah we’ll listen but we’re not really going to do anything about that’ 
(Interview 50, Participant, Sheffield). 
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To conclude, the form of collaboration and division of labour in Cambridge and 
Sheffield is to be favoured over the rest for three main reasons. First, Sheffield 
constituted relatively inclusive panels which provided a richer and more plural 
epistemic basis upon which to develop proposals than in most other cases. Second, 
‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ forms of collaboration deepened the knowledge-
production processes underpinning proposals, by giving greater opportunities to the 
actors involved to pool their knowledge and co-produce proposals. Third, Sheffield 
and Cambridge implemented reflexive agendas which allowed citizens on panels to 
exercise influence over problem definition, rather than to develop preferences on 
pre-defined proposals – as occurred in ‘sophisticated consultations’. This enabled 
the development of considered judgment in panel deliberations to add value to 
proposals. 
 
In the conclusion recommendations for changes to the SCA which might move panels 
in this direction will be made. Before doing so, however, it is important to consider 
the issue of the impact of power asymmetries upon collaboration. As will be 
explained below, although panels in Sheffield and Cambridge are to be valued, the 
different context in which civic participation occurred might have widened power 
asymmetries between panel participants and complicated the ability for facilitation 
to mitigate for their effects. 
6.2 Power Asymmetries and the Role of Facilitation in Local Panels 
One of the most common criticisms of deliberative democracy is that economic, 
social and cultural forms of inequality prevent democratic deliberation from 
developing because they may enable those with more experience, confidence 
and/or epistemic capacity to control deliberative processes (Sanders 1997; Young 
2001). However, rather than dismissing the value of PDPs on this basis, it is 
important to consider ways in which participation can be organised in order to 
maximise ‘equality of voice’ (Smith 2009: 21). Facilitation is widely seen as an 
important mitigating strategy here (e.g. Fung 2005). Thus, in section 6.2.1 shall 
present the thoughts of my respondents regarding what ‘good’ facilitation 
constitutes, as well as its role in mitigating power asymmetries. Section 6.2.2 
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explains why the process in Sheffield and Cambridge might have exacerbated the 
effects of power asymmetries in panels and limited the capacity for facilitation to 
mitigate these. Finally, section 6.2.3 considers whether facilitation needs to be 
thought of differently in this context.  
6.2.1 What Should Facilitators Do? 
Issues relating to facilitation came through mainly in interviews with participants and 
public officials in ‘sophisticated consultations’ and ‘analytic-deliberative’ type 
processes.54 That the issue of facilitation came up in these groups is not especially 
surprising.  Most councils using the SCA as a ‘lobbying tool’ either did not create an 
SCA panel (Kettering) or provided no opportunities for discursive interaction 
between participants on the panel (Kent). LSP-based panels were made up of 
relatively active individuals who could draw on considerable experience of 
participation from their roles in local partnership governance processes. Thus, 
although meetings were often ‘chaired’, respondents in these cases generally did not 
give much importance to the facilitation of meetings. Most participants involved in 
‘sophisticated consultation’ and ‘analytic-deliberative’ type panels, however, did not 
have this history of co-operation or experience of participation. It is perhaps for this 
reason discursive interactions were in greater need of facilitation. Although the data 
does not provide a basis upon which to confirm this, one might speculate that the 
relatively pluralist nature of these panels can be expected to have widened 
asymmetries between participants, a condition in which facilitation increases in 
importance. 
 
There were three ways in which respondents felt that facilitation affected panel 
discussions. First, respondents often understood facilitation as preventing more 
confident individuals from dominating discussions, and providing opportunities for 
equal participation. Respondents’ accounts suggest that a relatively proactive role 
was required of the facilitator to ensure equal participation, lending some support 
                                                     
54
 The facilitation category emerged from coding transcripts of interviews with six public officials 
(interviews 27; 33; 36; 54; 55; 57) across five cases (Herefordshire, Lewisham, Sheffield, Lewes, South 
Hams) and seven participants (interviews 6; 15; 16; 17; 31; 48; 73) across five cases (Brighton and 
Hove, Cambridge, Lewes, Sheffield and Wiltshire). 
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for the hypothesis that more active kinds of facilitation are most appropriate for 
mitigating power asymmetries. For example, a participant in Sheffield (Interview 48) 
noted the facilitator’s importance in intervening to ensure participants did not 
interrupt each other and that ‘everyone felt heard’. Council officers in Lewisham 
(Interview 36, ) highlighted the importance of facilitator interventions to make sure 
‘everyone had an opportunity to put their views across’, and a participant in 
Cambridge (Interview 17) highlighted the importance of intervening directly to make 
‘sure that everyone had the chance to speak’.  However, the data is thin on the 
precise levels of interference and specific kinds of discursive strategies which 
facilitators should use, since it is an aspect of collaboration which I, regrettably, did 
not probe much in interviews. 
 
A second role for the facilitator was structuring deliberation and providing a point of 
support for participants. This involved summarising key points throughout the 
deliberative process, timekeeping, explaining the particularities of the SCA process 
and providing clarifications on any procedural issues which came up. In terms of 
structuring deliberation, some respondents deemed it important that the facilitator 
‘guide’ discussion by asking prompting questions aimed at exploring new angles. 
Thus, interviewees often viewed ‘good’ facilitation as requiring a fairly high level of 
involvement to both mitigate power asymmetries and, more broadly, to structure 
and support the deliberative process. However, this ‘active’ role for the facilitator is 
tempered by the notion, expressed in some form by five interviewees (interviews 6; 
15; 15; 54; 55), that those facilitating discussions, whilst they should be active, 
should also let participants ‘take the lead’ (Interview 16, Participant, Cambridge) and 
not ‘control’ the process. For example, a participant in Brighton and Hove spoke of 
the facilitators’ ‘genuine commitment to facilitate rather than doing controlling’ 
(Interview 6, Participant, Brighton and Hove) Similarly, a participant in Sheffield 
recollected that the facilitator had ‘made very clear that the important people in this 
process were not the council officers, they were the members of the panel … he 
made it very clear that he wanted to hear our views’ (Interview 55, Participant, 
Sheffield). In this respect, it seems the facilitator walks a thin line, between 
exercising the necessary levels of control in order to structure deliberation and avoid 
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more confident or experienced actors from dominating, whilst also allowing 
participants to ‘take the lead’. Indeed, my respondents’ opinions broadly cohere 
with an understanding of the facilitator as a ‘designated driver’ developed in other 
inductive studies (Mansbridge et al 2006). 
6.2.2 Facilitating ‘Deliberative-Analytic’ Problem Definition 
Section 6.1 concluded that the more iterative and convergent processes evident in 
‘analytic-deliberative’ type panels are to be favoured over the sequenced dynamics 
present in ‘sophisticated consultations’. This is because they allowed for reflexive 
agenda setting processes that enabled panels to exercise influence over the problem 
definitions underpinning proposals, rather than developing preferences on pre-
defined proposals. Importantly, this also allowed a greater level of collaboration 
between public officials and participants, thus widening the ‘knowledge-production’ 
processes underpinning proposals. Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility that this 
approach exacerbated the effects of power asymmetries. These concerns relate 
especially to problems raised mainly by two respondents (Sheffield, interview 51; 
and Cambridge, Interview 16), who point to the possibility that the iterative 
processes through which proposals were developed gave council actors too much 
influence.  
 
In Sheffield one participant argued that iteration between the articulation of 
potential ideas by panel participants and feedback based on officer-led research into 
these gave officers too much control and led to ‘de-radicalisation’. It is worth 
quoting his words at length: 
 
the particular issues that were being kind of raised and discussed at 
these events, then sort of disappeared into the council machine and 
came back out sort of sanitised and explained in a particular form of 
language that reflects a way of doing things that, you know, it doesn't 
always maintain the level of information or the subtlety that is often 
important when trying to put forward radical new ideas for things that 
are not being done in a particular way at that point that need 
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changing. And there is a tendency for that process to make things 
dilute or convolute them in various ways (Interview 51; Participant, 
Sheffield) 
 
Another participant in Sheffield also argued that his proposal for legislation 
facilitating the transfer of derelict land for the specific purpose of local food 
production had been de-radicalised by the council: 
 
My concept was similar to the 80’s, when the government said any 
bits of local authority land weren’t used could be sold on house 
builders or properties developers to build on … We were pushing for 
similar things for derelict land, but the council’s legal team diluted, so 
we finished up with a proposal that …  anybody who wanted it will get 
land to up to two years … its quite attractive for someone who’s got 
land to give it away for two years, for someone to come and tidy it up 
for them, and then they get it back again. For food growing, we’d 
want the land for about 5 years, so that we can plant an apple tree 
and get a crop (Interview 52, Participant, Sheffield). 
 
In Cambridge, one participant felt that the council ‘was trying to lead us [the panel] 
towards something they thought was easy and acceptable’ (Interview 16, 
Participant, Cambridge). In reference to a proposal recommended by the council to 
ask the government to ban the use of plastic bags, which the respondent was 
disappointed by and saw as far too unambitious, she noted one instance in which 
she felt the council had attempted to control the process through agenda setting. 
Speaking of an open public meeting held in Cambridge to raise potential ideas for 
consideration in the panel, she said: 
 
it’s the general way the council kind of, they do a little presentation 
and they tell you what’s (pause) and at the end you have a very brief 
opportunity for 5 or 10 minutes to speak and then maybe someone 
said something like ‘oh, maybe we can get rid of plastic bags?’, and 
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then they said ‘OK well we need to have another meeting and we will 
discuss it in greater depth’ and I think that is probably what happened 
(Interview 16, Participant, Cambridge). 
 
I should note that although these are important concerns most participants spoke in 
broadly positive terms about their experience of participation. Thus, it is not clear 
how much weight should be given to these perspectives. However, interviewees 51 
and 52 in Sheffield suggested that it was because of their previous experience in 
local politics that they were able to notice the influence of council officers. Indeed, 
interviewee 51 insinuated that less-experienced panel members, because they had 
failed to notice this, were naïvely positive about the process.  
 
Cambridge put together a panel made up mainly of local interest group activists who 
seem to have been able to identify and reject the council’s attempt at agenda 
setting. One respondent refers to this episode as ‘the rebellion’, and notes the 
importance of the facilitator’s willingness to come up with new ideas ‘after the 
rebellion’: 
 
most people seem to want some really quite radical changes and the 
government and our local authorities are really not picking up on that 
… we sort of vetoed plastic bags, as being a bit woolly and superficial 
… And he [the facilitating officer] tried to, he was saying after that, 
after the rebellion – which is what it felt like – complete and utter ‘oh 
no! not plastic bags!’, after that he was really quite excited, you could 
feel his excitement about us being really interested in wanting to do 
something much more radical (Interview 16, Participant, Cambridge) 
 
Thus, participants gave what they saw as ‘safe’ or ‘unambitious’ ideas short shrift, 
and made demands to consider more ambitious proposals. Importantly, the 
facilitating officer was receptive to this. Again, an aspect of ‘good’ facilitation is a 
level of involvement which, whilst ‘active’, stops short of ‘controlling’ and lets 
participants develop ownership of the process (Mansbridge et al 2006). 
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Nevertheless, had the panel been composed of citizens with less experience this 
might not have occurred. Indeed, these problems are perhaps especially acute in the 
case of Sheffield because it bought citizens, interest group representatives and 
public officials into closer contact than in Cambridge. It also stands to reason that 
reflexive agendas in more continuous and iterative kinds of processes might 
complicate facilitation. This is because they increase the points at which those with 
experience and technical knowledge can influence framings and problem definitions. 
Moreover, the looser structure necessary for reflexivity in agenda setting can be 
expected to limit the facilitator’s ability to identify important points at which to 
intervene.  
 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent me from drawing clearer conclusions here. 
These problems were raised by a minority of interviewees, but it is possible that, 
without the complement of direct observation, interview data does not pick up on 
more subtle effects of power asymmetries. I would note, however, that some 
interview evidence points to perceptions that the direction of the process in 
Sheffield was influenced to a great degree by public officials. For example, the policy 
officer who praised the ability of citizens to engage with complex issues spoke of 
how citizens were able to ‘keep – up’ with ‘complex issues’ on discussions around 
topics such as incremental financing zones by ‘challenging’ policy officers and ‘asking 
important questions’ (Interview 53, Process Manager, Sheffield). This suggests that 
the pace and tone of deliberations were being set primarily by policy experts and 
public officials. Policy officers praised the process for enabling participants to 
develop the necessary competence to be on a par with experts. This expectation that 
it is citizens who should ‘keep up’ has been found to be problematic in ‘deliberative-
analytic’ approaches (Davies and Burgess 2004). One might argue that, in order for 
these processes to be democratic, experts also need to develop the capacity to be on 
a par with participants on their terms. 
 
Nevertheless, I do not want to dismiss the value of these approaches. Although it 
seems likely that there was space for public officials and policy experts to influence 
the process, it is far from clear that they dominated. Moreover, despite these 
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problems, the approach remains preferable to the others. In cases categorised as 
‘lobbying tools’ and ‘expert-elite problem solving’ panels were constituted by local 
elites, or at least very active sections of the population. In ‘sophisticated 
consultations’ participants developed preferences in response to problems which 
had already been defined. This was done through petitioning processes, or the 
gathering of initial ideas in open public meetings. Importantly, this was followed by 
the collation of ideas by policy officers, many of whom reported having to flesh out 
the ideas received. Thus, the problem of elite influence is still present in these cases, 
but affects another aspect of the process. Indeed, in ‘sophisticated consultation’ 
processes one might argue that policy officers were in a position to control problem 
definitions and agendas, whereas in Sheffield and Cambridge, they were in a position 
to influence these. 
6.2.3 A Different Approach to Understanding Facilitation? 
The discussion above raises the possibility ‘analytic-deliberative’ approaches created 
conditions under which facilitation met challenges which are not necessarily 
applicable to those implementing ‘sophisticated consultations’. Specifically, it is 
possible that the closer contact between public officials and citizens together with 
reflexive agendas increase the challenge facilitation faces in mitigating power 
asymmetries. This final section considers what impact this might have on the 
question of what constitutes ‘legitimate facilitation’.  
Discussing facilitation in mini-publics, Smith (2012: 99) argues that ‘a degree of 
separation and freedom of operation for the facilitator is necessary as an initial step 
in avoiding the charge of elite manipulation’. At first sight we might expect this 
insight to apply to the SCA. Many ‘local panels’ were essentially mini-publics; sub-
sets of the population who met on one, or more, occasions to think through and 
deliberate local problems and potential solutions to make recommendations to their 
councils. Indeed, Smith’s logic informed the design of SCA processes in those 
councils implementing ‘sophisticated consultations’. In the words of process 
managers in Lewisham: 
PM 1: …  it would have been a  distraction actually to have us doing it, 
it was easier for the facilitator to be completely neutral. 
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PM 2: Yes it would have been very difficult for us to ask those 
prompting questions without being accused of being biased  
(Interview 36, Two Process Managers, Lewisham) 
 
In this case an independent agency specialising in public engagement was contracted 
to constitute panels and conduct deliberations. Facilitation in Sheffield and 
Cambridge, on the other hand, was carried out by a council employee trained in 
public engagement (Cambridge) and by a senior local elected representative 
(Sheffield). It might be argued that this approach to facilitation increases space for 
manipulation by council actors, adding to the concerns raised about the process in 
these cases. Interestingly, however, a process manager in Sheffield suggested that 
the seniority of the facilitator, or ‘chairman’ (who was the leader of the council at 
the time) as well as the other policy officers involved, was valuable because it 
demonstrated to the panel that the council was taking the exercise seriously: 
 
… the seniority of people who were involved from the council’s 
perspective I think helped demonstrate the representatives we were 
very serious about it as well. It wasn’t just something that wasn’t 
important (interview 54, Two Process Managers, Sheffield)  
 
One of the main problems with local participation initiatives is that they might 
frustrate participants if they feel they are being engaged in tokenistic processes 
(Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 2001). This is especially acute in the SCA because the 
outcome of participation ultimately relates to policy making at the national level. 
Indeed, many of the participants interviewed expressed concerns that, even if they 
felt in control of the local panel, they were unsure as to what impact they could 
expect proposals to have upon national policy. As a panel participant in Wiltshire put 
it: 
I think it felt a lot more kind of woolly and undefined than that 
other stuff …  with the SCA it felt more like we were in control of it 
we can shape the direction but, actually … you are putting a lot 
more faith into someone you do not know, because … it felt like we 
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were almost more detached from it. Although we had more power 
over the process, we had more power over what we submitted … it 
felt like something we were doing in Wiltshire which would feed 
into the big national government we did not know much about and 
hopefully they would listen (Interview 73, Panel Participant, 
Wiltshire). 
 
Similar kinds of doubts were present across cases, but it is possible that the presence 
of a senior council figure in the case of Sheffield increased participants trust in the 
process and thus motivated them to spend more time and effort on the panel.  
 
A final important difference between the process in Sheffield and Cambridge and 
those implementing ‘sophisticated consultations’ are the greater attempts made by 
the former councils to reach agreement with the panel on which proposals to make. 
In those councils that implemented ‘sophisticated consultations’ panel meetings 
resulted in the development of recommendations on proposals which had been 
formulated elsewhere; with the council leadership ‘cherry picking’ or ‘rubber 
stamping’ results. In Sheffield and Cambridge, panels were engaged in more iterative 
and continuous processes allowed participants to influence the development of 
proposals and also allowed greater opportunities for agreement to be reached 
between the council and the panel on which proposals to make. Indeed, in the case 
of Sheffield public officials made it clear from the start that whatever emerged from 
the panel would be sponsored by the council. This suggests that where the panel’s 
decision were of greater consequence public authorities required some kind of 
council presence on the panel. This raises the possibility that a close association 
between participation and outcome creates a context that requires facilitation to be 
understood differently.  
 
Facilitation is usually understood, explicitly or implicitly, as an independent variable 
which can explain the nature of deliberation (Dillard 2013). Although the data is 
admittedly thin on this aspect of the research, the experience of facilitation in the 
SCA suggests that the dynamics of the deliberative process itself might also impact 
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upon the role of facilitation. The variable nature of facilitation in the SCA might be 
explained by its position between the more structured consultative processes, where 
facilitation is usually carried out by an independent actor (Smith 2012: 99), and 
collaborative governance approaches which usually have more reflexive agendas and 
where the closeness between the outcome of deliberation and consequent action 
might require a closer relationship (Ansell and Gash 2007). The different groups of 
cases analysed took different approaches in this respect. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that in PDPs facilitation should be carried out by an independent actor. 
However, it is not clear to what extent this model is transferable to the more 
continuous and collaborative approaches taken by councils such as Sheffield because 
of the more reflexive agendas, the more direct involvement of public officials and 
the greater consequence associated with panel deliberations. Although this 
possibility cannot be explored further using data produced by this study, the 
question of the relationship between ‘deliberative consequence’ and facilitation is 
an important one for future research (Fulwider 2005: 3).  
 
Literature on ‘facilitative leadership’ in collaborative governance might provide 
useful pointers here. Analyses of facilitation in collaborative governance have 
concluded that facilitation is highly context dependent (Ansell and Gash 2007), 
putting into the doubt to what extent it is even useful to talk of a ‘model’ of 
facilitation. Thus, Bussu and Bartels (2013: 14) argue that, rather than understanding 
facilitation as an institutional feature or a ‘task’ which can be carried out by one 
individual, ‘facilitative leadership’ should be understood as ‘an emergent property of 
the practices and interactions of various key individuals, who had not deliberately 
planned to act as facilitative leaders’. In the more reflexive process implemented by 
Sheffield analysis of the emergent properties of facilitation might be more 
appropriate. One explanatory factor identified by Ansell and Gash (2007) is that the 
emergence of ‘trust’, which is itself dependent on a sense of ‘interdependency’ 
between actors, is key for successful ‘facilitative leadership’. It is not clear, however, 
to what extent participation in the SCA context can be expected to encourage the 
development of ‘interdependency’ and ‘trust’ between participants. There might not 
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be enough at stake, or a close enough association between participation and 
outcome.  
6.3 Conclusion 
So, what can be learnt from the above analysis? First, all councils implemented idea 
raising processes separately to panel deliberations in order to develop initial 
agendas. This coheres with arguments made by deliberative theorists  that 
deliberation requires some form of A key issue to consider is where these ideas 
come from. However, the processes through which these ideas are raised developed 
into proposals is a different question. In terms of raising ideas, approaches such as 
relying on local interest groups, council-linked organisational networks or using 
interactive idea raising methods such as public events are to be favoured because 
they limit the receipt of irrelevant or poorly thought through ideas. Regarding the 
development of ideas into proposals, the kinds of collaboration present in LSP-based 
and ‘deliberative-analytic’ panels offer the best basis. The greater intensity and 
continuity of the processes meant that participants had greater opportunities to 
develop considered judgement and add value to proposals. 
 
However, in LSP-based panels, this was achieved by limiting the opportunities for 
participation to local elites. Those processes that have been labelled as ‘analytic-
deliberative’ are to be favoured over these because they more effectively included 
‘lay’ perspectives and knowledge in the process. They achieved this through the 
provision of participant support structures, which enabled participants on relatively 
plural panels to develop ‘considered judgement’. This is highly valuable to the SCA: 
enabling proposals to be developed in the context of a more inclusive process of 
deliberation which led to a deeper and more original exploration of local problems. 
Nevertheless, the experience in these cases bought up important questions 
regarding the relationship between the different actors and the role of facilitation. 
Those panels that implemented more continuous processes that allowed for a 
greater level of iteration between the council and the panel in the development of 
policy proposals seem to have generated greater opportunities for public officials to 
influence deliberations. Moreover, the kinds of reflexive agendas that these cases 
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have been valued for likely make it harder for the facilitator to act in ways which 
might be necessary to ‘organise’ (Levine, Fung and Gastil 2005: 275) the process 
effectively and, importantly, mitigate for power asymmetries.  
 
These are important issues, but I do not believe we should discard the value of 
‘analytic-deliberative’ type approaches on this basis. Indeed, it is possible that the 
greater interaction between public officials and participants increased the visibility 
of public officials’ influence. Nevertheless, opportunities for process managers to 
control deliberations in ‘sophisticated consultations’ were also present in different 
ways, such as their framing influence associated with ‘sifting’ the ideas received prior 
to setting up the panel. Clearer conclusions cannot be drawn here. More research is 
needed on the dynamics of the interactions between experts, public officials and lay 
participants in ‘deliberative analytic’ processes (Burgess and Davies 2004). 
 
Finally, the analysis has some implications for the study of facilitation: it challenges 
the conventional wisdom that independent facilitation is most appropriate. This may 
be so in ‘mini-publics’ (Smith 2012), and the SCA constituted panels which are similar 
to these. However, in those cases that deliberation had a greater consequence upon 
the council’s actions facilitation was carried out by public officials. This might be said 
to increase perceptions of bias, and widens power asymmetries in panels, but it is 
also possible that deliberations had greater consequence because of the more direct 
involvement of public officials. I end this discussion with a call for more research: on 
the relationship between deliberative consequence and facilitation, a case also made 
by Fulwider (2005: 3). Understandings of facilitation in the collaborative governance 
literature as an emergent property of group interaction dynamics, rather than as a 
‘task’ to be assigned to an individual, might be a fruitful perspective to develop 
(Bussu and Bartels 2013).   
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7. To What Effect: The SCA and Policy 
Development. 
 
Chapters five and six evaluated the local participation processes implemented by 
councils using the SCA. This chapter moves onto considering the relationship 
between the outcomes of these and the policy process. The ways in which the 
outcomes of PDPs can be linked to policy development is a little explored aspects of 
institutional design (Smith 2011; Font and Smith 2013). In the ‘full scale’ (Setala and 
Schiller 2012) citizen initiative decision making is effected through a referendum. 
This is an aspect of the process which is especially valued because it provides 
universal opportunities for participation (Saward 1998; Parknison 2009). However, 
referendums suffer from the problem of differential turnout rates across social 
groups. Moreover, referendums fail to encourage deliberation amongst participants 
and leave little space for the consideration of alternatives as well as for adaptations 
to changes in circumstance (e.g. Garrett 1999). Thus, the full-scale initiative is a 
rather un-reflexive form of policy making. PDPs have some potential to overcome 
these problems, but they suffer from scalability issues meaning that when they apply 
to decision making at high tiers of government they are mostly consultative (Goodin 
and Dryzek 2006) and thus have problems in ensuring the responsiveness of public 
authorities to the outcomes of participation (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007a).  
 
As I began to explain in chapter two it seems that whereas the full scale citizen 
initiative tend to ensure responsiveness, it does so at the cost of reflexivity. PDPs, on 
the other hand, ensure reflexivity at the cost of guaranteed responsiveness. This 
chapter explores how the processes through which SCA policy proposals were 
integrated within policy development balanced this apparent trade-off.  Because it 
was not designed to determine policy, the SCA might be expected to ensure 
reflexivity at the cost of responsiveness.  However, by placing a statutory 
requirement upon the government to ‘try to reach agreement’ with the LGA selector 
panel on which proposals to implement (see section 5.2), it was intended to ensure a 
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greater degree of responsiveness than that associated with traditional consultation. 
This chapter therefore answers the following questions: 
 
 (RQ 3a) How was the duty to try to reach agreement operationalised?  
 (RQ 3b) What contributions did the SCA make to policy making? 
This chapter evaluates how the SCA connected the results of participation to the 
policy process, building upon the process descriptions provided in the first and 
fourth chapters. It begins in section 7.1 by evaluating the role played by the LGA 
selector panel in filtering proposals. Section 7.2 moves onto the question of how the 
‘try to reach an agreement’ process between government and the selector panel was 
operationalised. Throughout the discussion, the analysis shall consider how the SCA 
integration process negotiated a line between reflexivity and responsiveness, as well 
as what constraints and opportunities it faced in doing so. Finally, section 7.3 
concludes by bringing the analysis together to answer the third research question. 
7.1 The ‘Fine Line’ Walked by the LGA: Process and Substance Criteria 
The ‘filtering’ role played by the selector panel is crucial to the SCA process. It acted 
as a conduit between local panels and central government, and by developing and 
applying criteria for the acceptance or elimination of policy proposals, it began to 
shape the contribution which the SCA makes to policy development. However, an 
important problem faced by the selector seems to have arisen from the delicate 
nature of the position in which the SCA process put the LGA in. The LGA’s mission 
and purpose is to represent the interests of local councils, but the selection role 
placed the LGA in the position of ‘de-facto judge and jury between councils 
(interview 45, Selector Panel Member). The compromising nature of this position 
was something that came through strongly in four out of the six interviews with LGA 
policy officers and selector panel members (Interviews 37 and 38; LGA Policy 
Officers; Interview 44; 45 and 46 Selector Panel Members). One respondent put this 
concern especially well: 
 
… the LGA had always been very careful to avoid getting in a position 
such as that which could prove invidious. But this was in fact what it 
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was now doing. It was saying to Local Authority A ‘yes this can go 
forward’ and to Local Authority B ‘no your bid should not go forward’. 
I think getting into that sort of area was something that by the end of 
the process the LGA had become very much aware of what it was 
doing and beginning to wander whether that was something it ought 
to be very careful about in future (Interview 44, Selector Panel 
Member). 
 
This raises the possibility of a conflict of interests between meeting government 
expectations in the development and application of selection criteria and not 
damaging working relations with members. Thus an LGA policy officer supporting the 
selector panel argued that the LGA had to keep a ‘very fine balance’: 
 
we are at the end of the day representatives for the local government 
sector so we need to be fighting their corner … pushing agendas that 
they want to fill, that central government should take notice of … [but 
we also] ... need to maintain our relationship with national 
government, and with our key politicians … we are in a difficult 
position. We are always going to be in the middle of the two sides … 
we also get funding from CLG in order to carry out the role as selector, 
so it is a very fine balance of keeping everybody happy (Interview 38, 
LGA Policy Officer). 
 
The difficulties with keeping this ‘fine balance’ became evident in the development 
of selection criteria. Government and council expectations regarding the selector 
panel’s role pull in different directions. This section argues that this had important 
consequences for the way in which selection criteria were developed and applied. To 
this end, a distinction is made between the application of proposal ‘substance’ 
criteria, relating to the content of proposals, and proposal ‘process’ criteria, relating 
to the public participation processes through which proposals were developed. The 
aim is to explain how the application of these criteria impacted upon the SCA 
process. 
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7.1.1 Substance Criteria 
Regarding proposal substance, the SCA legislation (SCA 2007) and associated 
guidance (DCLG 2008; 2008a) outlined that proposals should require some form of 
government action and make a reasonable case for the advancement of the 
economic, environmental and/or social ‘well-being’ of the local area. However, 
following consultation with government officials the selector panel added a ‘viability 
and credibility’ criterion to these, essentially considering their relation to existing 
policy frameworks and degree of institutional change they demanded. As table seven 
in section 6.3.2 demonstrated, ‘viability and credibility’ was the most popular basis 
upon which to reject proposals, (it was applied in 48.4% instances, sustainability in 
31.6%, government assistance in 11.6 and consultation in 7.4%) reflecting sensitivity 
to government expectations. 
 
The high application of the ‘viability and credibility’ criterion might be explained by 
the high LGA officer framing influence over the process. Selector panel members 
highlighted the importance of the background work which LGA officers had carried 
out, noting that it would have been impossible to carry out informed deliberations 
on over 300 proposals without such support. However, when developing these 
briefings, LGA officers had consulted relevant civil servants to seek the government’s 
‘informal views’ on proposals, especially on their relation to government policy, and 
thus their ‘political realism’. One selector panel member described this as ‘do they 
stand a chance of being implemented by the present government?’ (Interview 44, 
Selector Panel Member). By framing proposals in this way, integration was being 
shaped to cohere with existing government policy, potentially limiting the extent to 
which the SCA exerted an original influence.  
 
In the SCA, the selector panel acted as de-jure representatives of local councils and 
de-facto representatives of process participants. A key reason for the choice of the 
LGA as the agency to constitute the selector panel was that it could bring a degree of 
accountability to the process by staffing the panel with locally elected councillors. 
However, authorisation and accountability links between selector panel members 
and local participants were very weak and the high level of framing influence which 
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considerations of ‘political realism’ and ‘viability and credibility’ further undermined 
the selection process. 
 
Local Works campaigners were critical of this aspect of the process, especially 
regarding the development of the ‘viability and credibility’ criterion. A Local Works 
campaigner argued that it seems to have been applied arbitrarily and that it 
undermined the democratic nature of the SCA: 
 
There was maybe a slight discrepancy there in terms of democracy 
whereby they introduced a criterion which was ‘viability’, which 
basically seemed to be the criterion to apply when the panel did not 
like a proposal … I would not say that was within the spirit of 
democracy in the Act (Interview 42, Local Works Campaigner A). 
 
Suspicions arose that a dubious logic was being applied by the panel when 
considering the ‘viability and credibility’ of proposals. For example, the rejection on 
these grounds of Windsor and Maidenhead’s proposal to allow secession for the 
local fire service (which was due to be shut down)55 from the regional authority was 
contested by advocates of the proposal. The selector panel turned the proposal 
down on ‘viability and credibility’ grounds, arguing that localisation would lead to a 
lack of necessary resources to deliver the full range of fire and rescue services, and 
on ‘sustainability’ grounds, arguing it could not be financed locally and might also 
impact negatively on the strategic capacity of Berkshire fire authority. Advocates of 
the proposal on the other hand, argued in response that smaller fire and rescue 
services, such as that of the Isle of Wight, had been highly graded and were thus 
clearly not ‘unviable’. Moreover, the proposal explained that Windsor had made 
preparations to resource localisation and would co-operate with Berkshire on a 
regional level. Thus, the ‘sustainability’ of the regional fire service would be 
maintained. 
 
                                                     
55
 see www.windsorfirestation.co.uk (accessed 20/08/13) 
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The reasons for rejection given by the selector panel seemed dubious to advocates 
of the proposal and important suspicions were raised that the selector panel had not 
considered the proposal on its merits, but had used the ‘viability’ criterion in self-
interested fashion. As local Conservative Party MP Adam Afryie put it in a House of 
Commons debate on the matter: 
 
The use of the SCA is perceived as a threat to those in locally 
appointed quangos such as combined fire, police and transport 
authorities, as they could lose their jobs to elected councils … 
[through proposals seeking transfers of functions] … there are strong 
suspicions that it [the dismissal] had more to do with politicking and 
the LGA's protection of its own interests as appointee than with the 
democratic wishes of the people of Windsor.56 
 
Afryie takes Local Works’ criticism a step further by suggesting that rejection on 
‘viability’ grounds were motivated by a conflict of interests. It is of course not 
possible to confirm whether this was the case. Barbara Follett, a Labour DCLG 
minister at the time, argued in response to Afryie’s statement that the LGA applied a 
sound judgement. Moreover, it was within the scope of powers afforded to the 
selector panel by the legislation to develop additional criteria. Nevertheless, the 
perception remained amongst proponents of the proposal, and Local Works 
campaigners, that the selector panel had applied the criterion arbitrarily, damaging 
the integrity of the process. In their view, the selector panel had ‘created a problem 
for itself’ by developing additional criteria, and should have simply applied the 
criteria defined in the legislation:  
 
… the duty is clear, the Act is so clear … the act allows any council to 
put forward, so long as they reach agreement with their communities, 
any proposal that they can show promotes local sustainability as 
defined and that requires central government action (Interview 42 A, 
                                                     
56
 House of Commons Debate, ‘Sustainable Communities’, 11 March 2010, column 511. 
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Local Works Campaigner A). 
Thus, according to Local Works and aggrieved Local Authorities, the incorporation of 
‘viability and credibility’ in response to government concerns, reduced the integrity 
of the process.  
 
However, indicating a rather different understanding of the selection role and of the 
purpose of the SCA, the government criticised the selector panel for not applying 
‘viability and credibility’ strictly enough. A DCLG minister put this objection in the 
following terms: 
 
I do not think the selector panel was helpful to us in filtering out ideas. 
… some of them would have required the entire re-writing of national 
public policy on planning or finance or things of that sort … I think I 
had understood this primarily as a process that was supposed to 
produce locally focused changes in the way that things were done … 
but a very high proportion of what came through were actually entire 
existing national government policy or planning policy (Interview 20; 
DCLG Minister). 
 
The ‘viability and credibility’ criterion was intended to take into account the scope 
and level of institutional change which the implementation of a proposal would 
involve. However, government actors argued that the selector panel had been too 
permissive in its application of this criterion, accepting too many proposals that went 
beyond what they understood to be the remit of the SCA process. Thus, government 
actors, advocates of policy proposals developed by councils and local works 
campaigners advance criticisms that portray directly opposed expectations of the 
selector panel’s role in the process. The delicate nature of the LGA’s position 
emerges as a key factor to consider in the selection process. As explained in the 
section below, these concerns are compounded by criticisms that the LGA was also 
too soft on ‘process’ requirements. 
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7.1.2 Process Criteria 
A second area which stands out from table three in chapter four is the relatively low 
application of the ‘consultation’ criterion (just 7.1 % of instances). This is especially 
striking because, as has been demonstrated in chapters seven and eight, many 
proposals had been developed through relatively low levels of public participation. 
Indeed, compounding criticisms that the selector had been too lenient when 
applying viability and credibility, government actors also criticised the selector for 
failing to eliminate proposals which had been developed through low levels of public 
participation. This was especially the case in a series of proposals which indicated to 
government that the SCA had been instrumentalised by local elites. For example, 
citing a proposal developed by South Gloucestershire to abolish the regional spatial 
strategy, a civil servant in DCLG noted that: 
 
there were a lot of proposals which seemed very ‘Local Authority’ 
based … you looked at them and you thought there is no way there 
has been a conversation started by the community … so there was a 
little discrepancy in the aims of the Act and what actually came 
through in the proposals (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant). 
 
The abolition of the regional spatial strategy was at the time a ‘hot’ point of 
Conservative Party opposition to a well-established policy of the then Labour 
government. Thus, central government actors expressed suspicions that the SCA at 
local level did not necessarily represent the priorities of local communities, but had 
in too many cases been dominated by councils or local elites. When negotiating the 
design of the SCA process the government had initially argued for the creation of a 
selector precisely to mitigate the potential that the SCA process would be used in 
this fashion. In the eyes of actors in the then Labour government, the LGA selector 
panel had failed to carry out this role adequately, decreasing the legitimacy of the 
claim which the SCA could make to influence policy agendas.  
 
There is much to this criticism. As demonstrated in chapters seven and eight, many 
councils that implemented the process made little attempt to reach agreement with 
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panels of local representatives that included representatives from excluded groups, 
as the SCA required. However, just 7.1% of proposals developed were rejected on 
basis of low consultation. Thus, it seems that at the very least, the ‘consultation’ 
criterion was underpinned by a weak definition of what meeting consultation 
requirements (i.e. attempting to reach agreement with panels and the inclusion of 
representatives from under-represented groups on these) might look like.  
 
In fact, evidence from interviews with selector panel members and policy officers 
suggests that there was some confusion around what constituted appropriate levels 
of engagement. LGA policy officers and selector panel members expressed quite 
different, even contradictory, views on this point. For example, an LGA policy officer 
(interview 37) recalled that, because of the democratic mandate of council 
representatives, the scrutiny of consultation requirements was not an important 
aspect of the selection process: 
 
We genuinely feel that councils are best placed to engage with local 
people. So the approach we took was that we asked the council to 
sign off that it was happy with the approach they had taken to the SCA 
overall and if, as an elected leader, you are happy that you genuinely 
engaged with local residents then it is not within our jurisdiction. 
Q. So the mandate that the council has legitimates these decisions? 
A. Exactly. 
 
However, this is contradicted by a selector panel member who recollected his 
surprise at the number of times the panel had to send proposals back to councils on 
the grounds that they did not meet consultation requirements. He recalls that 
although there was no ‘ideal model’, the panel were looking for evidence of 
engagement in proposals:  
 
… one would have expected something reasonably systematic in 
terms of gaging the need for or the support for the particular proposal 
considered by a variety of social science research type methods, I 
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guess. And one might expect some attempt to evaluate local public 
opinion, and maybe the opinion of relevant local community groups of 
one sort or another whether geographically based or functionally 
based or whatever (Interview 44) 
 
As was discussed in chapters seven and eight, initial ideas for policy proposals were 
raised in many different ways by councils. However, selector panel members made 
different interpretations regarding the appropriate sources of ideas in the SCA 
process. The same panel member cited above recollected that the ‘nature of the 
generators’ (Interview 44, Selector Panel Member) did not preoccupy the panel, 
noting that it was more ‘a question of once the idea had been generated to what 
extent was it then put before something that might be thought to represent local 
opinion more widely than amongst those who generated the idea’ (Interview 44, 
Selector Panel Member). Nevertheless, another panel member interpreted the spirit 
of the legislation at local level rather differently: 
 
There was always an issue around whether ‘was this from the councils 
or was this from the people?’. The Act was designed to make it from 
the people with the council as intermediary (Interview 46, Selector 
Panel Member) 
 
The confusion surrounding, appropriate forms of participation in proposal 
development is very problematic for the process. The legitimacy of the SCA in 
influencing policy agendas depends on the constitution of inclusive panels and 
attempts to reach agreement with these because it is through meeting these 
requirements that proposals can be said to reflect the problems encountered by 
ordinary local citizens. Thus, local participation processes are the crux of the SCA. 
However, such a low threshold in terms of consultation requirements sends out a 
poor indication to councils of what is required in terms of the processes through 
which proposals should be developed. If the SCA is to make a more significant 
contribution to democratising the policy process, improvements are required in this 
respect. 
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7.1.3 Selection Process Problems 
To sum this section up, the selector panel is essentially a space where the LGA had to 
mediate between the different expectations and interests of the actors involved in 
the SCA. However, the different directions in which these pulled seems to have 
influenced the development and application of selection criteria in a negative way. 
Ultimately, the selector panel ended up disappointing the actors involved in ways 
which raise fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the SCA process. Of 
special concern are, first, the relatively high application of ‘viability and credibility’ 
criterion in response to government concerns regarding the ‘political realism’ of 
proposals. As a result integration was being shaped by the selection process to 
cohere with extant policy agendas, limiting the original influence which the SCA 
exerted. Second, the permissiveness of the selector panel regarding consultation 
criteria failed to guard against the what was the relatively widespread 
instrumentalisation of the process at local level. This is an important problem 
because it means that, although SCA was designed as a PDP, it is in danger of being 
institutionalised as a ‘lobbying tool’ for local councils. 
7.2 The ‘Try to Reach Agreement’ Process 
The duty placed by the SCA upon government to attempt agreement with the 
selector panel is an important, and unique, feature of the SCA. Of course, 
collaboration between government and external actors and organisations is a regular 
feature of policy making. However, to the best of my knowledge, the SCA is unique in 
so far as it legislated for collaboration. The statutorily defined link to policy 
development differentiates the process from consultative PDPs that have taken 
place at national level in the UK in the past (e.g. Rowe 2005; Parkinson 2006). As 
explained in chapter one when describing the design of the SCA, the duty was 
essentially a compromise between government concerns at securing freedom of 
manoeuvre, and advocates of the process seeking to ensure a more meaningful link 
to policy development than consultation. Thus, it is mainly through this duty that the 
SCA attempted to balance reflexivity and responsiveness. 
 
Section 7.2.1 describes how the duty was operationalised and presents the main 
achievements made. During this discussion some of the main obstacles to effective 
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integration will be introduced. These are to be considered in more detail in separate 
subsections. 
7.2.1 Operationalising the ‘Try to Reach Agreement’ Process 
Policy proposals related to a wide variety of policy areas, spanning the competences 
of different government departments. However, DCLG had no delegated authority to 
decide on proposals outside its remit. Moreover, many proposals that did fall within 
the competency of DCLG required legislative change and thus agreement at 
executive level. For this reason, an important part of the process was the nodal role 
played by a team of DCLG civil servants. They mediated interaction between the 
selector panel and the government by engaging in policy discussions with colleagues 
in DCLG and other government departments (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant). An 
important aspect of this process was searching for windows of opportunity, 
comprising synergies between policy proposals and the governments’ position on 
related issues, for the implementation of proposals. 
 
This process intensified in the months leading up to, and the change in government 
following, the May 2010 general election. The SCA was given a degree of continuity 
by civil servants in DCLG who, during purdah, planned ahead for the likely change in 
government by ‘scanning’ through election manifestoes to in search of ‘links’ with 
proposals (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant). This process was stalled by the 
formation of a coalition government because the search for ‘links’ depended on the 
outcomes of the policy negotiations between coalition parties. Indeed, the formation 
of a coalition government following the election represented both an opportunity 
and a constraint for the SCA. On one hand, both coalition parties had strongly 
advocated the process prior to election and the SCA could be understood under both 
discourses of ‘community politics’, advanced by the Liberal Democrats (Kemp 2010; 
Pack 2011; 2013), and that of the Conservative ‘big society’ (Mabbutt 2010; Stott 
2010).57 The SCA thus broadly cohered with important aspects of both parties’ 
                                                     
57
 In fact, anticipating the possible need to form a coalition government, an important aspects of 
David Cameron’s (the Conservative Party Leader, and present Prime Minister) pre 2010 election 
strategy was to highlight areas of agreement between the Liberal Democrats and thus establish the 
possibility of a ‘Tory-Lib Dem alliance’. The SCA offered an example of shared ground in this respect. 
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rhetoric and policy programmes. This provided ground for coalition building and the 
SCA was in a position to influence coalition government policy from a relatively early 
stage.  
 
On the other hand, although the broad brush policy direction had been set in the 
coalition agreement, there was a low level of specificity especially in those areas that 
attract less public attention. Thus, government departments to which proposals 
related were not able to respond until more clearly defined positions had been 
developed. Moreover, respondents in DCLG (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant; 
Interview 20, DCLG Minister) recalled that the volume of proposals received 
exceeded expectations, placing considerable strain on the capacity of government to 
respond.  Many proposals called for new legislation, but the processing capacity of 
legislative institutions is limited. Thus, respondents highlighted the importance of 
legislation ‘in the pipeline’ (interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant) or ‘legislative vehicles’ 
(interview 37, LGA Policy Officer) which could be used to ‘piggy-back’ (interview 61, 
South Somerset Process Manager) accepted proposals through the legislative 
process. These were important because it would simply not be possible to develop 
multiple pieces of fresh legislation. However, ‘the pipeline’ was empty in the months 
running up to and following the election and thus opportunities to find areas of 
agreement and move towards implementation were limited. As a result, participants 
who had engaged in the SCA process and developed proposals in early 2009, had to 
wait until December 2010 to receive a response (DCLG 2010), leading to a great deal 
of frustration at local level and perceptions that the SCA had been ineffective. 
 
Extant policy agendas emerge as a key factor shaping integration, in terms of both 
coherence with policy priorities and contingency upon developments in the 
legislative process. As will be discussed further in section 7.2.3, this placed an 
important limitation on the extent to which the SCA exerted an original influence 
over policy development. However, for now, although it is beyond the scope of the 
thesis to carry out a full impact analysis, it is important to recognise that it was not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus, in an article of the left-leaning Guardian newspaper in September 2009, Cameron highlighted 
Lib-Dem and Conservative ‘co-operation’ on the Sustainable Communities Act (see Cameron 2009). 
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only those proposals which cohered with government policy that were accepted. 
Rather, the search for ‘coherence’ impacted upon the government response to 
proposals in different ways. Table 8 provides some examples of proposals, policy 
outcomes and rationales given in the government response document (DCLG 2010) 
to illustrate how this was so. 
Type Proposal Example Policy Outcome Rationale 
 
1 
 
Proposal to Establish Post 
Banks in Local Post Offices 
 
Proposal Rejected 
 
Establishment of state-
backed bank counter to 
government austerity 
measures 
 
2 
 
Proposal to give local 
councils greater freedom to 
grant business rate 
discounts to local businesses 
 
Proposals to be 
implemented as part of 
legislation in development 
(the ‘Localism Bill’) 
 
Proposal coheres with 
government objectives (with 
caveat that discounts be 
funded locally). 
 
3 
 
One year extension of grant 
funding a community-led 
social enterprise delivering 
health and wellbeing 
services 
 
Commitment to roll forward 
capital funding for one year 
 
Proposal coheres with 
government ‘Big Society’ 
initiative 
 
4 
 
Give local authorities 
greater responsibilities and 
power to maintain and 
sustain local post office 
network.
58
 
Pilot scheme being run to 
examine possibility of 
extending local authority 
involvement in future 
development of post office 
network 
Locally run public services 
may better meet local needs  
 
5 
 
Prohibit the issuing of 
restrictive covenants 
preventing use of a property 
defined as a 'local service' 
(such as local pubs) by the 
Sustainable Communities 
Act.
59
 
Commitment to undertake 
a public consultation on the 
issue of covenants, focusing 
on the impact they have on 
pubs and communities and 
seeking views on the 
necessity and form of 
powers to restrict their use. 
Recognition of negative 
impacts of restrictive 
covenants as well as 
importance of amenities such 
as local pubs and fostering 
community relationships. 
Table 10: Examples of Proposal Policy Outcomes and Rationales 
To recap, one of the main findings from the content analysis presented in chapter 
five was that coherence with extant agendas was the most important factor shaping 
integration.  Thus, most proposals that went against the grain of government policy, 
especially those making large scale demands in strategic policy areas, received a 
negative response, and those which ‘mirrored’ pre-existing objectives, were 
                                                     
58
 See http://www.localworks.org/campaigns/achievements/entry/saving-local-post-offices (last 
accessed 16/08/2013) 
59
 See http://www.localworks.org/campaigns/achievements/entry/helping-local-pubs (last accessed 
16/08/2013) 
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accepted and linked to policy already in development. However, there were 
opportunities for original influence in some cases where proposals cohered with the 
general aims and direction of government policy, but added to it in some way or 
communicated a problem which the government had been theretofore unaware of. 
First, there were a small minority of proposals were directly implemented which 
made small scale local-level demands and cohered with government policy whilst 
requiring no legislative change, that had communicated an original issue to the 
government (see section three of table eleven). More significantly, a popular positive 
response on larger scale proposals was to initiate a ‘formal advisory processes’ such 
as piloting implementation (see section four of table eleven) and initiating a 
consultation (see section five of table eleven). Thus, although the SCA did not 
determine policy, it did, in a minority of cases, exert a recommendatory influence by 
catalysing further rounds of policy development. 
 
According to government actors, one of the main blockages to greater policy 
influence was the scale of change which may proposals called for. Despite the 
incorporation of the ‘viability and credibility’ criterion in the filtering process, 
government actors argued that far too many proposals making demands that went 
beyond the scope of the SCA process were developed accepted. In this vein a DCLG 
minister argued that he had expected the SCA to produce far more ‘locally focused 
proposals’, but instead received proposals which required an ‘entire re-writing’ of 
national policy in key areas such as planning (Interview 21, DCLG Minister). In some 
cases this problem was compounded by the suspicion that these proposals had been 
inappropriately developed, indicating that local elites opposed to government policy 
sought to instrumentalise the opportunities offered by the SCA. A DCLG civil servant 
articulated these concerns in the following way: 
 
The way it panned out was that there were a lot of proposals which 
seemed very Local Authority based. And I think ministers were quite 
surprised at the number of political proposals that came forward … 
bearing in mind this was under the Labour administration, there 
were a lot of proposals from conservative councils which promoted 
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ideas in what would become the conservative manifesto and would 
become conservative policy at the time … there were some 
proposals to abolish the regional tier in planning, that stood out in 
my mind.  
 
Despite frustration at receiving such proposals, respondents noted that these had 
been ‘easy to deal with’: they represented a diversion from the SCA’s purpose by 
advancing ‘old agendas’ (Interview 20; DCLG Minister) that challenged central pillars 
of government policy. Developing the government’s position was thus ‘easy’, there 
was no agreement to be had (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant). The ‘harder’ 
proposals to reach agreement on communicated original problems which policy 
makers wanted to help with, but were applicable to local contexts and made too 
great demands on change. The DCLG civil servant leading on the process recalls the 
response of other policy officials to these in the following terms: 
 
The overriding sense I got from officials was …  ‘it is working for 
everybody else, is there any circumstances in this particular council 
which are unique?’, ‘instead of changing the law for the entire country 
is there a particular thing we can work with this particular council?’ 
(Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant) 
 
In these cases, it seems policy makers were reticent to making large scale changes, 
but open to considering alternative options or help in other ways. Thus, agreement 
was sought in these cases by separating the ‘problems’ underpinning proposals from 
the ‘solutions’ advocated.  This kind of compromise was an approach to reaching 
agreement which an LGA policy officer recalls was encouraged by the selector panel: 
 
What we were trying to do was to encourage the government to look 
beyond that [unintelligible] and then pick apart the answer to the 
proposal, the answer to the problem. We would try and encourage 
the government to try to ask, ‘well how do we address this issue, how 
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do work with the council and local people to address this issue?’ 
(Interview 37, LGA Policy Officer). 
 
This aspect of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process was highlighted as an especially 
positive aspect of integration by respondents. In the words of a selector panel 
member: 
 
One thing that did strike me in a positive sense …. was the willingness 
of the LGA and the DCLG (pause) to offer further discussion, further 
advice, further suggestions, rather than simply saying no, go away … I 
got the impression that both the LGA and the government were 
disposed to be helpful to those that had taken part in the exercise … 
there was that element in the outcome which indicated a willingness 
in some way to be of further assistance as distinct from simply saying, 
yes you can do that anyway, or no you cannot do that because we are 
against it, or it would cost too much money (Interview 44, Selector 
Panel Member) 
 
Thus, the separation of problems from solutions and the willingness to offer advice 
rather than a closed response can be understood as a way to ensure a degree of 
responsiveness when policy makers rejected policy measures advocated by 
proposals. Importantly, the DCLG civil servant cited above argued that, in his 
experience, this was ‘unique’ to the SCA and would not have occurred without the 
duty to ‘try to reach agreement’.  
 
So instead of just saying ‘no’, they had to justify why they were 
saying ‘no’, they had to justify saying ‘yes’ and there was a 
discussion about, ‘hang on, if you cannot do this, when why don’t 
you look at it from this point of view’ … that  would not have 
happened if the trying to reach agreement had not been there … 
we would have sent proposals off to policy colleagues, policy 
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colleagues would have come back with an answer and we would 
have presented that answer (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant). 
 
Absent the duty it seems that proposals would have been considered in light of 
current policy by relevant departments and received a formulaic response, which 
would be ‘presented’ to the selector panel, with minimal opportunities for 
interaction. This contribution made by the requirement to attempt agreement, 
although modest, was important in ensuring a degree of responsiveness of 
integration. However, it is a form of responsiveness which differs from that achieved 
by the citizen initiative. In the citizen initiative, responsiveness is achieved according 
to what Chambers (2012: 67) calls, the input/output model, whereby outputs 
directly mirror inputs. However, the ‘try to reach agreement’ process 
institutionalised a link to policy development that realised a deliberative, rather than 
a causal, relation between inputs and outputs. Thus, responsive governance was not 
solely achieved to the extent that outcomes mirrored proposals, but to the extent 
that they communicated problems to, and informed deliberation by, policy makers. 
It is important to highlight that this would not have been the case in the absence of 
the duty.  
7.2.2. The SCA and Whitehall: Bureaucratic Processes and Interdepartmental Politics. 
 
The duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ did succeed in ensuring a degree of 
responsiveness which is not likely to have been present in its absence. However, this 
modest achievement is overshadowed by the substantial problems the SCA faced. 
The first to consider in this respect is the issues faced by proposals that cut across 
the competencies of different government departments. Although the Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government represented government in its entirety 
in the SCA process, he did not enjoy delegated authority to decide on proposals that 
fell beyond the jurisdiction of DCLG. For this reason the nodal work carried out by 
DCLG officials was an important aspect of the process. A DCLG civil servant recalls 
the painstaking nature of this task: 
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There was 100,000 of civil servants out there, each with a specific 
policy area … it was a scrounge, the entire civil service. First you have 
got to work out which department it was related to and you have to 
find the bit of the department and then you have to find an individual 
that works on this piece of policy, which until yesterday you have 
never heard of (Interview 19, DCLG Civil Servant) 
 
In fact, direct contact between DCLG civil servants and decision makers in other 
departments was a rare occurrence. Rather, communication was initiated with 
officials lower in the hierarchy. The process of co-ordinating the government 
response across departments was therefore a slow and bureaucratic, often paper-
based, exercise. A Labour government DCLG minister was critical of the way in which 
proposals were integrated within policy development:  
 
… it became a bit of paper exercise and maybe again that is civil 
service expertise drawing up a system, because they love systems, and 
actually they exercise control and power through systems … it was like 
a precious child, because it was not nurtured properly, and the system 
did not like it, it did not achieve its potential (Interview 24, DLCG 
Minister) 
 
The government minister involved in the design of the SCA recalled significant 
opposition to the original idea for the process. Advocates of the SCA in the Local 
Works campaign favoured the ‘try to reach agreement’ clause of the legislation 
precisely to mitigate for anticipated resistance to respond meaningfully to proposals 
on behalf of the civil service. However, the Labour government minister quoted 
above points to the possibility that the SCA was subsumed by the processes it 
intended to influence. Adding to these concerns selector panel members and LGA 
officials articulated suspicions that SCA proposals were received poorly across 
government departments. In the words of a selector panel member: 
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CLG doesn’t or has not had much clout in Whitehall and they went 
through a mechanistic process of talking with the experts in 
departments and coming back … my SCA officers felt that other 
departments out there were not hugely enthused about this, this 
was a funny bit of legislation, they were not sure of what it was, it 
was getting in the way of their day job (Interview 44, Selector 
Panel Member). 
 
An LGA officer concurred on this point, noting that inter-departmental differences 
are a characteristic feature of ‘dealing’ with Whitehall: 
I suspect that some departments viewed it as more of a useful tool 
than others and you find that generally dealing with government, 
there are different attitudes towards different policies (Interview 37, 
LGA Policy Officer) 
 
It seems therefore that the SCA faced substantial problems in integrating proposals 
that cut across the competences of government departments, and often received an 
unenthusiastic response. The evidence is limited here since ministers and policy 
officials outside CLG were not interviewed. However, some experiences at local level 
provide anecdotal evidence indicating that these suspicions might be correct. The 
LGA attempted to keep local councils updated on the progress of proposals through 
their website but a policy officer in Kent reported frustration at receiving repeated 
updates indicating proposals were under consideration by relevant government 
departments, suggesting that government was rather unresponsive to proposals. He 
argued that that the SCA had failed to gain ‘ministerial buy in’ at cabinet level and 
had thus become ‘siloed’ within DCLG (Interview, 28, Process Manager, Kent).  
Moreover, a senior official in Kettering (Interview 29, Senior Council Officer, 
Kettering) recollects that despite receiving a positive response on a local transport 
related proposal it was necessary for the local MP to lobby government to follow 
through on commitments. This led to the council securing a meeting with 
Department for Transport (DfT) officials to consider further options: the action 
committed to by government in its response (DCLG 2010: 16). However, once this 
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meeting took place, the respondent recalls that DfT officials were ‘completely 
unaware of the SCA process as far as the proposal was concerned’. It is therefore not 
clear what role, if any, the SCA played in ensuring this outcome. Indeed, in the case 
of Kettering’s proposal the DfT seems to have been more responsive to traditional 
means of lobbying than to the SCA.  
 
This suggests that the SCA faced substantial problems in co-ordinating the 
government response across departments and in ensuring that the commitments 
made by these were followed through. Compounded by the delays caused by the 
May 2010 election, this led to substantial frustration on the part of respondents at 
local level. Many respondents recalled upon receiving a response that they had 
forgotten proposals, or that they had lost significance. As a result perceptions of 
responsiveness at local level were generally low, with participants voicing complaints 
to the effect that policy proposal had disappeared into a ‘black hole’ (Interview 61, 
South Somerset Process Manager) had ‘vaporised’ (Interview 55, Sheffield Panel 
Participant), or that the SCA’s influence was unclear, making it difficult to justify 
involvement in the process (Interview 2, Doncaster Process Manager). 
7.2.3 Extant Agendas 
Although in section 7.2.1 I noted some areas where the SCA had an original influence 
over policy development, it is important to highlight that the main factor shaping 
integration was that of coherence with extant policy agendas. Interview data 
coheres with that from the content analysis on this point. The contingency of many 
proposals on the outcomes of the 2010 election and negotiations following the 
formation of a coalition government, the importance of ‘legislative vehicles’ 
contributed to what seems to have been the subsuming of the SCA integration 
process within extant policy agendas.  
 
This led to considerable frustrations by local respondents at receiving a ‘positive’ 
response which they felt departed from the terms set by proposals. Respondents 
complained that in many proposals the actions committed to were rather different 
to those called for, and often did not deal adequately with the issue underpinning 
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these. For example, South Hams submitted a proposal asking government legislate in 
order to give councils a duty to transfer poorly used local assets to community 
organisations. The government responded that it did not want to implement a ‘duty’, 
but that it would be making it easier, through the ‘Localism Bill’, for local 
communities to bid to take over assets and would place a duty on councils to publish 
lists of assets of community value (see DCLG 2010: 29). The impact of extant policy 
agendas is clear here: the government reconciled the proposal with a similar policy 
already in development which would tackle the problem in a different way. 
However, the policy committed to takes a much softer approach. The proposal 
essentially called for a right of community asset transfer, whereas the government 
committed to facilitate the process of tendering for such transfers, where 
community groups might have to compete with other bids. The SCA was not a 
determinant of policy, and it is right and proper that the government had freedom 
for manoeuvre when responding to proposals. However, the ‘softness’ of the 
government’s policy and the fact that the response was presented as a ‘proposal 
that the secretary of state will implement’ (see DCLG 2010: 14) suggests placation 
through the ‘try to reach agreement’ process. Again, this places an important 
question mark over the extent to which the SCA exerted an original influence. 
7.2.4 Generating ‘Motivation’: Countervailing Power and Deliberative Activism 
In no small part due to the limitations outlined above, respondents from the LW 
campaign were quite critical of the ‘try to reach agreement’ process. A theme which 
often came up in interviews with campaigners was an expectation of resistance on 
part of central government towards proposals that challenged powerful and 
established interests (Interviews 40; 42, Local Works Campaigners). For this reason, 
they viewed their advocacy role to be of key importance in ensuring government 
responsiveness. Thus, whereas LGA actors and DCLG ministers understood ‘try to 
reach agreement’ in collaborative or ‘un-politicised’ terms, LW campaigners 
articulated a more strategic and confrontational understanding of the integration 
process. Respondents were especially critical of the perceived ‘weakness’ of the 
selector panel, understood as its failure to ‘push’ government harder, especially 
where policy commitments differed from proposals or dubious reasons were given 
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for rejection (Interview 42, Local Works Campaigners). As such, one of the main 
areas for improvement identified by campaigners was the generation of greater 
pressure and incentives for government to incorporate proposals more meaningfully 
into policy development. They understood the problem to be that the government 
was essentially not sufficiently ‘motivated’ to follow through on commitments to ‘try 
to reach agreement’ made in the legislation. 
 
Since the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ is statutorily defined, government 
decisions could, in theory, be challenged at the courts. However, considering the 
absence of any precedent as well as the fact that meetings between the selector and 
government ministers were closed, with minutes only available for officer-level 
discussions, this would proceed on shaky ground. Moreover, although there is no 
data to back this up, one could speculate that considering the high costs of losing an 
appeal, councils are unlikely to challenge decisions. As Parkinson (2012: 156) put it 
‘judicialisation empowers those who have the resources to access the referee’. This 
is exacerbated by the significant delays witnessed in developing a response. As noted 
above, several respondents at local level noted that proposals had lost significance, 
had been forgotten or nullified by developments in the policy process. As attention 
turns to new agendas the salience of the issue is likely to decrease, making an appeal 
less likely. Thus, the extent to which judicial institutions might act as an effective 
‘referee’ seems limited. 
 
Local Works campaigners argued that crucial to the success of the Act is for public 
authorities to feel that it may be politically damaging not to follow through on 
statutory obligations. Thus, their goal was to increase scrutiny of process by 
generating civic interest and / or conveying an impression of widespread ‘grassroots 
support’ for the SCA to local and national government (Interview 40 and 42 Local 
Works Campaigners). As such, they played a role equivalent to that of ‘deliberative 
activists’ (Fung 2005; Kadlec and Friedman 2007). Their advocacy efforts were 
fundamental in changing the government’s initially sceptical position towards the 
private members’ bill in which the process was advanced. Indeed, without Local 
Works, the SCA idea would likely have remained within the pages of the ‘Ghost 
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Town’ reports (Simms et al 2002; Oram, Connisbee and Simms 2003). However, their 
efforts to scrutinise government once the process was in place were considerably 
dampened by a series of factors relating to the nature of the SCA process as well as 
the organisational culture and structure of Local Works as well as its approach to 
campaigning. 
 
Regarding the former, the SCA was relatively unpublicised, leaving it up to Local 
Works, an organisation with limited resources, to focus on promotion. It was 
therefore necessary for the organisation to prioritise resources across competing 
priorities, such as promoting the impact of the first round and ensuring the future of 
the SCA process. The original legislation (SCA 2007) did not guarantee future rounds 
of the process, thus Local Works focused resources on campaigning for an 
amendment, passed in April 2010, which would require future rounds. This meant 
that they were unable to focus upon scrutinising the ‘try to reach agreement’ 
process and maximising impact as fully as they would have liked. Compounding this 
problem, the low transparency of the integration process and made it harder for 
Local Works to track developments and identify pertinent points in the integration 
process at which to mobilise supporters. The publication of a response is an 
important aspect of PDPs. It makes decision a matter for public record, enabling 
government rationales to be more effectively contested by civil society actors. 
However, the significant time delays witnessed in integrating proposals within policy 
development undermined civic interest in the process. As noted above, respondents 
at the local level noted that by the time a response was received, interest in 
proposals had dwindled. This made it harder for Local Works to generate interest 
and mobilise supporters and process participants in support of their advocacy. 
 
Regarding the Local Work’s organisational structure and campaign strategy, Local 
Works is a professionalised and centrally directed advocacy organisation, with 
‘protest business’ organisational characteristics (Jordan and Maloney, 1997; see also 
Skocpol 2003). As such, their approach relies upon the central co-ordination of 
advocacy by campaign supporters through one-off activities such as mail-based 
lobbying or attending public meetings, and using the power generated to improve 
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their position when bargaining with policy makers. This approach was very successful 
in the promotion of a specific policy such as the SCA. A government minister argued 
that Local Works were instrumental in changing the governments’ attitude towards 
the process, specifically recalling that he had received more letters on the SCA than 
on the Iraq war! However, Local Work’s civic support networks are relatively thin 
and non-committal when compared to those that have been deemed fundamental in 
the ‘claiming’ of state power through PDPs (e.g. Heller 2001; Fung and Wright 
2003a). This meant that the organisation was not able to generate a base of more 
continuous civic support an interest for an on-going process such as the SCA, than 
that associated with ‘one-off’ lobbying. As a result, an important degree of 
‘countervailing power’ was lacking from the SCA process. This may go some way 
towards explaining the relative ease with which public authorities were able to 
shape integration according to their interests, expectations and interpretations of 
the process, as supposed to those arising from the meaning and purpose which 
advocates originally ascribed to the SCA.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the strategy which Local Works took to 
campaigning arguably undermined the legitimacy of their advocacy role. Local Works 
focused on the maximisation of process ‘use’ and ‘impact’. They understood this to 
be necessary in order to demonstrate ‘teeth’ and secure future interest. As such, 
their main preoccupation can be understood as generating a ‘demonstration effect’ 
(Abers 1998: 138) and they prioritised this objective over ensuring ‘process quality’. 
However, it stands to reason that ‘deliberative activists’ must, first and foremost, 
seek to ensure participation process quality because, when it promotes the 
outcomes of well-run deliberative processes, advocacy eschews association with 
narrow interests and can make a more robust, even if necessarily imperfect, claim to 
be promoting the public good.  
 
Thus, from a perspective of deliberative democracy, it seems that Local Works 
promoted the process from an illegitimate position. As noted in chapters seven and 
eight, many councils developed proposals through quite exclusive participation 
processes and / or sought to use the opportunities the SCA offered to lobby for 
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changes in government policy that reflected existing campaigns. Thus, at least in the 
first round, Local Works were promoting the impact of proposals which had often 
been inappropriately developed and could only make tenuous claims to represent 
the priorities of local citizens. The SCA process had failed to generate sufficient 
procedural legitimacy. For this reason, if Local Works are to perform as deliberative-
activists, rather than as a traditional pressure group, one could argue that the 
improvement of SCA participation process quality should be given greater priority. In 
doing this, the legitimacy of their advocacy activity, as well as of the claim which the 
SCA can make to influence policy agendas, stands to be improved.  
 
Further thoughts on Local Works’ role in the process and what lessons it bears for 
deliberative activism are offered in the conclusion. Before moving on, however, the 
chapter ends by providing a summary of what has been established by this analysis 
regarding the trade-off between reflexivity and responsiveness in the integration 
process. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explore how the SCA negotiated a line between reflexivity 
and responsiveness in policy making. It should not be surprising that the SCA 
favoured ‘reflexivity’. In fact, as explained in chapter one, it was not designed to 
determine policy, but rather to increase the flow of information between different 
governance tiers. Indeed, one of the main problems which actors involved in the 
integration process found was that locally developed proposals often called for 
nationally applicable changes. For this reason an important degree of reflexivity was 
necessary in order to allow government to consider alternative and perhaps more 
desirable policy options. There is therefore an important sense in which SCA 
proposals should be seen as messages communicating policy problems to 
government, so that it may mobilise resources in ways deemed appropriate, rather 
than proposals as demands for particular policy measures. One of the achievements 
made by the SCA was to engender a degree of responsiveness to the problems 
underpinning proposals - if not to the policy measures advocated by these. The duty 
to ‘try to reach agreement’ seems to have been important in this respect, ensuring 
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that policy proposals were given a deeper consideration than would have been the 
case in its absence. Actors involved in the process thus highlighted the importance of 
considering alternative options and ‘helping’ local councils tackle the problems 
informing policy proposals. It has been argued that this coheres with a deliberative, 
rather than a causal, understanding of the relation between input and output in 
achieving responsiveness (Chambers 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, this achievement is overshadowed by what seems to have been, in a 
nutshell, the subsuming of the SCA within those processes it intended to influence. 
This was so for a series of reasons. First, sensitivity to government concerns 
regarding ‘political realism’ in the selection process is highly problematic for the SCA 
because this meant that integration was being shaped from the very beginning to 
cohere with extant policy agendas. This was compounded by the relatively low 
priority given to public participation requirements, meaning that the selector failed 
to filter for proposals which had been developed through low levels of participation. 
From a deliberative democratic perspective, this undercuts the legitimacy of the SCA 
process because it is through quality public participation and deliberation processes 
that proposals can be said to provide a more accurate reflection of considered local 
public opinion, rather than that of local elites. It is therefore important to improve 
selection process criteria. Some ways in which this might be done shall be 
considered in the concluding chapter. 
 
Second, the influence of existing structures and extant agendas was especially 
pronounced upon the integration of proposals. The SCA was intended to influence 
central policy development processes with a view to making these more responsive 
to local contexts, but proposals faced substantial problems travelling between 
government departments. Moreover, they seem to have become entangled in the 
bureaucratic processes through which the government response was developed and 
presented. There was a space for original influence where SCA proposals went with 
the grain of government policy whilst adding to it in some way. In these cases SCA 
proposals catalysed further rounds of policy development. However, the main 
finding of this analysis is that the integration of policy proposals was mainly 
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contingent on coherence with extant agenda setting processes, especially to 
electoral outcomes and related policy development and legislative cycles. Local 
participants and public officials expressed frustration at commitments to policy 
action which diverted from the terms set by proposals and at the opaque and 
painfully slow nature of the integration process. Although the analysis suggests that 
the duty to try to reach an agreement did ensure a degree of responsiveness, low 
visibility and poor feedback mechanisms meant that perceived responsiveness was 
low. 
 
The paragraphs directly above have pointed to a series of problematic areas in the 
SCA process. The concluding chapter shall consider the extent to which these might 
be mitigated by through changes in institutional design. However, it is important to 
end by highlighting that there is an important sense in which modifications in 
institutional design will not achieve much lacking the political will to follow through 
on the intentions of design. In this sense, Local Work’s activities are important. They 
understood their role as generating civic interest in the SCA which could ‘motivate’ 
public authorities to follow through on commitments made in the legislation. The 
development of ‘countervailing power’ has been deemed fundamental to the 
successful implementation of participatory governance. For example, analysts of the 
Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre have argued that mass mobilisations keep 
public authorities responsive to participation (Santos 1998). Smith (2009: 42) argues 
that such impressive levels of civic mobilisation are facilitated by the incentive 
mechanisms in the design of the process. Equivalent sources of ‘motivation’, 
however, seem to have been lacking in the SCA. Their generation will be important if 
the responsiveness of the process is to be increased. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Citizen agenda setting is an important part of democratic governance. What issues 
reach the agenda and how they are defined has a huge influence upon political 
systems and thus democracy stands to be deepened if opportunities are provided for 
citizens to define problems and influence the development of policy agendas. This 
research has aimed to explore whether and how PDPs can contribute to problem 
definition and agenda setting. As argued in chapter one, because of its agenda 
setting function and the breadth of institutional scales it spanned, the SCA 
represents a departure from the norm. As well as being a rare example of a 
deliberative agenda setting process, it was an attempt at democratic innovation on a 
relatively large scale. For these reasons, an evaluation of its performance can expand 
our understanding of the potential for PDPs to contribute to the development of a 
more participatory and deliberative democratic system. The aim has been to analyse 
the innovative features of the SCA and highlight productive and problematic areas 
for institutional design. This final chapter brings the analysis together. It begins by 
revisiting the answer to each of the research questions outlined in chapter two. 
These have mainly been explored individually in separate chapters, but some aspects 
of the answers have also crossed chapters, so it will be useful to integrate these 
within individual sections (8.1, 8.2 and 8.3). Section 8.4 then considers the 
implications of the analysis for the prospects of democratising agenda setting 
through PDPs. In the process a more outline detailed outline of recommendations 
for the improvement of the SCA is given and other institutional forms which may be 
more desirable are considered.  
8.1 Elite Control and Participation Bias 
Saward (1998: 108) has valued the citizen initiative on grounds that it provides 
‘equal and regular opportunities for all adult citizens to set the public agenda’. 
However, it faces practical obstacles in realising this potential. Meeting quorum 
requirements involves substantial resource and organisational capacity and it is 
therefore social and political elites that have the most to gain from the opportunities 
offered (e.g. Garrett 1999). PDP designs can overcome these problems through the 
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use of different forms of participant selection. For this reason, this thesis has sought 
to answer the following question: 
 
 (RQ 1a) Did the constitution of SCA panels overcome problems of 
participation bias?  
It is important to note that underpinning participant selection choices are different 
assumptions regarding the constituencies to be represented (Saward 2008). It is 
important to consider these because in processes such as PDPs where universal 
participation is not possible inclusion is achieved through the representative claim-
making of participants (Marochi 2009). Thus the second question: 
 
  (RQ 1b) On what grounds where different participant selection choices 
made? 
To answer these questions three design features have been considered: 
representation, participant selection and facilitation. Each of these is treated in turn. 
First, when opportunities for universal participation are limited, ‘inclusion’ is 
achieved through representation (Marochi 2009), so it is important to understand 
how different representation forms impacted upon elite control and participation 
bias in local panels. In the case of the SCA the main ‘constituency’ to be represented 
in local panels was that of ‘the local community’. This was understood as individuals 
or groups within the geographical area governed by the local authority. Chapter five 
argued that this focus on the locality was problematic because it led to the 
development of policy proposals which were responsive to particular local contexts, 
but had national implications. Indeed, as explained in chapter seven, the integration 
of proposals within the policy process was discussed, this was a major obstacle to 
impact faced by the SCA. Section 8.4 considers other possible approaches to 
developing proposals that might avoid this problem. For now, the focus is upon 
describing the main ways in which appropriate membership within the local 
community was defined.  
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The most popular way in which respondents felt the ‘local community’ could be 
represented was by ensuring that the SCA process communicated ‘locally important 
issues’ to government. This priority sometimes led to the implementation of forms 
of public participation which have been criticised for being too exclusive. For 
example, drawing upon LSP networks to constitute panels was often justified on 
these terms, with process managers noting the importance of engaging actors which 
they felt had the necessary knowledge about local problems. However, this concern 
also underpinned the development of more inclusive processes where the presence 
of a greater plurality of actors was deemed to be important in enabling a more 
comprehensive exploration of local problems. Related to this concern was a 
preoccupation with engaging ordinary members of the local public. In a similar vein 
to Parkinson (2006), the analysis suggests that this was linked to the perceived need 
to avoid engaging highly active members of the population, the logic being that they 
would be too preoccupied with advancing narrow agendas, or lacked shared 
experienced with ordinary citizens and thus could not be expected to articulate ‘real’ 
priorities. Where the notion of avoiding the ‘usual suspects’ was underpinned by a 
concern with finding ways to engage those who do not usually participate, it is a 
worthy objective. However, where this concern was underpinned by a perceived 
need to represent ‘ordinary’ people it is problematic because, as Parkinson (2006: 
70) has explained, it rests on a statistical impossibility.  
 
Second, chapter five evaluated the extent to which different participant selection 
choices mitigated problems of participation bias and elite control. There are two 
areas to consider in this respect: (a) problem definition and (b) the definition of 
options. Regarding the former, as discussed in section 2.4, commentators have often 
argued that one of the ways in which elite control occurs in PDPs is through the 
framing power of process managers (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007; Tucker 
2008). For this reason, Parkinson (2006: 151) concludes that one of the most 
important ways in which the relationship between ‘expert’ and ‘citizen’ in 
participatory governance can be democratised is by having deliberation ‘triggered’ 
by another source, such as the informal public spheres or constitutional rules. The 
SCA provides an interesting example here, rather than by process managers, the 
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agendas for deliberation were, in most cases, set through different forms of 
participation.  
 
Passive approaches created entry points to propose ideas (through means such as 
local press releases or open public meetings) and active approaches targeted 
submissions from different local groups. Although it was not possible to gather data 
on the sources of ideas submitted by councils, the evidence available suggests that 
local voluntary groups and LSP bodies were especially involved in both approaches, 
suggesting that idea raising processes tended towards a bias in favour of local elites. 
The SCA would benefit from more comprehensive attempts to promote 
opportunities to propose ideas. Having said this, the value of relying on local 
voluntary groups and partnership governance networks to propose ideas should not 
be entirely dismissed. These bodies can draw on existing campaigns and on-going 
consultations to come up with relatively well formulated proposals that can provide 
an ‘agenda filter’ (Bohman 1996: 139; Parkinson 2006: 132) and thus an initial focus 
for deliberation on local panels. Moreover, by communicating the nationally relevant 
outcomes of on-going local consultations, such as sustainable community strategies, 
to central government the SCA could play the positive role of increasing the flow of 
information between governance tiers. Thus, although their engagement should be 
complemented by greater opportunities for ordinary citizens to propose ideas, local 
interest groups and LSP’s also provide a good source. 
 
Regarding ‘option formation’, it is at this stage that PDPs differ most clearly from the 
most widely institutionalised citizen agenda setting process, the citizen initiative. 
Whereas opportunities for option formation in the citizen initiative are limited to 
initiators (as well as public authorities in ‘mixed’ models) it is viewed as a sign of 
good practice in PDPs that participants can challenge initial framings and/or raise 
and develop alternative options (Lang 2008). In the SCA, it was at this stage that 
councils sought to meet the requirements associated with setting up a panel of local 
representatives to discuss, or develop, policy proposals. However, it is clear from the 
analysis in chapter five that most cases suffered from problems of elite control and 
participation bias. In some cases panels were not able to modify or redefine 
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proposals - their participation was limited to recommending pre-determined 
options. Council officers often ‘filtered’ ideas raised through prior petitioning 
processes, potentially entailing an arbitrary framing influence. Furthermore, the 
most popular approach was to draw on LSP’s to constitute panels, thus limiting 
opportunities to participate to local elites. Although drawing on LSP’s to raise ideas is 
to be favoured, the analysis suggests it was necessary to engage at a ‘deeper’ level 
than this when constituting panels in order to enable a more original exploration of 
local problems. 
 
On a more positive note, an approach present in a minority of cases was to use 
quota-based random selection to ensure broadly descriptively representative panels. 
This was most successful in avoiding problems of elite control and participation bias 
because it minimised the influence that strategic interests and individual dispositions 
to participate had upon panel constitution. As such it was most effective in 
minimising participation bias and maximising inclusion. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider how the process of deliberation impacts upon elite 
control. The evidence presented in chapter six suggests that discursive inequalities 
were most acute in those panels labelled as being similar to ‘analytic-deliberative’ 
processes. These panels were more diverse, participants worked closely with public 
officials in longer term processes with a relatively open agenda. Although the 
evidence is inconclusive, it seems possible that this increased opportunities for 
public officials and local elites to influence deliberations. This supports Cornwall and 
Coelho’s (2007: 9) finding that ‘in contexts with highly asymmetrical resource 
distribution among participants, there is a very real danger of elite capture’. 
Moreover, it stands to reason that ‘reflexive’ agenda setting processes complicated 
the facilitators’ ability to structure the process in ways that mitigate the effects of 
power asymmetries. 
 
These are important problems but, for reasons that will be re-visited in section 8.2, 
the value of ‘deliberative-analytic’ approaches should not be dismissed. It is 
important to note, however, that the experience in ‘analytic-deliberative’ type cases 
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has some important implications for facilitation. In these cases ‘facilitation’, or, 
‘chairing’  (as some respondents referred to it), was carried out by council officers or 
elected representatives. This goes against the grain of conventional wisdom that 
facilitation in ‘mini-publics’ should be independent (Smith 2012: 99). Nevertheless, a 
positive correlation was roughly identified between direct involvement of local 
decision makers on local panels and greater influence over decisions, pointing to the 
possibility that ‘deliberative consequence’ (Fulwider 2005: 3) affects facilitation. The 
data does not, however, permit drawing a clearer conclusion. More research is 
needed on the dynamics of the interactions between experts, public officials and lay 
participants in ‘analytic-deliberative’ processes (e.g. Burgess and Davies 2004) as 
well as on the relationship between ‘deliberative consequence’ and facilitation 
(Fulwider 2005: 3). One possibility is that in ‘consequent’ public deliberation it will be 
more fruitful to analyse facilitation as an ‘emergent’ property of group interaction, 
rather than as a ‘task’ to be assigned to an individual (Bussu and Bartels 2012).  
8.2 How? Collaboration and Division of Labour 
Interaction between participants in PDPs are ideally designed in ways that generate 
knowledge complementarities leading to the co-production of expertise (Sirianni 
2009). To this end, this thesis seeks to answer the following sub-question: 
 
 (RQ 2a) Through what processes were proposals developed in the SCA?  
 (RQ 2b) What forms of interaction were present between participating actors 
and which was most effective in co-producing expertise? 
There are two aspects which it is necessary to consider in answering this question: 
the processes through which agendas were set for local panels, and the processes 
through which proposals were developed. Regarding agenda setting, scholars have 
often proposed that deliberation requires some form of ‘agenda filter’, in order to 
provide an initial focus  for deliberation (Bohman 1996: 139; Parkinson 2006: 132). 
The analysis in chapter six supports this hypothesis - all cases used some form of 
prior idea raising process to set agendas for local panels. A key issue to consider is 
where these ideas come from and how they were raised. As noted in section 8.1, a 
popular approach was to raise ideas essentially through the creation of petitioning 
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processes. The analysis suggests that these failed to encourage sustained reflection 
or provide adequate support for participants before submitting a proposal. It seems 
many people responding to petitioning processes had not understood the nature of 
the SCA, and used the process as an opportunity to raise any issue with the council, 
often leading to the submission of irrelevant and / or unrealistic proposals.  
 
Many cases combined petitioning processes with promoting the process to local 
organisations and associated networks. Local interests groups and LSP networks 
were often involved in this aspect of the process. They submitted relatively well 
formulated ideas that reflected existing campaigns or the results of local community 
planning consultations, and thus the problem of inappropriate ideas was avoided. 
This form of idea raising was most often a ‘paper-based’ exercise. However, some 
councils, such as Sheffield, Cambridge and South Hams, held an idea raising event. In 
Cambridge and South Hams participants were asked specifically to propose ideas 
which they felt would advance the priorities determined in the council’s Sustainable 
Community Strategy. In Sheffield, council offers trained in public engagement 
managed a meeting of about 150 participants. These more discursive approaches are 
to be favoured, since they provided greater opportunities for participants to develop 
an acquaintance with the SCA process and discuss different options before 
submitting. 
 
Regarding the development of proposals and decision making, it has been argued 
that a key aspect of deliberative processes is the aim to ‘integrate’ or reconcile ‘lay’ 
or ‘local’ knowledge with more systematic and synoptic forms of ‘professional’ or 
‘expert’ knowledge. In the analytical framework different ways in which 
collaboration and labour divisions can be organised to this end were described. The 
analysis in chapter six suggests that a combination of ‘iterative’ and ‘convergent’ 
forms of collaboration are to be favoured over ‘serialised’ processes. A characteristic 
feature of the ‘serialised’ processes considered in chapter six, was a clear separation 
between the raising of ideas, and their prioritisation. This meant that participants 
developed preferences and made recommendations regarding pre-determined 
proposals. ‘Iterative’ and ‘convergent’ processes, on the other hand, enabled more 
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reflexive agenda setting processes which provided longer term opportunities for 
participants to develop considered judgement, contribute to the development of 
proposals and add value to these through deliberation.  
 
Such approaches were evident in LSP-based panels and analytic-deliberative type 
processes. In LSP-based panels limited participation opportunities to local elites 
present in council-linked organisational networks. These were identified as parts of 
the local population who could, at minimal resource expenditure, draw on 
substantial expertise and contribute to proposal development. Although LSP actors 
may have a good grasp of important issues affecting the local area, relying on LSP’s 
exclusively to constitute panels prioritised a narrow understanding of local 
knowledge. It could be said that it was ‘local professional knowledge’ which was 
being incorporated into the process in these cases. PDPs are often advocated by 
scholars who are deeply critical of democratic elitist theories (e.g. Cohen and Fung 
2004), however in these cases the SCA might be described as a ‘deliberative-elitist 
process’ (see Papadopoulos 2012: 146). Such an approach might be defended on 
epistemic grounds, but it did not entail an expansion of democracy. Rather, LSP-
based panels might be seen as ‘an expansion of the ruling elite itself’ (Somerville 
2005: 125).  
 
Analytic-deliberative type processes are to be favoured because they more 
effectively included lay citizens in the production of proposals. Developing 
considered judgment was more challenging in these cases, but was ultimately 
enabled by the provision of participant support structures. There are important 
problems to tackle here, that relate to power asymmetries between the different 
participants on the panel. However, approaches to collaboration such as those taken 
in Cambridge and Sheffield are to be valued because ideas were raised and 
developed in the context of a more inclusive and deliberative process, enabling a 
more original and comprehensive exploration of local problems to take place. 
8.3 To What Effect: Reflexivity and Responsiveness 
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One of the most innovative aspects of the SCA was the duty to ‘try to reach 
agreement’ on which proposals to implement. Especially where their outcomes 
relate to decisions at high governance tiers, PDPs have been overwhelmingly 
consultative and this has fed concerns of tokenism and placation (Hoppe 2010; Lee 
and Romano 2013). By answering the following questions, the thesis has sought to 
explore whether the design of the SCA avoided such issues@ 
 
 (RQ 3a) How was the duty to try to reach agreement operationalised?  
 (RQ 3b) What contributions did the SCA make to policy making? 
The analytical framework presented a trade-off between reflexivity and 
responsiveness and outlined a conceptual distinction between two institutional 
forms that negotiate this trade-off in different ways. In ‘transmission’, the outcomes 
of participation are directly binding. It should therefore be expected that 
responsiveness is maximised at the cost of reflexivity. ‘Integration’ is a weaker link 
that entails no guarantees of policy action. Nevertheless, even in entirely 
consultative processes measures such as requiring the publication of a response can 
ensure a degree of responsiveness. Links to policy development in the SCA, as in 
most PDPs, were a form of integration. However, the SCA attempted to ensure a 
greater degree of responsiveness than that usually associated with consultation 
through the statutory duty placed on government to ‘try to reach agreement’ with 
the selector panel on which proposals to implement.  
 
One of the main obstacles which the SCA faced in achieving greater impact was the 
perception amongst policy makers that proposals impacted beyond the local 
contexts within which they were developed. It was to a great degree in anticipation 
of this problem that links to policy development were designed to be a form of 
‘transmission’. Those involved in the design of the SCA process were preoccupied 
with ensuring freedom of manoeuvre for the government in making decisions. As 
one minister put it, the SCA did not have a ‘privileged position’ in respect to the 
policy development processes it existed alongside (interview 21). Thus, the design of 
the SCA tended towards reflexivity.  However, there was a space for original 
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influence in those areas that proposals went with the grain of government policy, 
but added to it in some way. In such cases, a popular response was to instigate a 
further round of policy development, such as piloting implementation, initiating a 
policy review or formal consultation. Thus, the SCA did exert a recommendatory 
influence in some cases.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the try to reach an agreement process did engender a 
greater degree of responsiveness than would have been the case in its absence. This 
was often not in relation to the solutions advocated by proposals, but to the 
problems underpinning these. Respondents noted the importance of considering 
alternative options and of ‘helping’ councils meet the objectives informing 
proposals. This is a different kind of contribution to responsive governance than that 
achieved by the initiative. In the initiative ‘proposals’ are demands for specific policy 
measures, and responsiveness can be understood in terms of what Chambers (2012: 
67) calls the ‘input/output’ model: strong responsiveness means that policy output 
reflects opinion input’. However, in the SCA they can be understood as messages 
communicating problems, in response to which government mobilises resources at 
its disposal in ways deemed appropriate. This is an important contribution to 
responsive governance, that coheres with one of main reasons advanced by John 
Dewey (cited in Fung 2006: 68) for greater participation: that ‘the man 
who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the 
expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied’. 
 
However, the analysis points to a series of important problems with the process that 
overshadow these achievements. Each is covered in turn. First, since it would be 
highly impracticable, if not impossible, for government to ‘try to reach an 
agreement’ with all idea proposers, a role for the LGA ‘selector panel’ was created. 
The SCA thus tackled the problem of scale, inherent in connecting locally developed 
proposals to national policy processes, through the de-facto representation of 
process participants by local councillors staffing the selector panel. The selector 
acted as the de-jure representative of councils, and de-facto representative of civic 
participants, in the ‘try to reach agreement’ process. Its first task was to ‘filter’ the 
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proposals developed by councils, ostensibly to eliminate those that failed to meet 
the requirements of the Act. However, the analysis in chapter nine suggests that the 
selector developed additional criteria that was too sensitive to government concerns 
regarding ‘political realism’, or ‘viability and credibility’, and gave too little 
importance to the participation requirements underpinning proposals.  
 
Sensitivity to government concerns meant that the SCA was being shaped from the 
beginning to cohere with extant policy agendas, something that content analysis and 
interview evidence both suggest emerges as the main factor explaining integration. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the SCA in influencing policy agendas is generated 
through the processes of participation underpinning proposals. It is because they are 
developed through this participation that proposals can be said to reflect the 
priorities of local citizens. However, the selector panel accepted far too many 
proposals which had been developed through negligible attempts at constituting 
inclusive panels and reaching agreement with these. Compounded by the 
instrumentalisation of the process at local level in many cases, the analysis suggests, 
as noted in chapter nine, that although the SCA was designed as a PDP, it is in danger 
of being institutionalised as a ‘lobbying tool’ for local elites. 
 
Second, the integration of proposals within policy development became, to a great 
extent, hostage to those structures and processes which it was intended to 
influence. The process was blocked by the 2010 general election and, although the 
‘try to reach agreement’ duty did achieve a somewhat greater responsiveness than 
would have been the case in its absence, it hardly led to a substantial departure from 
established ways of working. Integration was, to a great degree, contingent on 
coherence with agendas being formed through traditional means. Although there 
were some spaces for original influence, the influence of extant agendas upon 
implementation of proposals meant that in some cases their implementation 
departed too far from their initial intentions. Moreover, proposals seem to have 
travelled badly across government departments. Inter-departmental communication 
was a slow and bureaucratic process and the SCA seems to have received a rather 
unenthusiastic reception, especially outside DCLG. Alongside the onset of the May 
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2010 election, this led to substantial delays in coordinating and articulating the 
government response. Unsurprisingly, process managers and civic participants 
expressed substantial frustration at these delays, at the low levels of feedback 
received and the low visibility of the integration process. 
 
Finally, for similar reasons to those summarised above, actors in the LW campaign 
were quite critical of the way in which integration was operationalised. However, 
their ambitions to increase scrutiny of the process and thus generate a greater 
degree of responsiveness were curtailed by a series of factors. In sum, low 
transparency and significant delays prevented Local Works from identifying 
important points at which to pressurise public authorities. Moreover, the centralised 
form of advocacy which LW carry out limited their ability to generate a more 
continuous and effective base of civil support for the process and, finally, the 
priorities of the LW organisation in ensuring maximisation of use came at the cost of 
scrutinising process quality, something which undermined the legitimacy of their 
advocacy activity. 
 
Thus, overall, integration in the SCA fared rather poorly in terms of striking a balance 
between reflexivity and responsiveness. The analysis has highlighted a series of areas 
where it is important to consider potential forms of improvement. There are a 
number of possibilities here, which will be considered throughout section 8.4, where 
reflections are offered on what can be learnt from the SCA regarding the prospects 
for democratising the policy process through PDPs. 
8.4 Discussion and Recommendations: Democratising Agenda Setting 
through PDPs  
 
Deliberative and participatory democratic theorists have argued that public policy 
agenda setting needs to be opened up to greater civic influence (Cohen 1997; Barber 
2003: 181; Parkinson 2006; Skelcher & Torfing 2010) and identified the need for 
institutional designs to be developed which move beyond the local (Parkinson 2006; 
Smith 2009b) and operate across governance levels (Gaventa 2004; Stoker 2006; 
Elstub 2013). The SCA is an interesting example of participatory governance because 
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it represents an attempt to fulfil these objectives. However, the analysis has shown 
that it came up against some important problems. In order to understand the 
implications of the analysis, it is important to separate those problems which are 
intrinsic to the attempt to democratise agenda setting through participatory 
governance from those that are specific to the SCA process. In this way it is possible 
to identify possible areas for improvement through institutional design. The 
following sub-section outlines the problems which this analysis suggests are intrinsic 
to participatory governance. The final three sub-sections then outline case-specific 
problems, considering possible reforms and alternative arrangements. 
 
8.4.1 Intrinsic Problems 
Many of the problems faced by the SCA arise from difficulties that are ‘intrinsic’ to 
the attempt to democratise the policy process through PDPs. The first problem 
intrinsic to participatory governance is characteristic of the attempt to 
institutionalise deliberation by small groups of citizens within the policy processes of 
large-scale polities (Parkinson 2006: 5-8): the viability for the subsets of citizens that 
usually participate in PDPs to make binding decisions decreases in proportion to the 
size of the constituency affected. As we have seen, the SCA attempted to tackle the 
problem of scale through a series of procedural layers operating at different levels 
that connected the results of local participation to central government policy 
making. At local level, processes were designed to enable citizens to define problems 
and develop policy proposals. At national level, actors from the LGA acted as 
intermediaries between local authorities and government, acting as de-facto 
representatives of process participants. Finally, binding decisions were ultimately 
made by actors in representative institutions. However, the analysis has highlighted 
some problems arising from the lack of mechanisms to ensure the selector panels’ 
accountability to process participants, its high sensitivity to government concerns 
when filtering proposals and concerns that proposals went beyond the scope of the 
local contexts within which they were developed.  
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Second, the analysis has pointed to a series of limitations which essentially arise 
from difficulties surrounding the accommodation of participatory democracy within 
representative institutions. The SCA originated as a relatively radical proposal by 
research and advocacy organisations seeking to promote decentralised and 
participatory governance. However, as the SCA proceeded through the political 
agenda, the dynamics of ‘issue expansion’ (Baumgartner & Jones 2009) characteristic 
of agenda setting in representative systems affected its development. Policy makers 
were keen to make it cohere with previous and on-going attempts at institutional 
reform. The end result was the setting up of a participatory process which ‘fit’ the 
dynamics of the system, or, as a Local Works campaigner put it, had been ‘watered 
down’.60 Once the process was implemented, institutional conflicts were also 
manifest in findings such as the instrumentalisation of the SCA by local authorities, 
the importance of coherence with extant policy agendas in the shaping of 
integration dynamics and the influence of electoral, policy development, and 
legislative cycles of representative institutions. 
 
These limitations point to the fact that participatory governance provides no 
panacea for the ills of liberal-democratic capitalism. However, there are grounds for 
measured optimism. There are areas where the SCA was successful as well as those 
where there are opportunities for improvement. Limitations of scale and 
institutional conflict are real and considerable, but they are not absolute. They are, 
to a degree, contingent on design. In the rest of this section three ‘case-specific’ 
areas where the design of the SCA exacerbated problems of scale and institutional 
conflict are considered, and reforms which might improve the process suggested. 
 
8.4.2 Rules and Regulations 
Analysing the citizen initiative in California and Switzerland, Smith (2009: 141) 
concludes that many problems have more to do with the regulatory framework 
embedding the initiative than anything intrinsic to the process itself. This is also true 
of the SCA: limitations which might be overcome through changes in rules and 
                                                     
60
 Personal conversation. 
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regulations were evident in both the development of proposals and their integration 
within policy development. Some of the major problems with the SCA process arose 
from (a) the permissive nature of the legislation, as well as (b) the nature of the 
‘rules’ (or lack thereof) governing interactions between local and national level 
actors. Each is considered in turn. 
 
i. Proposal Development and Selection Criteria 
The permissiveness of the SCA and associated regulations was especially problematic 
regarding the processes through which proposals should be developed. To be sure, 
there is a reason for the lack of prescription. Councils have different populations 
which face different issues and much of the value of the SCA is the provision of a 
channel to communicate this diversity to central policy development. Moreover it is 
questionable that much can be attained through more prescription. Local 
institutional cultures vary (Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 2006a), and, even with 
strict regulations, councils would likely implement the process in different ways. That 
being said, there is a need for more clearly defined minimum standards. The 
legislation, regulations and guidance documents provided some definitions, but 
essentially left it up to councils to decide whether requirements had been met. This 
led to many implementing the minimum necessary levels of engagement to get 
proposals through. In these cases the SCA failed to tap into the kinds of local 
knowledge which could enable a more original exploration of local problems, and 
was often dominated by local elites or instrumentalised as a ‘lobbying tool’ by local 
authorities. 
 
Regarding the regulations governing the integration of proposals within policy 
development, it is important to highlight that the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ 
did lead to a more intensive consideration of policy proposals, making an important 
contribution to responsiveness. However, the integration process was itself 
corrupted from the beginning by the low threshold in participation requirements 
underpinning the filtering role carried out by the selector panel. As a result, many 
proposals which were developed through dubious processes were accepted, 
damaging the strength of the claim which the SCA could make to influence policy 
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agendas. Thus, some minimum standards regarding inclusiveness of panels and their 
role within the proposal development process need to be established. These should 
be universally applicable, but flexible enough to allow response to local 
circumstance. If they are not met, then policy proposals should be discarded by the 
selector panel, or the equivalent body. 
 
The recommendations made in chapters seven and eight form an adequate basis 
here. To recap, on the question of ‘who participates’, chapter five concluded that 
ideas might be raised from local voluntary groups and LSP-led consultations, but, as 
long as local panels have the ability to reject or modify ideas raised previously (as 
argued below) so that idea proposers cannot control outcomes of panel 
deliberations through agenda setting, the origins of ideas is not a central concern: as 
a respondent from Local Works noted ‘good ideas can come from anywhere’ 
(Interview 42, Local Works Campaigner A). Regarding the constitution of local panels, 
councils should be required to demonstrate that a representative cross-section of 
the population was randomly selected. A requirement to meet standards of 
descriptive representativeness through some form of random sampling will increase 
the inclusiveness of the panel and reduce partisanship, but the advantages of full 
statistical representativeness need to be weighed against the requirements of 
discursive interaction. Overall, it would not be necessary or productive to adhere to 
full statistical representativeness. Instead, smaller panels might use quota sampling 
to reduce chances of unrepresentative panels. If certain groups are under-
represented following invitation, councils should be advised (as they currently are) 
to invite relevant spokespeople from voluntary groups. 
 
Regarding the form of collaboration in local panels and the role of panel participants 
in proposal development, the process in Sheffield offers a good model to follow. It 
enabled ideas to be co-produced in a process which mixed lay and professional 
knowledge and made the most concerted attempt to reach agreement with the 
panel. The SCA currently leaves it up to councils to decide whether attempts at 
agreement have been made, allowing councils essentially to consult participants on 
pre-determined proposals. In order to avoid this, the requirement to reach 
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agreement should be compounded with a requirement that the panel participate in 
the development of ideas into proposals. As noted above, ideas may initially come 
from a variety of sources but panels should operate reflexive agendas whereby new 
proposals can be raised or existing ones rejected or modified, allowing the panel to 
add value to their development.  
 
This permissiveness in terms of where ideas come from, a requirement that panels 
meet standards of descriptive representativeness, broadly defined, through random 
selection, plus the requirement that panels participate in the development of 
proposals, mixes the best aspects of the different approaches taken to 
implementation across the cases considered in chapters seven and eight. 
 
ii. Communication and Feedback Mechanisms 
One of the main problems with the SCA was that locally developed proposals could 
not be expected to lead to nationally applicable changes: an important degree of 
reflexivity was necessary in order for government to consider alternative, and 
perhaps more desirable, options. In this vein, proposals should be understood as 
messages communicating problems rather than demands for specific forms of 
action. As explained above, one of the achievements made by the operationalisation 
of the duty to ‘try to reach agreement’ was to engender a degree of responsiveness 
to the problems underpinning proposals, if not to the policy measures advocated by 
these. The analysis has suggested that the SCA’s contribution to responsive 
governance should be understood in terms of a deliberative, rather than a causal, 
relation between input and output (Chambers 2012). Thus, responsive governance is 
not achieved to the extent that outcomes ‘mirror’ proposals, but to the extent that 
they communicated problems to, and informed deliberation by, policy makers. This 
is an important contribution that coheres with the understanding of democracy as 
being characterised by the ‘flow of information between governors and the 
governed’ (Hirst 1994: 24, see also Coleman 2005).  
 
However, an important problem with the SCA is that information flowed upwards 
but not downwards. As explained in chapter seven, local participants complained at 
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lack of feedback, the low visibility of the SCA’s influence and the long delay in 
receiving a response. Research into civic attitudes towards participation has found 
that it is not necessarily impact that participants expect, but an indication that they 
are not ignored and thus that their participation is meaningful and worthwhile 
(Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker 2001, see also Coleman 2005). Lowndes, Pratchett 
and Stoker (2006: 289) have suggested that this can be provided by ensuring the 
provision of clear information and feedback regarding the role of participation within 
policy making. However, such mechanisms were lacking in the SCA process, leading 
to low perceived responsiveness and considerable disaffection by process 
participants and local process managers. Thus, rules governing the interactions 
between national and local actors should be established that create lines of 
communication between actors operating at different tiers of the process. This is 
especially important in the context of a deliberative understanding of 
responsiveness, where the influence of process outcomes upon policy can be very 
unclear. This is a key aspect of process design if PDPs are to succeed in bringing 
citizens into a closer ‘conversation’ (Coleman 2005) with representatives.  
8.4.3 Redesign: Are Local Authorities and Whitehall the Appropriate ‘home’ for the 
SCA? 
The SCA took a specific approach to developing proposals and integrating these 
within policy development: it relied on local councils to resource public engagement 
processes and upon central government to make binding decisions, through a 
process of collaboration / negotiation with other state actors acting as de-facto 
representatives of process participants (i.e. the selector panel). There are some 
problems with this approach. The first relates to the local limitation of the process, 
the second to the fact that decisions are made by central government, rather than 
some other body or process. Although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to provide 
a full account of possible alternatives, this section considers a few options for 
reforms that may improve the SCA. 
 
i. Proposal Development Processes 
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Local development of proposals is problematic because it often led to the 
development of policy proposals which were responsive to particular local contexts, 
but could affect other areas negatively if implemented nationally. In fact, as 
explained in chapter seven, one of the main frustrations articulated by policy makers 
responding to SCA proposals was the relatively large scope of many proposals. 
Moreover, relying on local authorities to sponsor proposal development also led to a 
quite a fragmented view of local problems. Three hundred proposals were 
developed by one hundred councils, placing substantial strain on the processing 
capacity of government departments (Interview 19; 21). Finally, relying on local 
authorities to resource proposals increased the potential for institutional conflict, 
since the priorities and motivations of local representative institutions using the SCA 
often conflicted with the purpose of, and sometimes ‘captured’, the process. If these 
problems are to be avoided, it is important to consider whether local councils are 
the appropriate agencies to resource engagement processes and sponsor policy 
proposals. 
 
Since most citizens’ lived experience of the political system occurs in local contexts 
(Yanow 2003) it is arguably correct that opportunities to define problems are 
focused on the locality. But this does not mean that local authorities are the 
appropriate agencies, or that boundaries of political authority are the appropriate 
constituencies. Proposals might be developed in other ways. For example, Coleman 
and Blumler’s (2009) call for the creation of a public agency responsible for 
managing an online process  ‘eliciting, gathering, and coordinating citizens'  
deliberations upon and reactions to problems faced and proposals issued by public 
bodies … which would then be expected to react formally to  whatever emerges 
from the public discussion’. This ‘Online Civic Commons’ (OCC) could randomly select 
citizens at national level and thus provide an improved basis upon which to avoid 
problems of exclusion. The agenda of the OCC could be opened up to submissions 
from citizens and civic associations and / or be ‘triggered’ by constitutional rules.  
 
Parkinson (2006: 170-172) proposes a similar function for a parliamentary 
committee. He argues such a body could be set up to receive proposals from civil 
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society and, according to publicly defined criteria, determine whether or not to set 
up a policy making sequence in response. The possibility of setting up a 
parliamentary committee to receive proposals is considered below, the relevant 
aspect of Parkinson’s discussion for current purposes is his suggestion that initial 
priorities could be set through the use of a process akin to the ‘21st Century Town 
Hall Meeting’, as developed by ‘AmericaSpeaks’ (see also Fung 2003)  is one of the 
few deliberative processes where an agenda is worked from the bottom-up. The 
‘AmericaSpeaks’ model has operated at local or regional levels, but this is not a 
necessity (e.g. Dryzek 2009). Similarly to Blumler and Coleman’s idea for an OCC, the 
use of information communication technology means that the process can involve 
thousands of people in real time interactions across multiple geographical sites 
(Napoli, Bingham and Nesbitt, 2006). A process operating across multiple local sites 
but with a single focus would enable a more synoptic view of local problems to take 
shape. The broader basis upon which proposals are developed would legitimise 
proposals that make larger scale demands. Although the ‘AmericaSpeaks’ model has 
mostly been used as a one-off event, it could be set up on an on-going basis. It could, 
even if it was limited to a number of proposals over a certain period, become a 
permanent feature of the UK’s institutional architecture. 
 
This proposition might be objected to on the grounds that more synoptic policy 
proposals would entail a loss of local nuance but this problem could be mitigated 
through a ‘two-track’ proposal raising processes. On one hand, higher profile and 
larger scale proposals, developing a more synoptic and coherent view of local 
problems around the country, might be developed though ‘AmericaSpeaks’ type 
processes. On the other hand, local councils might have opportunities to engage 
citizens on local problems which require relatively small degrees of change. These 
might seem menial in the broader view of things, but can be of great importance to 
those affected. Where proposals arise that make larger scale demands, they might 
be diverted to the co-ordinating agency of the larger scale branch of the process for 
consideration to feature on the agenda. 
 
ii. Incorporation in Policy Development 
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The SCA tackled the problem of scale, inherent in connecting locally developed 
proposals to national policy processes, through the representation of process 
participants by the selector panel. However, authorisation and accountability links 
between selector panel members and local participants are almost non-existent and 
the low threshold in participation requirements and sensitivity to government 
concerns when shortlisting proposals undermined the integration of process. It is 
important to consider alternatives to this set up. As noted above, when discussing 
options to open central government policy agendas up to civic input, Parkinson 
(2006 p. 169-71) suggests that a parliamentary committee might be set up to receive 
and review proposals from civil society and respond to these according to publicly 
defined criteria. This could be an option for the SCA: since the SCA was a process 
essentially designed to propose changes in legislation and policy it makes sense that 
it should be linked to the parliamentary select committee system.  
 
There is, however, some ground for scepticism on whether such arrangement would 
constitute an improvement. Various studies of legislative influence over policy 
making conclude that Britain’s legislative chamber’s powers are very weak and have 
declined in recent years (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Beetham et al 2003). 
Moreover, parliamentary committees in the UK are essentially reactive. Russel and 
Benton (2011) find that most committee recommendations respond to government 
initiatives, with just 1 in 10 being “agenda setting” in character. It is thus not clear 
how an agenda setting process like the SCA might relate to existing practice. There 
would have to be some broader reforms regarding the role of parliamentary 
committees in the policy process. 
 
In response to such doubts two arguments can be made. First, recent studies have 
suggested that parliament’s power is manifest in subtle and non-measurable ways 
such as through the “anticipated reactions” by policy makers to the proposals they 
make to the legislature (Russel and Benton 2009). Russel and Benton (2011) 
conclude that the influence of “anticipated reactions” is especially acute in 
parliamentary committees’ influence. Second, a recent study of democratic decline 
in Britain, Australia and New Zealand (Marsh and Miller 2012) identifies the 
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contemporary importance of parliamentary committees in the UK and concludes in 
favour of a radically reformed committee system. Although it is not possible to give 
detailed consideration in this paper, the authors propose committees that enjoy “a 
substantive role in the policy process (particularly at the emergent or strategic end 
of the process), supported by powers and procedures that sustain this role” (Marsh 
and Miller 2012. p. 311). This would require radical reforms to the role parliamentary 
committees play in the policy process, something which according to their analysis 
would go some way towards reversing democratic decline in the UK. Should such a 
reform agenda gain purchase, a participatory-deliberative agenda-setting process 
like the SCA might well feature alongside Marsh and Miller’s proposals. 
8.4.4 Generating Motivation: Countervailing Power and Deliberative Activism 
It is important finally to note that recommendations for changes in design are not 
sufficient to make the SCA process ‘work’ if the political will to follow through on the 
purpose of design is not present. In institutional design there is a big gap between 
the intentions of designers and outcomes (Goodin 1996). In the case of the SCA, this 
gap is evident in the instrumentalisation of the process by local councils and the 
subsuming of policy proposals within the processes it intended to influence. The 
generation of ‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 2003a) through civil society 
mobilisations has been found to be important in avoiding such problems in other 
PDPs (Abers 1998; Santos 1998: 502; Baiocchi 2001; Heller 2001). Similarly, one 
might argue that in the Swiss citizen initiative it is not a desire to be responsive that 
motivates government to engage in negotiations with initiators. It is the prospect of 
a referendum and the evidence of civic support underpinning the proposals that 
motivates public authorities to take the process seriously. However, the analysis has 
suggested that the SCA was lacking in mechanisms which motivated public 
authorities to implement the process in a fashion which met the ‘spirit’ of the 
legislation more closely. There are two areas to take into account in this respect, (a) 
the generation of ‘countervailing power’ and (b) the role of Local Works as 
‘deliberative activists’ (Fung 2005). 
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i. Countervailing Power 
Advocates of the SCA process in Local Works aimed to motivate public authorities to 
implement the SCA and follow through on the intentions of design. However, their 
efforts were considerably dampened by a series of factors. The first relates to 
limitations of the SCA process itself, including difficulties in scrutinising integration 
and sustaining civic interest arising from the lack of transparency in integration and 
the significant delays in forming a response. The second involve Local Works’ 
organisational structure and approach to campaigning. It is a lobbying group with a 
managerial (or ‘do for’ rather than ‘do with’, Skocpol 2003) culture vis-à-vis 
membership, relying on centrally co-ordinated advocacy and relatively thin and non-
committal support networks relative to those deemed fundamental in the capturing 
of state power through PDPs (Baiocchi 2001; Heller 2001). Thus, although it was very 
successful the promotion a specific policy such as the SCA, the campaign failed to 
generate a sufficient degree of ‘countervailing power’ (Fung and Wright 2003) that 
could ‘motivate’ public authorities to follow through on intentions of design. 
Changes to the process pointed to above, such as the establishment of clearer lines 
of communication between public authorities and participants might mitigate this 
issue. A harder problem to overcome will be the culture, resources and campaigning 
strategy of Local Works. 
 
ii. Local Works as Deliberative Activists 
Local Works played a key role in promoting the SCA process, scrutinising its 
implementation and promoting impact, which is equivalent to that which Fung 
(2005) refers to as ‘deliberative activism’. However, their approach diverted 
somewhat from what we might expect from such actors. Local Works’ prioritised 
maximising process use and impact.  The campaign understood this approach to be 
necessary in order to ensure a ‘demonstration effect’ (Abers 1998) and thus secure 
the future of the SCA process.  The problem is that the maximisation of use and 
impact came at the cost of focusing resources upon a closer scrutiny of the quality of 
the participation processes through which proposals were developed. It stands to 
reason that deliberative activism must be firstly preoccupied with ensuring the 
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quality of deliberative process, because it is the procedural legitimacy generated 
through with well-run PDPs that legitimises the use of non-deliberative means to 
promote results. When it promotes the outcomes of deliberation, strategic activity 
eschews association with narrow interests and can make a more robust and less 
dogmatic, even if necessarily imperfect, claim to be promoting the public good. Thus, 
one might argue that Local Works advocated for impact from an illegitimate 
position, because, at least in the first round, they were promoting proposals which 
had often been inappropriately developed. Arguably, greater focus upon ensuring 
process quality is necessary if the SCA’s claim to influence policy agendas is to be 
strengthened and Local Works’ strategies in maximising impact are to be legitimised. 
 
Local Works’ approach reveals an important tension regarding how deliberative 
activism might contribute to the development of a more deliberative system. That is, 
deliberative activism may need to be thought of differently when it is involved in 
promoting more continuous processes, such as the SCA, rather than one-off events. 
Dryzek’s (2010: 15) differentiation between ‘categorical’ and ‘systemic’ tests is 
pertinent here (see chapter 2). Local Works’ activism fares poorly in categorical 
terms, but is justifiable if it produces systemically positive results. Does taking the 
future of more continuous processes like the SCA into account justify prioritising use 
and impact over process quality? Institutions change, and if this ensures the 
development and survival of a worthy process, then one might answer in the 
affirmative. This is an important question that relates directly to the problem of 
pursuing change ‘from within’. The key issue is whether means will become ends: is 
it realistic to expect that putting off these objectives in the short term will ensure 
longer term success, or might it contribute to the subsuming of the SCA process 
within established ways of doing things?  
 
It is clearly counter-intuitive to argue that the SCA might contribute to deliberative 
institutional change when its key advocates compromise scrutinising the quality of 
participation process for the sake of maximising process use. However, this must 
remain an open question in the context of this analysis. One problem with analyses 
of institutional change is that whilst processes of change develop slowly and need 
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careful tracing, constraints are more immediately manifest (Hoppe 2011). That being 
said, the prioritisation of process quality by Local Works may deliver the beneficial 
long-term results that campaigners associated with maximising use and impact. 
Although it is not likely to fully overcome the constraints identified in the thesis, it is 
worth considering because, as Baccaro and Papadakis (2005: 46, citing Habermas, 
1996), explain, ‘discourse is itself a source of power, which can be used to 
counterbalance or even neutralise other sources of non-communicative power’ (see 
also Dryzek 1996: 107-115). Thus, quality participation processes might contribute to 
responsiveness by increasing the saliency attributed to proposals by policy makers. 
Perhaps more importantly, they may also do so by generating constituencies around 
salient local issues, leading to a more effective development of the kinds of 
countervailing power deemed lacking above. 
8.5 Closing Summary 
This thesis has sought to explore the prospects for democratising agenda setting by 
providing opportunities for citizens to define problems through PDPs and 
institutionalising links between process outcomes and the policy process. To this 
end, a theoretically informed empirical analysis of the SCA has been carried out. The 
SCA was selected for analysis due to its analytically relevant features. It differs from 
most PDPs for a combination of three reasons - (a) it was specifically designed to 
allow citizens to identify policy problems and influence policy agendas; (b) it 
operated across governance levels, connecting local participation to national policy 
development and (c) it institutionalised a link to the policy process. These are 
important objectives. Citizens have unique experiences of the political system and 
the effects of policy (Yanow 2003; Fischer 2009) but centralised policy making 
processes can be information poor and unresponsive to local circumstance (Scott 
1998). PDPs are valued for their potential to increase the responsiveness of political 
systems to the experiences and problems encountered by citizens (Fischer 2009; 
Hoppe 2010). A degree of centralisation is necessary for resource maximisation and 
the enablement of strategic action, but centralisation need not necessarily imply 
‘distance’. If the SCA succeeded in improving the flow of information between public 
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authorities and citizens it will have made a valuable contribution to democracy and 
responsive governance. 
 
This final section summarises the achievements made, and the obstacles faced, by 
the SCA as well as the implications and recommendations of the analysis. Two key 
achievements were made by the SCA process. First, implementation in a minority of 
local authorities is to be commended for developing proposals through reflexive 
agenda setting processes in relatively inclusive panels. These allowed panel 
participants to explore problems in the locality and add value to the development of 
policy proposals through deliberation. This marks an important departure from 
participation in other PDPs, where participation is subsequent to problem definition. 
In these cases, the SCA demonstrates that PDPs can make an important contribution 
to responsive governance by allowing citizens to identify and define policy problems 
and communicate these to central government. Second, despite some limitations 
(which will be outlined below) the analysis has found that the operationalisation of 
the ‘try to reach agreement’ (the process through which the SCA connected 
proposals to the policy process) contributed to the realisation of a deliberative, 
rather than a causal, form of responsive governance (Chambers 2012: 67), whereby 
responsiveness is achieved to the extent that inputs communicated problems to, and 
informed deliberation by, policy makers rather than the extent to which they ‘mirror’ 
outcomes. In this respect, the SCA suggests that agenda setting PDPs might 
contribute to the realisation of the normative model for a democratic division of 
labour proposed by scholars such as Dewey (2008: 264) and Christiano (2012: 33-34) 
whereby aims are defined by citizens and means by experts. 
 
However, these achievements are modest in relation to the problems faced by the 
SCA process.  These arise from ‘intrinsic’ obstacles of scale and institutional conflict 
that characterise attempts to integrate PDPs within representative democracy in 
large scale polities. First, the SCA tackled the problem of scale through the 
representation of process participants by state actors outside central government 
(the selector panel). However, authorisation and accountability links between 
representatives and local participants were very weak and the high level of 
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sensitivity on the part of the selector panel to government concerns regarding the 
‘viability’ of proposals further undermined the strength with which this body played 
this role. Moreover, problems of scale were evident in concerns by policy makers 
that locally developed proposals were often too wide in scope. In these cases, policy 
makers expressed reticence at the prospect of grating the SCA a ‘privileged’ position 
in policy making, reducing the impact of the process. 
 
Second, institutional conflicts were manifest in the influence which the priorities of 
local public authorities and partnership governance structures had over the SCA. In 
many cases, the opportunities offered by the process were limited to 
representatives from voluntary, public and private sector organisations featuring on 
council linked networks. In this respect, rather than a PDP, the SCA more closely 
resembled what Papadopulos (2012: 131-137) calls an ‘elitist-deliberative’ process. 
Moreover, a minority of councils offered very limited opportunities for citizens to 
influence policy proposals and essentially instrumentalised the process to advance 
party-based and / or devolutionary agendas. Importantly, the selector panel was 
quite permissive in this respect, often failing to eliminate proposals which were 
developed with minimal civic input. Due to a combination of these factors, the 
analysis has suggested that the SCA, although designed as a PDP, is in danger of 
being institutionalised as a ‘lobbying tool’ for public authorities and local elites. 
Finally, the integration of proposals became hostage to the policy development 
processes, as well as the electoral and legislative cycles of representative 
institutions. Indeed, one of the main factors shaping integration was coherence with 
extant policy agendas, placing an important question mark over the extent to which 
the SCA exerted an original influence upon policy. Ultimately, the SCA seems to have 
been, to an important degree, subsumed within the processes it was designed to 
influence and reform. 
 
However, ‘intrinsic’ limitations of scale and institutional conflict are not absolute. A 
series of areas where their manifestation is exacerbated, and might therefore also be 
mitigated, through institutional design has been highlighted and potential reforms 
subsequently proposed. First, there is a need for more clearly defined and strictly 
246 
 
 
 
enforced rules and regulations governing the processes used to develop proposals 
and to select these for government consideration. Second, the thesis has considered 
options for reforming the process, including designs which might legitimise the 
development of proposals that make larger scale demands, and mitigate institutional 
conflicts by setting up a decision sequence that does end ‘within’, but functions 
parallel to, representative institutions. Although it is beyond the scope of the thesis 
to provide a full account of alternative arrangements, the development of the SCA 
into the kind of institution sketched in section 8.4.3 would radically increase the 
availability of opportunities for citizens to influence political agendas.  
 
Finally, the analysis suggests that, as well as attention to institutional design, greater 
motivation for public authorities to follow through on the intentions of design needs 
to be generated. Most importantly in this regard, the thesis concludes that the Local 
Works campaign lacked the capacity to generate a base of more continuous civic 
support and interest in the SCA than that associated with the lobbying activity that 
contributed to the development of the original legislation. The resulting lack of 
‘countervailing power’ goes some way towards explaining some of the limitations 
faced by the SCA. Moreover, the focus of Local Works upon maximising process use 
and impact over quality did little to enhance the kind of procedural legitimacy that 
would have strengthened the claim of the SCA to influence policy agendas in a 
clearer, and more meaningful, fashion than consultation.  
 
Attention to these issues will be crucial if the SCA it to develop into an institution 
which makes a more substantial contribution to democratising the political system. 
Although the limitations of the process are not to be taken lightly, there is some 
ground for optimism.  I close with a remark made by one respondent: 
 
… I’m cynical but I’m also a die-hard romantic … The Act is saying we, 
the people, for the first time are driving through something in a 
political arena, to bring back community and sustainability together … 
That is going to plant itself like a little seed. Then it depends on how it 
is nurtured and pruned, so maybe, in 50 years’ time, the seed planted 
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now, the SCA, is just a tiny weeny seed right now, but what is it going 
to grow into?  
(Interview 5, Participant, Brighton & Hove). 
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Appendices 
Item 1: Example of Sheffield Proposal Form61 
 
 
 
 
The Sustainable Communities Act 
proposal form 
Using this form  
This form should be used to submit proposals under the Sustainable 
Communities Act to the LGA for short listing. Please complete all sections and 
then email a copy to selector@lga.gov.uk. These must be received by July 
31st 2009, and you will receive confirmation that the form has been received.  
Once submitted, information within this form may be made publicly available, 
unless you request for it to be kept private. We will treat information submitted 
sensitively. If you wish to attach any relevant presentations or graphs etc. 
please attach them separately in the email. 
For questions regarding the act or the role of the Selector, please see our 
FAQs. Any further questions can be directed to selector@lga.gov.uk.  
 
Section 1: Proposal Summary 
Proposing Authority 
Under the terms of the Sustainable Communities Act, all proposals must be 
submitted by a local authority, or group of authorities, in England. Any group, 
organisation or individual may originate or develop a proposal. However all 
proposals will require Local Authority endorsement and submission to the 
Selector.  
Parish councils and other organisations and agencies must seek support and 
formal endorsement from a proposing local authority (defined in the Act as 
county councils, district councils (including metropolitan, non-metropolitan and 
unitary authorities), the common council of the city of London or the Council of 
the Isles of Scilly).  
1.1 Lead Authority name 
Sheffield City Council 
1.2 Is this proposal submitted by this authority alone, or is it a joint 
proposal with other local authorities? (If joint please list authorities) 
Sheffield City Council alone 
1.3 Who is the lead contact (s) in the authority for this proposal? Please 
provide email address and telephone number - The LGA will direct any 
enquiries to this contact. 
                                                     
61
 For consultation requirements see especially sections 3.1 and 3.2 
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James Henderson, Interim Director of Policy and Research, Sheffield City 
Council, Tel: 0114 2039681 email: james.henderson@sheffield.gov.uk 
Supporting Organisations 
Whilst proposals may only be submitted by a local authority, we acknowledge 
that local partners and outside organisations may wish to register support for 
the proposal. This is entirely voluntary.  
1.4 Please provide details below of supporting organisations to your 
proposal. Please explain if the organisation is a charity, company, 
unincorporated association or other body.  If a charity or company please 
provide registration numbers.  If a local partnership please explains the 
relationship to the Local Strategic Partnership for the area.    
Sheffield First, the Local Strategic Partnership for Sheffield fully supports this 
proposal. 
Summary of your proposal 
Please summarise your proposal. You may wish to include: 
 The main elements of your proposal  
 What issues your proposal is addressing and how it will promote the 
sustainability of the local community  
 Who is affected by this proposal and how?  
 Which public bodies might be affected? 
 What are the main actions needed from Government? 
 What do you expect this proposal to achieve?  
 
1.5 Please enter your summary below (word limit 1000 words) 
There are around 650 asylum seekers (plus dependants) in Sheffield, who 
have fled persecution from a range of countries across the globe.   The 
current asylum system requires asylum seekers to claim asylum on entering 
the country – they are then dispersed to different towns and cities, including 
Sheffield, whilst their claim is being processed. 
Since mid-2002, asylum seekers have not been allowed to work whilst their 
claim is being processed, unless they have waited for more than 12 months, 
at which point they may make an application to work.  There is no 
presumption, even at this stage, that the application will be successful.  
Instead asylum seekers are reliant on cash support worth 70% of Income 
Support, which is paid by the United Kingdom Borders Agency (UKBA). 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that asylum seekers come to the UK 
as economic migrants, asylum seekers are often highly skilled and want to 
contribute to the city’s economy – for example there are 1100 medically 
qualified refugees (including over 300 asylum seekers) living in the United 
Kingdom, who would not have been allowed to practice whilst seeking 
asylum.  As a city we are not able to make full use of the skills and 
qualifications of asylum seekers living in Sheffield. 
Proposal 
The proposal of the Sheffield Sustainable Communities Panel is to allow 
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asylum seekers the right to work in the city once their application for 
asylum has been received and they have been dispersed to the city, and 
to retain this right if they are unsuccessful so long as they remain in the 
country for reasons outside their control are meeting any requirements 
to report to the authorities.  Asylum seekers who do not seek (or do not 
find) employment would still be eligible for the same support that is 
available at the moment.  The right to seek employment would be open 
to any asylum seeker aged 16 or over. 
 
For practical and ethical purposes this proposal is suggested to be 
implemented nationally, but those groups that would be most directly affected 
would be asylum seekers and employers.   
 
The main actions required by Government are to provide employment 
concessions to enable asylum seekers who have lodged an application for 
asylum to make an application for permission to be legally employed, and 
except in exceptional circumstances to exercise discretion to grant such 
permission until any appeal against a negative decision on any application for 
asylum has been finally determined and the decision to refuse asylum upheld. 
  
It is not anticipated that any public bodies would be directly affected by this 
proposal, apart from the United Kingdom Borders Agency, who would no 
longer have responsibility for administering Section 95 support for those 
asylum seekers who found employment.   
 
This proposal would help the Council to achieve our vision for Sheffield, as set 
out in ‘A City of Opportunity’.  In particular, the proposal will ensure that 
asylum seekers are treated fairly and can achieve their full potential, and will 
have a good quality of life.  It will also mean that asylum seeking children 
have the same opportunities as other children in the city, and will help people 
to get on well with one another and reduce community tensions. 
 
 
Section 2: About your proposal 
The form asks a set of questions to gather as much information as possible to 
allow for assessment and short-listing by the Selector. A word-limit is stated for 
each part of the form.  
We appreciate that SCA proposals will vary in range and scope, and some 
questions will be more relevant than others for any one proposal. Please do 
not feel that answers are required for every questions or that the full word limit 
need be used in respect of each and every question box.  If you are submitting 
a joint proposal, please include evidence for all areas.  
Impact on sustainability (word limit 2000 words) 
2.1 Please explain how your proposal promotes sustainability as defined 
locally (for example in your Sustainable Communities Strategy or LAA) 
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The Sheffield City Strategy, Sheffield’s Sustainable Community Strategy, has 
as one of its five Big Ambitions for the city the commitment that everyone 
should be able to fulfil their full potential through learning and enterprise, 
whilst Sheffield City Council’s vision is that Sheffield should be a city where 
everyone can achieve their full potential: this proposal would enable asylum 
seekers and failed asylum seekers to work towards achieving their full 
potential in a way that is not currently possible: through paid employment. 
This proposal would help to improve both the economic and social 
sustainability of Sheffield.  It will help to improve the city’s economic 
sustainability by utilising valuable skills that asylum seekers possess in a 
positive way for the city, and by helping to address the significant skills gap 
(particularly in higher level skills) that has been identified, reducing 
worklessness which is also a theme in the City Strategy.   
 
The City Strategy also has an ‘inclusive, healthy communities’ theme: 
enabling asylum seekers to improve their standard of living, raising them out 
of poverty, can only help to reduce health inequalities. Most asylum seekers in 
the UK live in poverty, experiencing poor health and hunger,62 with a recent 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation report, Still Destitute, finding that more than a 
third of refused asylum seekers have been destitute for longer than a year, 
with two thirds of these coming from countries with ongoing unrest that could 
be difficult to return to.  This is particularly profound for families with 
dependent children as a report produced by the children’s charity Barnardo’s 
in 2008 highlights: asylum seeker families with children receive less benefits, 
are not afforded the same guarantees in terms of appropriate accommodation 
as UK families and the children are likely to have to move schools repeatedly, 
interrupting their education and limiting their chance of success.63 Giving 
asylum seekers the ability to work would help pull them out of poverty, 
improving their income and as a consequence, their health.   
 
The proposal would also help to secure the city’s social sustainability.  It 
would help to end the perceived unfairness of the asylum system amongst 
local people, and would help to dispel the notion that asylum seekers were 
claiming support that had not been earned.  It would also have a positive 
effect on local communities by improving cohesion, making neighbourhoods 
more welcoming and tolerant places, and by integrating asylum seekers fully 
into the local community.   
 
The proposal is also in line with the city’s role and commitments as a City of 
Sanctuary.  The Council has endorsed the City of Sanctuary manifesto, which 
states that ‘we are working to make Sheffield a city that takes pride in the 
welcome it offers to people in need of safety, and that enables asylum 
seekers and refugees to contribute fully to the lives of our communities’.  This 
proposal will help us to achieve those commitments. 
                                                     
62
 Refugee Council and Oxfam, Poverty and Asylum in the UK, 2002 
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2.2 Over which geographic area will your proposal impact? (e.g. 
neighbourhood, town, city, sub-region)? 
This proposal would have a positive effect on the city as a whole.  Specifically, 
it would have a particularly pronounced effect on those parts of the city where 
asylum seekers are housed, currently asylum seekers are living in 21 of the 
28 wards of the city.  However in order to be workable, any changes in the 
rights of employment for asylum seekers would need to apply equally across 
the country. 
 
2.3 Who would benefit from your proposal?  
Asylum seekers would benefit from the proposal by being able to support 
themselves and contribute more fully to the life of the city. 
 
More generally, everybody living in Sheffield would benefit from this proposal 
as community tensions reduce and improvements occur the way in which 
people get on with one another.  Residents living in those parts of the city 
where asylum seekers are housed would particularly benefit from this 
proposal. 
 
Employers would also benefit from the proposal as they would have a wider 
pool of skills and qualified people to draw on, helping to address the skills gap 
that has been identified in the city. 
 
2.4 What steps will you take to mitigate any adverse affects on 
sustainability from your proposal (if relevant)? 
The key adverse effect on sustainability identified is that there may be a 
perception from existing residents that asylum seekers will take jobs that 
would otherwise have gone to local people.  This would be mitigated by 
ensuring that employers have transparent recruitment practices which are 
based on clear skills-based criteria.  We can also anticipate (principally from 
the evidence of migrants from A8 accession states) that asylum seekers 
would be likely to take up vacancies that have been unfilled for long periods of 
time because they are not attractive to the general population. 
 
It would also be necessary to ensure that legislation was drafted tightly to 
make it unappealing for economic migrants to attempt to gain entry using the 
asylum legislation.  
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2.5 What project, activities and changes would take place in your area if 
your proposal was successful?  
 
Because this proposal would change the rights of asylum seekers to seek 
employment, no specific projects or activities are planned.  However, we 
would work with Jobcentre Plus, advice centres, voluntary organisations and 
other statutory partners to ensure they were prepared for the impact of the 
change in advance of it coming into effect.  This might mean, for example, 
that we would work with advice centres to ensure that they were aware of the 
new rights to seek employment. 
 
We would also work with employers, through the Chamber of Commerce, to 
ensure that employers in the area were aware of the changes in the right to 
seek employment, and of the benefits that employing an asylum seeker could 
bring.  We would also use existing relationships (e.g. through the Refugee 
New Arrivals Project) with employers to ensure that asylum seekers were able 
to access employment opportunities in a fair and equitable way. 
 
2.6 Does your proposal involve transfers of responsibilities between 
public bodies in the area? If so what are these? What budgetary 
implications might be involved?  
This proposal does not involve transfers of responsibilities. 
 
Local authorities are required to ‘have regard’ to a set of specific issues when 
deciding whether to support SCA proposals. These are matters listed in 
Schedule 1 of the Act, as passed by Parliament64. It is worth noting that the 
issues listed in the Act are not supposed to be exhaustive and that ideas can 
cover anything that promotes the sustainability of the local area.  
Many of these matters may not be relevant to any one proposal. If you are 
submitting a joint proposal please include evidence for all areas.  
2.7 Please identify which, if any, of the issues authorities are required to 
have regard to, are relevant to this proposal and include any data and 
information which you feel would be helpful in the assessment process.  
a) the provision of local services 
b) the extent to which the volume and value of goods and services that are- 
i) offered for sale, ii) procured by public bodies, and are produced within 
30 miles (or any lesser distance as may be specified by a local authority 
in respect of its area) of their place of sale of the boundary of the public 
body. 
c) the rate of increase in the growth and marketing of organic forms of food 
production and the local economy 
                                                     
64
 The Sustainable Communities Act is available here : 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/ukpga_20070023_en_1 
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d) measures to promote reasonable access by all local people to a supply 
of food is adequate in terms of both amount and nutritional value 
e) the number of local jobs 
f) measures to conserve energy and increase the quantity of energy 
supplies which are produced from sustainable sources within a 30 mile 
radius of the region in which they are consumed 
g) measure taken to reduce the level of road traffic including, but not 
restricted to, local public transport provision, measures to promote 
walking and cycling and measures to decrease the amount of product 
miles 
h) the increase in social inclusion, including an increase in involvement in 
local democracy 
i) measures to increase mutual aid and other community projects 
j) measures designed to decrease emissions of greenhouse gases 
k) measures designed to increase community health and wellbeing 
l) planning policies which would assist with the purposes of this Act, 
including new arrangements for the provision of affordable housing 
m) measures to increase the use of local waste materials for the benefit of 
the community 
 
There are three specific issues set out in the Act, which this proposal will help 
to address: 
 
b) Measures to promote reasonable access by all local people to a 
supply of food that is adequate in terms of both amount and 
nutritional value 
 
This proposal will help to ensure that asylum seekers living in the 
community have access to an adequate supply of food.  The evidence 
under the current system is that many asylum seekers are forced to 
live in poverty without access to a suitable quantity of food, and 
Refugee Council research has indicated that many asylum seekers 
consequently suffer from malnutrition.  This proposal would give 
asylum seekers a means to support themselves more adequately 
whilst waiting for a decision on their application. 
 
The proposal will also have a positive beneficial effect on the children 
of asylum seekers who are also often forced to live in poverty because 
of the low financial level of Section 95 support provided to asylum 
seekers. 
 
h) The increase in social inclusion, including an increase in 
involvement in local democracy 
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This proposal will help to improve social inclusion by reducing 
community tensions and by giving asylum seekers the means to 
contribute to their local community.  This will lead to better integration 
and more tolerance of different groups of people within Sheffield. 
 
k) Measures to increase community health and wellbeing 
 
Giving asylum seekers the right to seek paid employment will also help 
to increase community health and wellbeing.  Employment has been 
shown to be a key contributor to good health and wellbeing, with 
mental health conditions such as stress and depression associated 
with not being in work.  This is especially the case with asylum seekers 
who may have fled war, conflict and human rights violations to come to 
this country. 
 
 
Existing Barriers  
(Please do not write more than 1000 words for 2.8 and 2.9) 
2.8 What are the existing barriers to implementing your proposal? 
The only barriers to this proposal are legislative – councils have no discretion 
to alter the right to seek employment as this is a national issue.  It is therefore 
within the power of Government to put this proposal into practice. 
 
2.9 What actions are needed by Government to make your proposal 
possible? 
The Government could amend Rules laid before Parliament under section 
3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 with regard to the practice to be followed in 
the administration of the Immigration Acts for regulating entry into and the 
stay of persons in the United Kingdom and/or introduce or amend or revoke 
such other legislation as it considers may be required to minimise the 
employment restrictions and achieve the outcome. 
Currently the right to request permission to take up employment states: 
360 An asylum applicant may apply to the Secretary of State for permission to take up 
employment which shall not include permission to become self employed or to engage in a 
business or professional activity if a decision at first instance has not been taken on the 
applicant's asylum application within one year of the date on which it was recorded. The 
Secretary of State shall only consider such an application if, in his opinion, any delay in 
reaching a decision at first instance cannot be attributed to the applicant. 
360A If an asylum applicant is granted permission to take up employment under rule 360 this 
shall only be until such time as his asylum application has been finally determined. 
The Government could relax the provisions to allow for an application to be 
made within a much shorter time frame or immediately after lodging an 
application for asylum and to continue until any appeal against a negative 
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decision on any application for asylum has been finally determined and the 
decision to refuse asylum upheld.  The ‘Let them work’ campaign is an 
existing and widely supported campaign headed by the Refugee Council 
which argues that asylum seekers should be allowed to work once their claim 
has been lodged for six months and for unsuccessful asylum seekers to be 
allowed to continue working if they are unable to return home immediately 
through no fault of their own, and are complying with instructions to report to 
authorities. 
 
Part 3: Local Authority Endorsement 
This section should be completed by the proposing local authority. (Under the terms 
of the act this means a county council in England, a district council (including 
metropolitan, non metropolitan and unitary authorities), a London borough council, 
the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the isles of Scilly) 
3.1 Have consultation requirements been met? (500 words max)  
Please confirm that your authority has met the statutory requirements for 
consultation on this proposal, via one or more panels of local representatives 
and persons from under-represented groups constituted in accordance with 
the Act and statutory guidance as set out in Strong Safe and Prosperous 
Communities. 
You may wish to describe who has been involved in discussions and 
development of the proposal (e.g. council, local community organisations and 
residents groups, parish or town councils, local partnership bodies, local or 
national organisations, political parties, church and faith organisations, local 
businesses or chambers of commerce and others.  
If you have not done so already please give brief details of relevant panel 
meetings.  
Please note if you are submitting a joint application please provide details of 
consultation and local support across all areas.  
This proposal has been discussed by the Sheffield Sustainable Communities 
Panel at its meetings on 19th March 2009 and 20th April 2009, was the fourth 
most popular of ten previously agreed proposals at a vote at the meeting on 
21st May 2009 and was officially agreed by the Panel on 11th June 2009.  
The Panel is comprised of 36 members of the community who have been 
appointed by Sheffield City Council. In accordance with statutory guidance, 
the Panel has been chosen with the intention of being representative of a 
wide range of those living and working in Sheffield including black and 
minority ethnic people, disabled people, young people, older people, 
employed people and unemployed people. In the majority of cases Panel 
members are appointed to act in their own capacity rather than as 
representatives of any particular group, although officers of the Federation of 
Small Businesses, the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce and Voluntary Action 
Sheffield were invited to attend in their official capacity.  
During discussions, strong support was given to the economic and moral 
arguments for changing the rules on asylum to allow asylum seekers to take 
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up paid employment and make a contribution to the communities in which 
they live. 
3.2 What are the views from this consultation? You may wish to provide 
evidence of local support for your proposal? This might include petitions 
or letters of support from the public, local councillors, Members of Parliament, 
businesses, public bodies and agencies?  Please describe this evidence 
below. (The local authority submitting the proposal is likely to wish to review 
such material and to summarise its content.  Onward submission to the 
Selector of all original documentation will not normally be required). 
In discussion, the Panel agreed that the current rules were not morally 
defensible; did not support the city’s aspirations as a City of Sanctuary; and 
did not help to achieve community cohesion.  In fact the Panel held the view 
that the current rules may contribute to community tensions, and therefore act 
as a problem and challenge to the continued wellbeing and sustainability of 
Sheffield.  
In particular, the Panel were concerned that denying asylum seekers the right 
to work meant that they could not integrate effectively with the host 
community, and that there may be longer-term effects in terms of de-skilling 
which would have a negative impact on the individuals and on the city if 
asylum seekers are granted refugee status.  The Panel were also concerned 
that the city was missing out on utilising the valuable skills that many asylum 
seekers possess.  
The Sheffield Refugee Forum has fully endorsed the proposal on 9th June 
2009. The Sheffield Refugee Forum is a multi-agency group including 
representatives from South Yorkshire Police, Voluntary Action Sheffield, 
Northern Refugee Council, Places for People, Refugee New Arrivals Project, 
Refugee Support, Community Training Services, Voluntary Action Sheffield 
and other local organisations. The proposal also has the support of Sheffield’s 
Youth Council. 
 
Proposals may include a change/transfer of functions from one person to 
another. If this is relevant to your proposal please confirm that the duties 
under clause 2, subsection 3 of the act (consulting with organisations affected 
by a change in location of a function) have been carried out.  
3.3 Please give brief details of consultation with any affected 
organisations 
No bodies are affected in terms of having powers or budgets transferred, and 
therefore there is no requirement to carry out consultation under the terms of 
the Act.  The UKBA, as the administering body for asylum seeker support, 
have been consulted on the proposal by letter but no response has been 
received. 
 
3.4 Confirmation of council support 
The process for formal endorsement is a matter for local discretion; however 
we anticipate that authorities will wish to gain political endorsement and 
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clearance for the proposal through the relevant processes at local level. 
Please give details of how formal approval has been attained.  
 
This proposal has been endorsed by Sheffield City Council Cabinet on 22nd 
July 2009 and has been taken to Full Council for information on 29th July 
2009. 
3.5 General comments 
This is an opportunity for the local authority to express any additional 
comments or views on the proposal: This may include: (1500 words max) 
- the council’s view of levels of local support for the proposal 
- any local opposition or objections that the Selector should be aware of 
- relevance of the proposal to the area’s Sustainable Community Strategy and 
Local Area Agreement 
- outcome of any local authority discussions with agencies or public bodies 
affected 
- potential regional/national significance of the proposal, if replicated 
elsewhere 
- any major resource implications for the council or its local partners 
- any other factors influencing viability and achievability of the proposal 
It is proposed that if this proposal is successful it should be implemented 
nationally. This is because the nature of the change being proposed could not 
equitably or practically be implemented on a local basis. We believe that the 
case nationally is as strong as that for Sheffield and this is a view which is 
shared by many: there is a national Let them work campaign organised by the 
Refugee Council which is almost identical to this proposal and is supported by 
a number of MPs, religious leaders and major organisations and charities 
including the Trades Union Congress, Barnardos and the Immigration 
Advisory Service. 
Support for the proposal within organisations working with refugees and 
asylum seekers in Sheffield is strong. 
There are no major resource implications arising from this proposal. 
Sheffield in 2007 became the UK’s first City of Sanctuary after the City of 
Sanctuary movement began in Sheffield in 2005. Sheffield, along with other 
towns and cities with City of Sanctuary Status are proud to be places of 
safety, and which include people seeking sanctuary fully in the life of their 
communities. Sheffield City Council believes that to be fully included in the life 
of their communities, and to contribute to their communities, asylum seekers 
need the right to work. 
 
Part 4: Assessment by the Selector 
SCA proposals will be assessed by the LGA as Selector. This will include 
consideration, short listing and negotiation with the Secretary of State via the 
LGA Selector panel made up of councillors from the four parties represented 
on the LGA   
The LGA Selector Panel is committed to undertaking the role in a transparent 
manner; as such reasons for decisions on proposals will be made available.  
There will be no appeals process in relation to decisions of the Selector 
Panel.   
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4.1 Do you confirm your agreement to abide by the outcome of the 
Selector’s assessment and decision-making processes? 
 
Sheffield City Council will abide by the outcome of the Selector’s assessment 
and decision-making process. 
 
4.2 Would your council, accompanied by the originators of the proposal, 
wish to make a short verbal presentation to the Selector Panel, should 
this opportunity be available?  
 
Yes. 
Thank you for completing this form.  
Please email it to selector@lga.gov.uk by 31 July 2009.  
Item 2: Coding Dictionary for Content Analysis of Response Document  
 
Code 1 -  ‘Council’ 
Council sponsoring proposal. 
Code 2 – ‘Action Relation to Request’ 
Actions are split into four categories determined by their relationship to the request 
– action inspired by request, action in spite of request, past action and no action.  
(1) Action inspired by request 
Response document indicates that the request is the cause of government 
action.  
 
 
 
 
(2) Action in spite of request 
No indication that action committed to is caused by request, or response 
points to policy already implemented or in development which tackles 
request. 
 
 
 
 
 (3) No action:  
No response, or no actions future actions relating to request, or actions since 
proposal deadline, specified -  request de facto rejected.  
 
 
 
Code 3 – ‘Action Type’ 
(1) ‘Direct action’ or New Legislation 
Commitment to implement changes directly or to pass fresh legislation / 
changes already implemented legislation already passed / in development.  
  
Example 
Proposal Summary: Prohibit restrictive covenants that prevent any future use of a property as a 'local 
service' as defined by the Sustainable Communities Act.  
 
Response Summary: We recognise that restrictive covenants can have a large impact on local 
communities. Therefore the Government has agreed to look into the issues raised by Darlington [and 
will] undertake a public consultation on the issue of covenants. 
 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Government transfer a proportion (£50,000) of the Low Carbon Buildings Programme 
funding direct to Brighton & Hove City Council. 
 
Response Summary: The Low Carbon Buildings Programme ended in 2010. It has been replaced by a 
scheme of feed-in tariffs for small scale renewable and low carbon electricity, in a scheme which started 
in April 2010. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Repeal the ‘Right to Buy’ 
 
Response Summary: The Government supports the principle of Right to Buy … There are no plans to 
reduce the right of eligible tenants to purchase their home under the Right to Buy scheme. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Amend Planning Policy Statement 3: Housing (PPS3) to exclude gardens from the 
definition of brownfield land. 
 
Response Summary: The Government has taken decisive action to implement Chorley’s proposal and 
has amended PPS3 to remove gardens from the classification of 'previously developed land'. 
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(2) ‘Consultation’ 
 Request considered as part of / linked to a consultation process, policy 
review or pilot project. 
 
 
 
 
(3) ‘Deliberate’ 
Indication that government will continue considering the request, without 
committing to 1, 2 or 4. 
 
 
 
 
 (4) ‘Invite Council’ 
 Invitation made for the council to collaborate with government in solving 
request, offer to advise council on how to solve problem underpinning request or to 
participate in some activity with a view to implementing the request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5) ‘No Action’ 
 No forthcoming action specified (No response specified, request either 
nullified by past action or request rejected). 
 
 
 
 
Code 3 – ‘Response Rationale’ 
In the response document a rationale was provided in support of the decision.  
 (1) Government Learns:  
Response states that proposal has communicated an original issue and / or the is 
reason for action. 
 
 
  
 
 
(2) Same / Similar Aim/Act: 
Excluding minutiae, the government points to plans to implement, or has already 
implemented,  the same or a similar policy. In these cases, developments in the 
Example 
Proposal Summary: That Sheffield City Council should be given responsibility for maintaining and 
sustaining the local Post Office network in our local area. 
 
Response Summary: The Government will examine whether it is possible to implement the proposal to 
give them [councils] more involvement in the future development of the Post Office network in light of 
the results of the pilot scheme being run with Sheffield. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Remove the exemption criteria contained within The Housing Order 2006 for all 
dwellings that have been empty, unfurnished and un-maintained for more than five years. 
 
Response Summary: Ministers are currently looking at the nature of the problem, and the civil liberty 
implications, and potential solutions including the operation of interim empty dwelling management 
orders. 
 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Change the statutory guidance to allow local authorities to employ single teams of 
wardens capable of dealing with all civil enforcement issues. 
 
Response Summary: The Government recognises the difficulties faced, especially by smaller districts, 
in trying to implement entirely separate law enforcement regimes efficiently. We will work with 
Kettering to address the issues they have raised. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Provide the council with the power to ban plastic bags 
 
Response Summary: Our policy on carrier bags is based on a voluntary approach and this approach 
has been effective so far. Banning solely plastic bags is also likely to run counter to the EU Packaging 
Directive. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Allow the council to retain a proportion of revenue generated via non-domestic 
rates. 
 
Response Summary: The Government has noted the number of proposals which ask for a proportion 
of business rates to be retained locally, and we have considered the proposals as work on 
decentralisation and the Spending Review has progressed. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: City of York council should be able to keep all of its council housing rental income. 
 
Response Summary: On 5 October the Minister for Housing announced that the Government will replace 
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policy process since the proposal was made have resulted in the government 
developing or implementing policy which acts along the same lines as request. 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) ‘Keep on Radar’ 
In these cases government indicates it is in the process of finding solutions for the 
issue raised by the ‘request’ (E.G. waiting for results of consultation, pilot project, 
policy review etc) and will consider the proposal as part of this. 
 
 
 
(4) ‘Alternative or Different Act’ 
Response states that LA can use existing powers to act upon request differently or 
act upon part of the problem raised in the proposal with no need for government 
action. Or, the government has acted or plans to act in a different way, thus 
nullifying the request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) ‘No Need’ 
The government expresses that the proposing authority is already fully empowered 
(excluding minutiae) to implement the proposal, there is thus no need to undertake 
action specified in request. 
 
 
 
 
(6) ‘Higher Law’ 
Government prevented from acting by ‘higher law’: such as EU law, existing 
legislation, departmental prerogative (e.g. tax questions need to be handled by 
chancellor). 
 
 
 
(7) ‘No Money’ 
Request considered financially unviable or too costly. 
 
 
 
 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Make recycling of waste a condition of a trading area 
 
Response Summary: The Governent is reviewing all its waste policies and will consider the proposals 
from the councils above as part of that. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Legislate to give Councils a duty to transfer any inefficiently utilised asset 
 
Response Summary: The Government does not wish to impose a duty in the precise way that South Hams 
suggest, as we believe it would unacceptably restrict the freedom of local authorities to manage their 
assets strategically. However we will be making it easier, through the Localism Bill, for communities to bid 
to take over assets, and will instead place a duty on local authorities to list Assets of Community Value …  
The Localism Bill … will set out the broad framework for introducing the Community Right to Buy scheme 
referred to above. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Change the Allotment Act to enable the sale of grown produce to allow holders to 
sell their surplus product to local shops. 
 
Response Summary: A change in the law is not required as there is no legal restriction on allotment 
holders selling genuine surplus product to local shops, but we would be happy to discuss this further 
with Brighton. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Amend legislation which restricts the freedom of the council to require its 
contractors to pay the London Living Wage. 
 
Response Summary: The Government is unable to implement this proposal as it would not comply with 
European Union law. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Introduce a universal concessionary pass for young people implemented across the 
country, enabling unrestricted movement for young people. 
 
Response Summary: An England-wide young people's pass would be very expensive and unaffordable 
in the current climate where the Government's priority is to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
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(8) Government Unconvinced 
Response states request provides poor course of action due to foreseen negative 
external effects; impracticality; or failure to improve upon existing arrangements. 
 
 
 
 
 
(9) Principle 
The government objects to the principles informing the proposal or the definition of 
the problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) No Rationale. 
No Government Rationale Given. In some cases (especially where a response is given 
to a group of proposals) there is not direct response to policy requests. 
 
 
 
(11) Other /Non-codeable. 
The response does not fall into any of the categories above. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Allow asylum seekers the right to work in the city once their application for asylum 
has been received. 
 
Response Summary: The Government’s priority is to ensure that those who apply for asylum have their 
applications processed as quickly as possible. Giving asylum seekers permission to work would be likely 
to encourage asylum applications from those without a well-founded fear of persecution, thus slowing 
down the processi g of applicati ns made by genuine refugees. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Amend the Local Government and Housing Act to support the employment of 
young people and people with learning difficulties, specifically within local authorities 
 
Response Summary: The Government believes it is right that local authorities should employ people 
based on merit, and we do not wish to change this fundamental principle of local government 
employment policy. 
Example 
Proposal Summary: Government should make it mandatory for utility companies to publish or make 
available aggregate figures for utility usage on a community basis. 
 
Response Summary: The Government does not want to impose this requirement on private companies. 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) already publishes gas and electricity usage on an 
annual basis for local authorities and below this for middle layer super output areas/intermediate 
geography zones. 
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Item 3: SCA Regulations 
 
This appendix section defines the key regulations in the SCA legislation and guidance 
documents.  
 Policy Proposals 
Regarding the nature of appropriate proposals, the legislation and associated 
regulations require firstly that they should be demonstrably likely to improve the 
economic, social or environmental ‘well-being’ of the local area. Proposals would 
thus benefit from presenting evidence in support of the nature of the problem being 
defined and the solution proposed. Secondly, proposals should specify the nature of 
action to be taken by government, such as a change in legislation, a transfer of 
responsibilities from one body to another, a new national policy or a change or 
strengthening of policy, to facilitate implementation of the proposal. Thus, policies 
which could be implemented by councils under existing powers would not be 
appropriate for the SCA.  
 Representatives of Local Persons 
‘Local person’ is defined in the SCA as ‘a person who is likely to be affected by, or 
interested in, the proposal’ (SCA, 2007: 3). The statutory guidance expands upon 
this definition noting that panels should be made up of ‘a balanced selection of 
the individuals, groups or organisations the authority considers likely to be 
affected by, or have an interest in the proposal’ (DCLG 2008: 8). This is not strictly 
a geographically bounded or locality-based definition, and is analogous the principle 
of including all affected interests (Goodin 2007), common to deliberative democratic 
theory. To this end, government advice regarding the constitution of local panels in 
the statutory guidance to a 2006 White Paper (DCLG 2006) was to ‘identify 
communities of interest in their area and ensure that people who are broadly 
representative of these groups are invited to join the panel’ (DCLG 2008a: 42). 
 Under-Represented Groups 
The regulations defined ‘under-represented groups’ as ‘those groups of local persons 
who in the opinion of a local authority are under-represented in civic and political 
activity in the authority’s area’ (SI 2008 No. 2694). Thus the legislation is relatively 
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non prescriptive, leaving it to the councils to establish their own criteria to 
determine if this commitment has been met. This non-prescriptive guidance was 
reiterated within the 2008 ‘Communities in Control’ White Paper (DCLG 2008a). 
However, the White Paper did recommend that councils should ‘identify 
communities of interest in their area and ensure that people who are broadly 
representative of these groups are invited to join the panel’ as well as ‘work with 
council colleagues, third sector representative groups and other  agencies providing 
services to individuals and groups to take a view on which  communities of interest 
may be underrepresented in civic and political activity, in particular those who are 
hardest to reach, and invite people who are representative of these communities to 
join the panel’. Finally, the statutory guidance document further recommended that 
third sector organisations are especially well placed to act as advocates for 
marginalised groups and may provide ‘relevant expertise and knowledge that might 
help the authority reach out to marginalised and vulnerable groups’ (DCLG 2008a: 
24).  
  ‘Try to Reach Agreement’ 
Hazel Blears, the then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, 
defined ‘try to reach an agreement’ as a ‘decision by a dialogue where you say ‘I can 
do this and I can’t do that’ and then have a dialogue about the final decision to be 
taken together.’65 However, the Act does not specify how this might be 
operationalised. Indeed, the guidance makes it clear that councils might take 
different approaches, ‘because circumstances vary between each area and local 
authorities are best placed to determine how to engage local people.’ (DCLG 2008a: 
55). Moreover, little specification is given of the kinds of processes through which 
agreement might be reached at national level. The guidance refers to ‘trying to reach 
agreement’ at national level as ‘co-operation’ between the selector and the 
government, and makes it clear that ‘although the Secretary of State and the 
selector must try to reach agreement, the final decision on whether or not to 
implement any proposal rests with the Secretary of State’ (DCLG 2008: 7). The 
legislation also placed a requirement on the government to publish a document 
                                                     
65
 Speech at a Local Government Association conference, October 2008. 
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outlining decisions, giving reasons for each decision and proposing a plan of action to 
implement accepted proposals (see DCLG 2010), and also provide a yearly report to 
parliament on the progress being made on actions plans. 
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Abbreviations  
 
BCCA– British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly 
DCLG– Department for Communities and Local Government 
LSP– Local Strategic Partnership 
NEF– New Economics Foundation 
PBPA– Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre 
PDP(s)– Participatory Deliberative Process(es) 
PEP(s)– Public Engagement Practitioner(s) 
SCA– Sustainable Communities Act 
SCB– Sustainable Communities Bill 
SCS(s)– Sustainable Community Strategie(s) 
SoS– Secretary of State 
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List of Interviews 
 
(1) Process Manager, Bath & NES, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(2) Process Participant, Bath & NES, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(3) Process Manager, Bexley, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(4) Local Councillor, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(5) Process Participant, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(6) Process Participant, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(7) Process Participant, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(8) Process Participant, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(9) Process Manager, Brighton and Hove, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(10) Process Manager, Bristol, (First Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(11) Process Manager, Bristol, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(12) Process Manager, Bristol, (Second Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(13) Process Participant, Bristol, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(14) Local Councillor, Bristol, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(15) Process Participant, Cambridge, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(16) Process Participant, Cambridge, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(17) Process Participant, Cambridge, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(18) Process Manager, Cambridge, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(19) DCLG Civil Servant, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(20) DCLG Minister, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(21) DCLG Minister, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(22) Process Manager, Doncaster, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(23) Process Manager, East Lindsey, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(24) DLCG Minister, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(25) Process Manager, Wirral, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(26) Process Manager, Herefordshire, (First Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(27) Process Manager, Herefordshire, (Second Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(28) Process Manager, Kent, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(29) Senior Council Officer, Kettering, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(30) Process Manager, Kingston Upon Thames, (Personal Interview, Adrian  Bua) 
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(31) Process Participant, Lewes, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(32) Local Councillor, Lewes, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(33) Process Manager, Lewes, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(34) Process Manager, Lewisham, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(35) Process Participant, Lewisham, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(36) Process Managers, Lewisham, (Personal Double Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(37) LGA Panel Support Officer, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(38) LGA Panel Support Officer, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(39) Liberal Democrat, Member of Parliament, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(40) Local Works Campaigner, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(41) Local Works Coalition Member, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(42) Local Works Campaigners, (Double Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(43) Process Manager, North Yorkshire, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(44) Selector Panel Member, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(45) Selector Panel Member, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(46) Selector Panel Member, (Personal Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(47) Selector Panel Member, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(48) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(49) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(50) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(51) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(52) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(53) Process Manager, Sheffield, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(54) Process Managers, Sheffield, (Personal Double Interview, Local Works) 
(55) Process Participant, Sheffield, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(56) Local Councillor, Sheffield, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(57) Local Councillor, South Hams, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(58) Process Participant, South Hams, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(59) Process Manager, South Hams, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(60) Process Manager, South Hams, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(61) Process Manager, South Somerset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(62) Process Manager, Stockton, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
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(63) Process Manager, Torridge, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(64) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(65) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(66) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(67) Local Councillor, West Dorset, (Personal Interview, Local Works) 
(68) Process Manager, West Dorset, (First Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(69) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(70) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(71) Process Participant, West Dorset, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(72) Process Manager, West Dorset (Second Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(73) Process Participant, Wiltshire, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(74) Process Participant, Wiltshire, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
(75) Process Manager, Wiltshire, (Telephone Interview, Adrian Bua) 
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